ON THE TRACK

Introduction
Kashmir named as Kashyap-Mar or Kashyap-Pura and also implies a land desicated from water: "ka" (the water ) and Shimeera (to desicate). The ancient Greeks called it "Kasperia" and the Chinese pilgrim Hien-Tsang ,who visited the valley in 7th century called it KaShi-Mi-Lo ". In modern times the people of Kashmir have shortened it into "Kasheer" in the language of natives .Major Linguistic groups are Kashmiri ,Dogri ,Gujari , Pahari,Ladakhi,Punjabi ,Lahanda (Pothwari), Urdu , Balti,Shina (Dardi ; spoken chiefly in Gilgit and Gurez area),Tibetan, Burushaski(mainly spoken in Hunza, Nagar and Yasin) (Kishtwari, Siraji, Rambani, Poguli, Banjwahi which are included with Kashmiri ) ,Hindustani(Urdu and Hindi). Kashmir valley , surrounded by the mountain range is inhabited as long as 4000B.C .Crafts and handworks like Carpets, Shawls, Paper Machie , Wood Carving, Stone Carving , Namda Work, Chain Switch , Embroidery (Crewel Work) ,Needle Work(Sozni) and Gabba making , and most important is literature and poetry— attracted the world attention . So far as the definition of ‘Kashmir’ itself, which can be a source of confusion since ’Kashmir’ is a term that describes both a region as well as the Valley of Kashmir.
The region of Kashmir is generally used to denote the borders of the princely state of Kashmir which, since the partition of the Indian sub-continent, now spans three countries, India, Pakistan and China. Kashmir as a greater term comprises several sub-regions, each with varying and different cultures. This child of the mighty Himalayas receives in abundance the paternal grace in the form of captivating scenic beauty, lush green pastures, meadows and condescending gleaming snow covered mountain peaks which capture the changing tinges of the bright sun, in so many ways the perennial murmuring rivers and rivulets ,and the vast lakes give it a peculiar character to the nature lovers. In its valleys and paddocks , grow the trees and herbs of rare quality , including the most precious of all flowers - the Kesar (Saffron). In its forests are found the best pines , deodars and atypical species of animals including world famous Hangul . From its orchards come apples, apricots, pears, walnuts and cherries of world standard. On her green meadows graze the lambs bearing the most superb wool , spun into fine textiles . Wular Lake (Asia’s biggest fresh water lake), Dal lake with house boats, Gulmarg ,Pahalgam and their glaciers besides other tourist places like Nishat, Shalimar, Harvan, Chasma Shahi, Achabal, Kokernag ,Aharbal have given it an international fame as a tourist spot , moreover some new places which include Kongwatan, Kousarnag, Nagputin, Chatapal, Chohurnag, Yousmarg are emerging tourist destinations although visited only by locals .
Kashmir is the only region in the subcontinent which has a continuous recorded history and which dates back to 4000 B.C. Twenty-one dynasties of Hindus, Buddhists,Kushans ,Huns ,Jains and Zoroastrians had ruled Kashmir,which was historically regarded as one of the major Centre of Sanskrit Scholars ,during the epic period with a Republican system of government from the capital city of Karna-Rajapuram-gatva-Kambojah-nirjitastava , shortened to Rajapura, and has been identified with modern Rajauri. The oldest authentic books on Kashmir history are Nilmat Puran and Rajatarangini.
Mauryan Emperor Ashoka is recorded to have ruled Kashmir the king was a follower of Buddhism. Ashoka founded the old city of Srinagar near " Pandrethan ", ( Puranadhisthan ) and also build many vihars and temples and repaired the old shrine at Vijeshwari (modern Bijbehara), he built a Shiva Temple, in order to win hearts of local population. After the death of Ashoka, his son Jaluka ascended the throne of Kashmir, and the latter was succeeded by his son King Damodar II. Jaluka was a great king who cleared the valley from murdering foreign tribesmen which often invaded Kashmir .
Kalhan's account of Turushka Kings indicates undoubtly the Kushan rule over Valley. The three kings mentioned by Kalhana in Rajatarangini are Huska, Juska, and Kanishka, each of them is credited with the foundation of a town, called after their respective names : Hushkapura, Jushkapura and Kanishkapura. The Kushan Kings also built many temples and Vihars.
According to many scholars, Kanishka held the third great council of the Buddhist church at Kundalvan , (Harwan, near Shalimar garden) Hien Tsang has given the proceedings of this council. Nearly 500 Buddhist and Hindu scholars attended the conference, and a learned Kashmiri Brahmin Vasumitra presided over its session. Some of the great Buddhist scholars, who took active part in this council were Ashvagosha, Nagarjuna, Vasubandu Sugamitra and Jinamitra. Hien-Tsang had praised the intellectual calibre of the Kashmiri scholars, which were incomparable. Many Buddhist scholars, missionaries, and intellectuals permanently settled in the valley. Kashmir took the leading part in the transmission of Buddhist thought and traditions directly to Tibet, and China.
Archeological discoveries reveal the occurence of quaternary Glacial cycles in the valley. The chief Geological formation of the ice-age are the lacustrine deposits called the Karewas , which overlay the terminal moraines of the first Glaciation and are comprised of two groups, Lower and Upper, differentiated by the moraines of the second Glaciation. The fossil remains of Elphas-hysudrious obtained in the lower Karewas point to lower Pleistocene age.
The discovery of archaeological sites at Burzahom Srinagar were neolithic culture is indicated by the discovery of ground and polished stone axes, hoes, pestle, and bone , Parihaspora archeological site gives the account of Lalitaditya reign , were he had built a temple . The archeolgical sites of Awantipora are also of great histogrphical value.
Archeological sites like Watnar ,Hutmarah , Kutbal of Anantnag, Qusbiyar, Balyar and Letpur of Pulwama and Zurhama site of Kupwara , of these the most outstanding were the sites of Hutmarah ,Letpur and Kutbal which date back to the period of Kushans and revealed artifacts influenced by Gandhara art, thus established Gandhara Kashmir connections. Besides these underground sites the shrine of Thagh Baba at Shah Muhalla Safa Kadal and one another Dumath of Budshah at Soura and the large find of silver coins of Azes ( and Azilies ) (coins of Indo-Scythians) on the banks of Vitasta (river Jhelum) in the hills between Varahmulla(Baramullah) and Jhelum are living examples which support the Kashmir Indo-Greek Gandhara connections .
King Praversein II in whose reign people enjoyed perfect peace and prosperity, He was a great conqueror ,who extended the boundaries of the state in all directions and founded the city of Praverseinpura (modern city of Srinagar), the summer capital of the state at present. Karkota dynasty that has given Kashmir the greatest ruler Lalitaditya Muktapid ( 724- 761 A. D.). He is known as the Samudra Gupta of Kashmir during his reign borders Kashmir were extended far and wide to Asia and India which include Punjab, Kanuj, Tibet, Ladakh , Badakshan, Iran, Bihar, Gauda (Bengal) Kalinga (Orissa), South India, Gujarat, Malwa, Marwar and Sindh .Throughout the valley, he built very fine and massive temples, out of which the world famous sun temple (Martand) built on Mattan Karewa, reminds the granduer and splendour of the times when their builder ruled the state, the master ruins of Martand built of massive lime stone with heavy columns were influenced by Indo-Greco-Roman Archetech. . It was about 855-56 A. D. that Karkota rule ended, and a new Utpal Dynasty assumed power in Kashmir. The most important ruler of this dynasty was Avanti-verman who recovered Kashmir from utter political and economic disorder. His reign witnessed a period of peace and consolidation and prosperity. It was during this time, that the valley rose to great heights in the realm of philosophy, art and letters. There was an outburst of literary activity on a grand scale, and eminent men Kallata Bhat Sura, Ratnakar, Anandavardhana, Muktakana, Siva-Swamin, Rudrata and Mukula came to the limelight .The reign of this King would not be complete without the mention of Suya one of the engineering genius of Kashmir produced in ancient times. For centuries the people of the valley had suffered the recurring curse of famines and floods. Suya correctly assessed that these frequent calamities occured due to heavy rains and excessive water of river Jehleum(Veth) which could not easily get out with swiftness, through a gorge near Varahmulla, due to compressed passage the bed got blocked with silt and huge boulders. The people removed both the silt and stones when the great engineer threw plenty of gold and silver coins into the river at many places. Thousands of starving people immediately jumped into the flooded Vitasta(Jehleum) and in order to find the coins, cleared the bed of the rocks and boulders which had chokedup the passage. Suya, then raised stone embankments, and adopted other protective measures. Many canals were dug-out to increase the irrigational facilities. The result of all these measures was that a great increase of land became available for cultivation. Suya's memory is still preserved to this day, by the town Sayapur (Sopore) founded by him at the point where river Jehleum, since his regulation leaves the basin of Mahapadomsar (Wouler lake). Alberuni, who accompanied Mahmud Gaznavi in his Indian Campaigns, specifically mentions in his book ( Tahqiq-i-Hind) about Kashmir . Abhinav Gupta who flourished at the beginning of the 11th century A. D. and is the exponent of Kashmir Shivaism known as Trika. Bilhan the great Sanskrit poet who flourished in the same century was born at Khunmoh ( a village at a distance of 5 km. towards the east of Zewan ).
In 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir, starting with the conversion in 1323 of king Rinchana, when on one morning he saw Bulbul Shah(R.A) at his prayers and admiring that form of devotion, he converted to Islam and taking the name of Sadr-u-din . Bulbul Shah's Real name was Syed Sheriff Uddin Abdul Rehman(R.A) and title Syed Bilal that owing to frequent use changed into Bulbul. Hence he came to be known as Bulbul Shah or the Bulbul-e-Kashmir. Bulbul Shah sought allegiance to the renowned saint, Shah Nemat-Ullah Farisi Shirazi, of the Suharawardy order who, in turn, looked to Zia Uddin-Ul-Najeeb Abdul Qahiri.People called him with the epithet of the nightingale of Kashmir.
Sufi Saint Mir Syed Ali Hamdan(R.A), who stayed in Kashmir for meditation and preaching of Islam. He was the torch-bearer of Islam in Kashmir. His name was Ali, and titles were Amir-e-Kabir, Ali Sa'ani, and Mir. Besides them, the Chroniclers had mentioned several other titles: Qutub-e-Zaman, Sheikh-e-Salikan-e-Jehan, Qutub-Ul-Aktab, Moih-Ul-Ambiya-o-Ul-Mursaleen, Afzal-Ul-Muhaq-e-qeen-o-Akmal-Ul-Mudaq-e-qeen, Al-Sheiyookh-Ul-Kamil, Akmal-Ul-Muhaqqiq-Ul-Hamadani etc.He traced his patrimony through his father, Syed Shahab Uddin, to Imam Zain-ul-Abedein and finally to Hazrat Ali(Rz.A). His mother, Syeda Fatimah(Rz.A), with seventeen links, reached the Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W).Syed Hamdani came from an educated family. He was intelligent and quick of mind, and read the Holy Qu'ran, under the care of his maternal uncle, Hazrat Ala-Uddin and from him too he took his lessons on subjects outer and intrinsic for a period of thirteen years.He fought with Amir-e-Temur and so moved to Kashmir with seven hundred Syeds and his followers, during the reign of King Shahab-Uddin ,when borders of Kashmir were extended upto Central Asia .
He had already sent two of his followers: Syed Taj Uddin Samnani and Mir Syed Hasan Samnani to take stock of the situation. The ruler of Kashmir became the follower of Mir Syed Hasan Samnani and because of the Kings concurrence he entered Kashmir with a large following. The King and heir apparent, Qutub Uddin, received him warmly. At that time the Kashmir ruler was on war with Firoz Tughlaq and because of his efforts the parties came to terms.Shah Hamdan started the propagation movement of the Islam in Kashmir in an organized manner. The Kashmiri Muslims were unaware of the Deeni spirit before his arrival there. The reason being, the people, who had initiated the Movement, were saintly by nature and carried a deep influence of the Hinduism and the Buddhism. In-spite of having been turned Muslims they still observed many local rites and practices. Shah Hamdan did not stay in the valley permanently but visited on various occasions. He came to Kashmir in September 1372 AD, 1379 AD and the third time in the year 1383 AD.
Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir lived in relative harmony, since the Sufiyat` way of life that ordinary Muslims followed in Kashmir complemented the Rishi tradition of Kashmiri Pandits. To which Lal Ded and Nund Reshi (R.A) played pivotal role where there was no clash of civilization during the propagation of Islam .
Lal Ded (Laleshwari) born at village Sempore in the year 1317 A. D. She had initiation from her spiritual Guru known as Sedu Bayu as the practice in vogue at that time. She sang and wrote of divine love, tolerance, and universal brotherhood. The great mystic poet chose the general language for expression of her delicate spiritual ideas. She was the omen of new patriotic awakening and laid the foundation of Kashmiri song and poetry. The vakhs(verses) of Lal Ded had persuaded all shades of Kashmiris people ,irrespective of creed, colour , race or religion a way forward towards spiritual course of living.
Nund Reshi(R.A) was the founder and most popular saint of the Reshi cult of Kashmir. Muslim theologists describe him as Noor-ud -Din Noorani or Sheikh-ul -Alam (the light of religion and the Sheikh of the world). But as the darling of all Kashmiris, irrespective of caste and creed, and as per his own repeated reference, as Nunda he was endearingly called Nund Reshi. His pious memory still continues to be cherished by this nomenclature.
Nund Reshi born in the village Kaimoh Kulgam in 1377AD but brought up in another village of the same Tehsil. The Shruks(sacred hymns)of Sheikh Noor-Ud-Din (R.A) have impressed and influenced both the communities, Hindus and Muslims, in Kashmir .
Nund Reshi's pithy saying 'Food will last as long as forests last" is a clear indication of his instinctive foresight and intuitive acquaintance. Thus as the saint-poet conveys in his important message, that cultivation and supply of good material is so essential for the existence of life, depend on plants of which forests are a part. If the forest areas are discarded gushing rain waters would erode the slopes and soft areas. Much land would be lost and also the grain. He uttered these words six centuries ago even before the present concept of ecological balance and climate change , which in present times is most burning issue on the globe thus a real eco-scientist . Nund Reshi while giving a sermon to the village folk, cautioned them, on moral and ethical grounds, against damages to or destruction of plants in general and herbal plants in particular.
In 1398 the foundation stone of historical Jammia Masjid of Srinagar was laid by Sultan Skinder at the advice of Mir Mohammad Hamdani(R.A) the oldest and the first Masjid(Mosque) of Kashmir and also built Shah-e-Hamdan or Khanqah-e-Moulla which is one of the oldest Muslim shrines situated on the bank of river Jhelum in Srinagar city. It is worth to mention that Skinder is also known as Butshikan and has been misquoted by some historians that he ruined the temples in Kashmir , his religious tolerance can be established by the fact that he had visited a temple at Habakadal Srinagar were a stone has been displayed mentioning his visit to the place .
Sultan Zainul Abedin’s (1420 to 1470 A.D.) reign is considered as golden period of Kashmir history and was popularly known as Budshah. Budshah, the great king as it means in Kashmiri language, was one of the noblest sons of the soil. People used to call him ‘‘Budshah” with love and affection and even today they mention his name with great respect. Budsah’s Kashmir was a model of economic prosperity, social justice and communal harmony in this part of the world. As a great centre of learning and culture, Kashmir attracted students from India, Persia, Central-Asia and Middle- East. Trade and commerce were at their peak and all the neighboring nations held Kashmir in great esteem. As a free patriotic nation, Kashmiris repulsed all those forces, which posed a threat to their Independence .
Budshah’s rule of 50 years is therefore called the most prosperous period of Kashmir history. Embassies represented Kashmir in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Delhi and Gujarat. With the death of Budshah began the gradual decline of Kashmir’s golden era.
Budshah’s Shahmiri dynasty was later over thrown by Chaks who ruled the State for quite some time meanwhile Khatoon Habiba, alias Habba Khatoon alias Zoon , was a great romantic poet of the late sixteenth century. Born in Chandhar (Pampore), fifteen kilometers from Srinagar, her parents used to call her Zoon (Moon) due to her extreme beauty. They educated her but did not appreciate her innate poetic talent. They married her to an illiterate peasant, a total mismatch to her poetic bent of mind, but the marriage ended in a divorce as she could not reconcile with her illiterate husband.It is said that one day she along with her friends was heard singing love lores, in the saffron fields, by Sultan Yousuf Shah Chak. The Sultan was so much intoxicated with her melodious voice and poetry that he fell in love with her at first sight and proposed marriage which her parents willingly consented. In this way Habba Khatoon the poetess became the queen of Kashmir and a very wise adviser to the King.' Her poetry scaled new heights of imagination and her poems became an important part of Kashmiri' s folk literature
In 1585 A.D , after facing two defeats (and perhaps the only two during his kingship) at the hands of Kashmiri, the independence of Kashmir came to an end when Akbar, Moghal king of India ruled Kashmir in 1586 . Mughals ruled the State for about 167 years . Mughals visited Kashmir quite often and took steps to add to its loveliness by raising stylish buildings and beautiful gardens. But Mughals did not bother much to improve common man’s lot. On the contrary, they forcibly introduced a typical way of living on Kashmiris eventhough not a single strategic investment was made in Kashmir . This was a very effective recipe to deprive them of their erstwhile bravery, militancy and self-confidence, in order to eliminate all chances of revolt by them .
Hazratbal Shrine, situated on the bank of famous Dal Lake, is the most important Muslim shrine of Kashmir. It commands the reverence of the people beyond measure as the Prophet Mohammad`s (SAW) Moi-e-Muqqadas ( Holy relic) is preserved in it.
Gani Kashmiri a superb Persian poet became famous in Iran also. His philosophical Persian poetry prompted Saib, a famous Persian poet, to travel all the way from Iran to Kashmir in order to see Gani and have a deeper insight into his philosophy.
With the decline of Mughal power, Kashmir was annexed by Afghans. The Afghan rule over Kashmir, which lasted for 67 years (1752 to 1819 A.D.) was one of cruelty and loot. Most of the Afghan governors of Kashmir crushed the people ruthlessly. But there was something worse in store for Kashmiris. The Sikhs conquered the State and made it a colony of theirs, literally a prison for common Kashmiris . The Sikh rule, which lasted for only 27 years, was worse than that of the Afghans. Continuous slavery and ruthless suppression by foreign rulers had badly demoralized Kashmiris hence they could not put up a concerted resistance against alien domination and suppression and that subjected them to yet another slavery. In 1846 when the British conquered Kashmir as a result of a defeat which they inflicted on the Sikhs with the treacherous help of Gulab Singh, their defence minister and made a commercial deal of Kashmir to him like a commercial commodity for a sum Rs 7.5 million (Nanak Shahi Takas)of this most ignominious and inhuman transaction was made on 16th March 1846 under an agreement called the Treaty of Amritsar.
Shamus Faqir Born in 1843 and died on 1901,the mystical poems of Shamas Faqir, the Sufi poet of note from the valley of Kashmir, exemplify this cultural synthesis in a remarkable way.
Mystical poetry in Kashmiri (spoken by the natives of the valley) has a richness and variety of its own, traceable to the mingling of several cultural streams. This intermingling is specially noticeable in the poems of Shamas Faqir, a spiritually enlightening study.
Rasul Mir, that skilled decanter of love, has a raging controversy shrouding his age. The local traditions recorded in 1940’s spoke of a death in his prime. Folk history states that, Mahmood Gani predicted his youthful death (Amis Chhi jan-h-margi handi koder). His poetry, its fervent youthfulness, its vibrant tenor, its tone of hearty yearning, its pristine emotions, all point to a poet, untouched by the cares of decaying age. Rasul Mir was said to have been alive in 1855 AD when Mahmood Gani passed away and died a few years before-Maqbool Shah Kralawari (d.1874). Accordingly his demise was reckoned between 1867-1870).
Gulab Singh and his successors ruled Kashmir with an iron hand. Some patriots who resisted the inhuman suppression were flayed alive and others subjected to other similar atrocities. Robert Thorp was an Englishman who arrived in Kashmir as a tourist in 1865. The wretched condition of Kashmiris at that time when forced labour, slavery, etc, were the order of the day moved Thorp. Thorp travelled across the length and breadth of Kashmir Valley to have a first hand account of the situation. He soon apprised the British authorities, who then ruled India, about the Dogra rulers’ atrocities on the hapless people of Kashmir.
Thorp’s exposing the Dogra rulers’ earned him their wrath and ultimately on the morning of November 22, 1868, he was found dead probably because of poisoning near Srinagar. Thorp was buried in a local Christian cemetery in the heart of Srinagar city. His grave still bears an epitaph reading: “Robert Thorp who laid has life for Kashmiris.”
Maulana Anwar Shah Kashmiri , the world famous Theologian and accomplished religious scholar. Maulana Anwar Shah who was born in 1875 in Lolab area of the South-west Kashmir, merits special consideration. Maulana Anwar went outside Kashmir for higher studies and came back after receiving education and then started delivering sermons on various aspects of religion and theology.During his pilgrimage to Mecca also he got great recognition for his erudition and knowledge of Islamic theology.
Dr. Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the greatest poet and philosopher of the sub-continent whose grandfather migrated to Sialkot in order to explore the better avenues of livelihood and settled there permanently. Iqbal always boasted of being a Kashmiri and used to introduce himself in these words: 'The seeds of this flower are from the flower-gardens of Kashmir".The plight of Kashmiris always dominated Iqbal's thinking which prompted him to take' active part in the freedom struggle of Kashmir.
Gulam Ahmad Mehjoor ,the revolutionary poet popularly known as Shair-e-Kashmir (the poet of Kashmir) was born at Mitrigam, Pulwama on Ist August, 1887.He is considered herald of didactic poetry in Kashmiri language. He was the first poet of Kashmiri language to incorporate themes closer to life and times of his age. Yet his lyrics have the magical appeal.
Abdul Ahad Azad Born in village Ranger Chadoora on 13th June 1903 , died on 4th April 1948 at the age of 45 only cause of death was reported as peritonitis although appendix operated by Dr. Omkar Nath successfully at Ratan Rani Hospital Srinagar , was one of the well known Kashmiri poets of his era. He was one of the pioneers of the modernist movement. 'Azad' is inherently possessed of uncommon consciousness of head and heart.
On the other hand wave of repression continued until 1931 when the Muslims of Kashmir realized that they would perish if they continued to let the ever-increasing suppression go unchecked and unarrested. They abruptly rose in revolt against the despotic ruler and within a couple of years compelled him to concede to them a number of political, economic and social rights.
Glancy commission’s report which had been established to inquire into the Muslim uprising that broke out in the country in 1931. The issue of Pather Masjid also made a broad base for the political mobilization of the newly formed Muslim conference. In the end the Dogra rulers realized the significance of the agitation around the Pather Masjid that it had to return the mosque to the Muslim community as per the Glancy commission’s recommendation. This success gave a morale boost to the Muslim community and made them more bolder in their demands. In 1932, the Mosque(Masjid) of Dara Shikoh was returned to the Muslims .Thus archaeological protests became one of the source for Muslims of Kashmir for raising there voice against the denial of there social, political and economic rights.
A lot of the more recent recorded history of Kashmir can be credited to the various travelers and historians who visited Kashmir. Abul Fazal has recorded the state of Kashmir during the Mughal period .The Europeans, like Moorcroft, Vigne, Walter Lawrence who visited Kashmir either as government officials or simple travelers have recorded the history of Kashmir in magnifique detail during the Sikhs and Dogra periods . It is not only the political aspect of the country that they have recorded but rather every aspect of the region, be its geography, geology, architecture or its people with there cultures and traditions. From the grand stone temples during Hindu period, it changed to timber and stone and later brick in the post Muslim period.
In 1946, exactly one hundred years after their sale in 1846, Kashmiris rose in open revolt .The movement was anyhow crushed and its leaders sentenced to long imprisonments.
In 1947 the British divided Subcontinentand two sovereign countries India and Pakistan came into existence . The ruler of Kashmir was being compelled by Indian leaders to ‘accede’ to India against the wishes of the people."The large majority of the population of the State, almost the entire Muslim community and an appreciable number of non Muslims was totally against the Maharjaha declaring accession to India,"writes Prem Nath Bazaz, founder of the Kashmir Socialist Party in 1943, a reliable primary source of history, in his book, History of freedom Struggle In Kashmir while as New Delhi’s version states that Maharaja has by his will acceded to India through the instrument of accession , however Islamabad maintains that Kashmir is a dispute which should be resolved in acordance with the aspirations of People of Jammu Kashmir .After 27th October 1947 accession , Kashmir remained fragmented out of 222236 Sq. Kms Pakistan adminsiters 35% out of which 13297 Sq. Kms of Azad Kashmir are autonomous , 72, 971 Sq. Kms of Gilghit and Baltistan under their direct control , India adminstered 45% of its land (1,39,000 Sq. Kms ) while as 20% of its land is under China (44447.2 Sq. Kms) Kashmiris have rosen up several times in the form of revolt , in 1966 they resorted to armed struggle for a period of 4 years and in 1988 the re-emergence of another armed revolt took place which is still going on, to curb it India has invoked some draconian laws which resulted into the large scale human rights violations , thus the ongoing violence has claimed more than 80,000 lives in Kashmir .
It is important to recognize that the region is the centre of one of the most intensely contested territorial disputes. Four wars have been fought in the past 62 years over this area (three between India and Pakistan, and one between India and China) and the latest Kargil War , and some consider the situation one of the most dangerous in the world since both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. As a result of the dispute, many have lost their lives, and economic development has lagged. Those who live in this region have suffered, both from a humanitarian and economic perspective.
Politics is art of possibles, a way for balancing ,interpreting the different forces of opinion , and it becomes a method at the times of conflict and crisis for reconciliation , and yoking together the contending forces of opinion –the inclination or a belief that may or may not be backed up with evidence, but which cannot be proved with that evidence: is neither right nor wrong, it is normally a subjective statement and may be the result of an emotion or an interpretation of facts.
In clash and confrontation of political nature no solution is possible unless and until the confronting parties espouse a flexible approach, growing within or outside forces –same is true of India and Pakistan who are able to resist the persistent demands of solution of Kashmir conflict . In reality the prospect of internal pressure is missing- within the populace of the two countries, who could compel governments for settlement but sarcastically the civil society opinion is segregated. The matter of fact is that stances of people alter with the change in government strategies. Thus making Kashmir conflict more multifaceted , in the given situation an honourble ,viable ,acceptable and durable solution to the long pending issue is to be carved out , which can give a win- a-win position to Kashmiris first then to India and Pakistan , moreover the most important aspect to the resolution is no sense of defeat to the confronting parties.

The Genesis of Conflict
The ocean of factors are responsible for the emergence of Kashmir conflict, while seeking opinion of a Kashmiri, Indian or a Pakistani, they share different opinions even about the genesis conflict. The Kashmir conflict soon turned into a struggle for strategic superiority. The Kashmir dispute is entangled in the definitions of sovereignty and the right to self-determination-the viability of using military force to resolve border disputes, especially those embedded in the Kashmir conflict-this aspect is significant as the conflict exists in a weaponized environment. These factors points to the need for evolving new approaches to deal with this problem: Kashmir gives a description of the two sides of the LOC – the Indian administered Jammu Kashmir having an area of 1,39000 sq.Kms and the Pakistan administered Jammu Kashmir having an area of 84000 Sq. Kms , 44447.2Sq. Kms lie with China including 8000 Sq. Kms of Shakshum valley ceded in 1963 also in 1978, the Karakoram Highway was opened from Pakistan to Sinkiang ,while as Kashmir Valley, which is administered by India , is about 80 miles long and 35 miles wide (130 x 55 kms).
The Kashmir conflict refers to the political dispute over Kashmir, the northwestern most region of the subcontinent. The parties to the dispute are India, Pakistan, People of Jammu Kashmir and even China also . On 16th March ,1846, when the British defeated Sikhs and sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh, the ruler of Jammu thus given an employment through an infamous deal called Treaty of Amritsar . After his death, he was succeeded by Ranbir Singh in 1857, Partap Singh in 1885, and Hari Singh in 1925.

CLAIM OVER LADDAKH
(English translation of the Persian text of the treaty signed at Leh on second of Asuj 1899 Bikrami - September 1842 - between the Government of Maharajah Gulab Singh and the Government of Tibet.)
Whereas we the Officer, of the Lhasa country, viz., firstly, Kalon Surkhan, and secondly, Depon Pishi, commander of the forces of the Empire of China, on the one hand and Dewan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratanu, on behalf of Maharajah Gulab Singh, on the other, agree together and swear before God that the friendship between Maharajah Gulab Singh and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru Sahib Lassawalla will be kept and observed till eternity: no disregard will be shown to anything agreed upon in the presence of God; and we will respect the boundary of Laddakh and the countries bordering on it as fixed since olden times. We will carry on the trade in Shawl, Pasham and Tea as before by way of Laddakh; and if anyone of the Shri Maharajah's enemies comes to our territories and says anything against the Rajah, we will not listen to him, and will not allow him to remain in our country, and whatever traders come from Laddakh shall experience no difficulty from our side. We will not act otherwise but in the same manner as it has been prescribed in this meeting regarding the fixing of the Laddakh frontier and the keeping open of the road for the traffic in Shawl, Pasham and Tea. We will observe our pledge to God, Gaitri and Pasi, Wazir Mian Khushal Chu is witness.
Written on the second day of Asuj 1899 (September, )

Treaty of Amritsar
March 16, 1846

The treaty between the British Government on the one part and Maharajah Gulab Singh of Jammu on the other concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brever-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., one of her Britannic Majesty's most Honorable Privy Council, Governor-General of the possessions of the East India Company, to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies and by Maharajah Gulab Singh in person - 1846.

Article 1
The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in independent possession to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.
Article 2
The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharajah Gulab Singh shall be laid down by the Commissioners appointed by the British Government and Maharajah Gulab Singh respectively for that purpose and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey.

Article 3
In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing article Maharajah Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees (Nanukshahee), fifty lakhs to be paid on or before the 1st October of the current year, A.D., 1846.

Article 4
The limits of territories of Maharajah Gulab Singh shall not be at any time changed without concurrence of the British Government.

Article 5
Maharajah Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or question that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or any other neighboring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government.

Article 6
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join, with the whole of his Military Forces, the British troops when employed within the hills or in the territories adjoining his possessions.

Article 7
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages never to take to retain in his service any British subject nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the British Governnent.

Article 8
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages to respect in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of Articles V, VI and VII of the separate Engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated 11th March, 1846.

Article 9
The British Government will give its aid to Maharajah Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.

Article 10
Maharajah Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.
This Treaty of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brever-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under directions of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General, on the part of the British Government and by Maharajah Gulab Singh in person, and the said Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General. (Done at Amritsar the sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the seventeenth day of Rubee-ul-Awal (1262 Hijree).
(Signed) H. Hardinge (Seal)
(Signed) F. Currie
(Signed) H.M. Lawrence

The Kashmir dispute dates back to the partition of British India when two Independent states of Indian and Pakistan emerged as separate dominions in August 1947,at the time, the princely states under British suzerainty but not directly ruled by the British Government opted for joining either Pakistan or India, however Kashmir remained a different case . The newborn states of Pakistan and India are fighting an endless war to claim over Kashmir. Both countries claiming peace as their bye word never realize the fact that the right to rule belongs to the sons of the soil.
In June 1947, Poonch disputes assumed a militant and separatist character. The Maharaja's armed forces responded with tremendous brutality. In Jammu, Hindu and Sikh communalists, supported by the fascist Jan Sangh (National Volunteer Organization, RSS) and the Sikh Akali Dal (Akali Party), attacked Muslim villages and set them on fire, displacing some 500,000 residents.
In the case of Jammu Kashmir , the ruler was Hindu while the population was overwhelmingly Muslim, waited for the decision to join Indian or Pakistan . Maharaja Hari Singh hoped to keep Kashmir independent, offering a “standstill agreement” for trade, communications, and other normal affairs between Kashmir, India, and Pakistan, as in the British era. On 12th August 1947 Maharaja of Jammu Kashmir decided to negotiate a standstill agreement with India & Pakistan. Government of India sent a telegram for Maharaja or his representative to visit Delhi for discussions. Where as Stand Still agreement was signed with Pakistan on 18th August 1947 thus accepting Sovereignity of Kashmir . Pakistan was authorized to operate Kashmir posts and telegraph department. Pakistan was also obliged to supply food stuffs and other necessary items under the agreement[i], but India pressed for Kashmir's incorporation into India. At the same time Maharaja had to face a powerful national movement and there had been demands for autonomy in Gilgit, Baltistan, Hunza, and Nagar regions, autonomous vassals of Jammu Kashmir , since the mid-nineteenth century. By September, there was an armed uprising in Poonch, led by Muhammad Ibrahim[ii] with a view that the Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to call in the Indian Army, because it held that the Maharaja of Kashmir was not a heredity ruler, that he was merely a British appointed employee. On 20th -22nd October 1947 people of Azad Kashmir equipped with arms and the active support of tribesmen took control of Muzaffarbad side and on 24th October 1947 they formed their own government , The tribesmen from North West Frontier Province descended on Baramullah, only 30 miles from Srinagar on October 24-26 and opened up Gulmarg front . Maharaja blamed that tribesmen have entered in the State and writes to Mountbatten “I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As Your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and with China.” [iii] While as India claims that the Accession of the state of Jammu Kashmir to India, signed by the Maharaja (erstwhile ruler of the State) on 26th October, 1947, was completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law and was total and irrevocable. But evidence based on declassified military papers that India had Patalia gunners at the Sringar airport by October 17, 1947, and has scoffed at the Indian apologists who propose that India’s invasion of Kashmir was the triumph of improvisation. Instead, states that India had troops mobilized for an invasion of Kashmir by October 25th, 1947 ,this would mean that India’s army was in Kashmir before the decision of the Mahrajah. With India’s army already in Kashmir it is obvious why the Maharajah would hand his country over to India. Because of the injustice displayed by India, the Treaty of Accession, if it was even signed, is nullified and void.[iv]
The Accession was also supported by the largest political party in the state, the National Conference. “On 27th October 1947, the working committee of the NC passed a resolution recommending the accession of Jammu Kashmir to India, and the resolution was ratified in a special convention.”[v] In the Indian Independence Act, there was no provision for any conditional accession. The Instrument of Accession executed by the Maharaja was the same as the ones executed by over 500 princely states in India claims New Delhi . There has been no complication in any of the other cases. There would have been none in this case either, except for Pakistan's action in sending in tribal invaders first (in October 1947) claims India: “In the circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”[vi]
On 27th October, the Government of India announced that the Hindu ruler had acceded to India and it airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar, where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence perimeter,in Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces (the Gilgit Scouts) joined the Azad Kashmir forces, who thereby obtained control of northern region of the state. The Azad Kashmir forces were also joined by troops from Chitral, whose ruler, the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan but claims and counter claims of both new born states of Pakistan and India started aggressively over Kashmir , which result into to an armed confrontation . On 6th November , 1947 more than 0.2 million Muslims were indiscriminately killed by Hindu Fanatics of Jammu which mostly include women children and were supported by forces of Maharaja , which was a sheer saga of tyranny and oppression , the motive behind the pogrom was ethnic cleansing to change the demographical nomenclature of Jammu province especially in the areas surrounding proper winter capital of Kashmir.

Excerpts of telegram dated 26 October, 1947 from Jawaharlal Nehru to theBritish Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.
"For Prime Minister United Kingdom from Prime Minister India.
We have received urgent appeal for assistance from Kashmir Government. We would be disposedto give favourable consideration to such request from any friendly State. Kashmir's Northernfrontiers, as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics and China. Security of Kashmir, which must depend upon control ofinternal tranquillity and existence of stable Government, is vital to security of India especially sincepart of Southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common. Helping Kashmir, therefore, is anobligation of national interest to India. We are giving urgent consideration to question as to whatassistance we can give to State to defend itself. I should like to make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in anyway to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public isthat the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance withwishes of people and we adhere to this view. It is quite clear, however, that no free expression ofwill of people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression succeeds in imperilling integrity of itsterritory. I have thought it desirable to inform you of situation because of its threat of internationalcomplications."
Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten

My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As Your Excellency is aware,the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with China. In their external relations the Dominion of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and of my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. ln fact the Pakistan Goernment under the standstill agreement is operating the post and telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, the Govemment permitted a steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.
Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area, then from Sia1kot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining-Hazara district on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life ad property and the looting of the Mahura power house, which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnpped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my government, as a first step to overrunning the whole State.The mass infiltration of tribesman drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motortrucks, using the Manwehra-Mazaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Govemment of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. Inspite of repeated appeals made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop them from coming into my State. In fact, both radio and the Press of Pakistan have reported these occurences. The Pakistan radio even put out the story that a provisional government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.
With the conditbns obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my state and people to free booters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained.
This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country. I may also inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. V.P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is needed.
In haste and with kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh October 26, 1947

Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Your Highness' letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr. V.P. Menon. In the circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.
Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir, to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property, and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister.

Mountbatten of Burma October 27, 1947

Mountbatten's conditional acceptance of accession Text of Lord Mountbatten 's letter dated 27 October, 1947 to signify his acceptance of the Instrument of Accession signed by the Kashmir Maharaja.
"My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Your Highness' letter dated 26 October has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question if accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people. Meanwhile in response to your Highness' appeal for military aid action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and toprotect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and l note with satisfaction that your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister. With kind regards, I remain, Yours sincerely,October 27, 1947.Mountbatten of Burma."

Indo-Pakistan War of 1947
Date: October 21, 1947 - December 31, 1948
Location: Kashmir
Result: Ceasefire arranged by UN pending plebiscite. Princely state of Jammu Kashmir dissolved. Pakistan takes control of roughly one third of Kashmir- the north-western scrublands, whereas India takes control of the Kashmir valley and most of Jammu.
Territorial changes: Line of Control divides erstwhile princely state of Kashmir between the Indian administered state of Jammu Kashmir (roughly 1,39000 Sq. Kms ) and the Pakistani administeted regions which subsequently became Azad Kashmir (13,297 S. Kms ) and the Northern Areas (72,496 Sq.Kms ).
Casualities of India : 1,104 killed [vii](Indian army)
684 killed (State Forces) [viii]3,152 wounded
Casuality of Pakistan:
1,500 killed [ix] ( Tribesmen along with Pakistani army)
2,633 killed(Armed people of Muzaffarbad and its allied areas), 4,668 wounded
As per most independent sources as many as around 9000 Indian soldiers died and 1200 Pakistani soldiers were also killed.[x]
Commanders who took part in 1947-1948 war
India: Field Marshal K M Cariappa, Lt Gen S M Shrinagesh, Maj Gen K S Thimayya,Maj Gen Kalwant Singh,
Pakistan : Maj Gen Muhammed Akbar Khan[xi]
Later on India took the matter to the UN Security Council in on 1st January 1948 under Article 35 chapter VI of UN Charter . The UN Security Council through its Security Council Resolutions No. 47 (1948) , 51 (1948), 80 (1950) and the United Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 declared that accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. These UN resolutions were accepted by both India and Pakistan . Prime Minister Nehru declared before the Indian Parliament that India was committed to holding a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir .[xii] According to the Indians, Pathan troublemakers from the Northwest Frontier (places like Chitral and Peshawar) were causing riots and agitation in Kashmir. As a result, the Maharaja of Kashmir joined India and requested the assistance of the Indian Army. The Indian Army arrived immediately on 27th October , next day full swing First Indo-Pak Was broke out and Pakistan contested the allegations of India , stating that the tribesmen were local Kashmiris who opposed the accession of Kashmir with India .
Briefly stating that when British India was given its independence, India was supposed to be divided into two countries: India and Pakistan. All areas which were more than 70% Muslim were suppose to go into Pakistan. The rest would be with India.
However, the "princely states" would be left to decide on their own. They could join Pakistan or India or they could remain independent.
UN Charter
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter.
Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter were adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965. A further amendment to Article 61 was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1971, and came into force on 24 September 1973. An amendment to Article 109, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1965, came into force on 12 June 1968.
The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
The amendment to Article 61, which entered into force on 31 August 1965, enlarged the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. The subsequent amendment to that Article, which entered into force on 24 September 1973, further increased the membership of the Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four.
The amendment to Article 109, which relates to the first paragraph of that Article, provides that a General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council. Paragraph 3 of Article 109, which deals with the consideration of a possible review conference during the tenth regular session of the General Assembly, has been retained in its original form in its reference to a "vote, of any seven members of the Security Council", the paragraph having been acted upon in 1955 by the General Assembly, at its tenth regular session, and by the Security Council.

PREAMBLE
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
· to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
· to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
· to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
· to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
· to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
· to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
· to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
· to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO
ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.
CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are[Only Selected!]:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.
CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

UN Resolutions over Kashmir Resolution of the Security Council of April 21, 1948
The Security Council,
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
Having heard the representation of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan;
Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting;
Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;
Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,
Reaffirms the Council's resolution of 17 January;
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by the resolution of the Council of 20 January 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution, representatives of . . . . and . . . .and that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this resolution the President of the Council may designate such other Member of Members of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five;
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian Subcontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution, and to this end,
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.

A. RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavors:
(a) to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State;
(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of 20 January that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order:
(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announces the completion of each stage;
(c) When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the States;
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area.
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator.
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2(a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification.
B. PLEBISCITE
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the Ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administra-tion to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. 8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police.
9. The Government of India should, at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions.
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator;
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite;
(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates;
(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite.
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing, any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavors to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose.
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State release all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that:
(a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens;
(b) There is no victimization;
(c) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.
C. GENERAL PROVISIONS
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein .

Resolution of the Commission of August 13, 1948
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavors to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation,
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART I
Cease-fire order
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.(For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.)
C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.
PART II
Truce agreement
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.
A
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
B
1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.
C
1. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communiqué containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission will be made public.
PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

Resolution of the Commission of January 5, 1949
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,
Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in communications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively, their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948:
1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;
2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed;
3. (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff of assistants and observes as he may require.
4. (a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
(b) As regards the territory referred to in A.2 of Part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.
5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for the holding of the plebiscite.
6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commission shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Governments of India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect.
(b) All person (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to leave the State.
7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to ensure, in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator, that:
(a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite;
(b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit;
(c) All political prisoners are released;
(d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection; and
(e) There is no victimization.
8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance, and the Commission may in its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been entrusted;
9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial;
10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations;
Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt action in ordering a cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight of 1 January 1949, pursuant to the agreement arrived at as provided for by the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948; and
Resolves to return in the immediate future to the Sub-continent to discharge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the Resolution of 13 August 1948 and by the foregoing principles.

The Karachi Agreement
Text of the agreement signed between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Governments in April 1949. The Agreement was signed by the following:
1. Honourable Mushtaque Ahmed Gurmani, Minister without Portfolio, Government of Pakistan.
2. Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, the president of Azad Kashmir .
3. Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, Head of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.
This was the only Kashmiri political party on this side of the cease fire line at that time, and the Agreement it was persuaded to sign, very seriously limited the role of Azad Kashmir Government in the Kashmiri freedom struggle. Therefore it is no surprise that respective governments of Azad Kashmir have very little or no interest in the freedom of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Text :::
A. Matters within the purview of the Government of Pakistan.
1. Defence (as modified under....).
2. Foreign policy of Azad Kashmir.
3. Negotiations with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
4. Publicity in foreign countries and in Pakistan.
5. Co - ordination and arrangement of relief and rehabilitation of refugees.
6. Co - ordination of publicity in connection with plebiscite.
7. All activities within Pakistan regarding Kashmir such as procurement of food, civil supplies running of refugee camps and medical aid.
8. All affairs of Gilgit - Ladakh under the control of Political Agent.

B. Matters within the purview of Azad Kashmir Government.

1. Policy with regard to administration of AK territory.
2. General supervision of administration in AK territory.
3. Publicity with regard to the activities of the Azad Kashmir Government and administration.
4. Advice to the honourable Minister without Portfolio with regard to negotiations with United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
5. Development of economic resources of AK territory.

C. Matters within the purview of the Muslim Conference.

1. Publicity with regard to plebiscite in the AK territory.
2. Field work and publicity in the Indian occupied[administered] area of the State.
3. Organisation of political activities in the AK territory and the Indian occupied[administered] area of the State.
4. Preliminary arrangements in connection with the plebiscite.
5. Organisation for contesting the plebiscite.
6. Political work and publicity among the Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan.
7. Advise the honourable minister without Portfolio with regard to the negotiations with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
Cease –fire Agreement :It was agreement signed by Pakistan and India on the 27th of July 1949. It established a cease-fire line which could be monitored by observers from the United Nations. Article 370 of the Constitution of India{370. Temporary provisions with respect of the State of Jammu and Kashmir granted to Kashmir in 1949} 1. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution: a. the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, b. the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to;
i. those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and
ii. such other matters in the said Lists, as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.
Explanation—For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;
c. he provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to this State;
d. such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify
i. Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State:
ii. Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of the Government.
2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.
3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of the article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may notify:Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.
4. In exercise of the powers conferred by this article the President, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, declared that, as from the 17th day of November, 1952, the said art. 370 shall be operative with the modification that for the explanation in cl.(1) thereof the following Explanation is substituted namely: Explanation—For the purpose of this Article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the *Sadar-I-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office.

Resolution of the Security Council of March 14, 1950
The Security Council,
Having received and noted the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, established by the resolutions of 20 January and 21 April 1948
Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L. McNaughton on the outcome of his discussion with the representatives of India and Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the decision taken by the Security Council on 17 December 1949
Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesmanlike action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 for a cease-fire, for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially implementing these resolutions by
• The Cessation of hostilities affected 1 January 1949;
• The establishment of a cease-fire line on 27 July, and
• The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be Plebiscite Administrator,
Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be based upon the substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles already reached, and that steps should be taken forthwith for the demilitarization of the State and for the expeditious determination of its future in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants,
1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programmer of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;
2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate:
(a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarization referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization,
(b) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before these Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir?
(c) To exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission by reason of existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949,
(d) To arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitarization for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between the parties,
(e) To report to the Security Council as he may consider necessary submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make;
3. Requests the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to ensure that their agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed, and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotiations;
4. Extends its best thanks to the members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton for their arduous and fruitful labours;
5. Agrees that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan shall be terminated, and decides that this shall take place one month after both parties have informed the United Nations Representative of their acceptance of the transfer to him of the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (c) above.

Liaquat–Nehru Pact
The Liaquat–Nehru Pact was signed by Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on April 8, 1950.
At the time of independence, many communal riots broke out in different areas of Pakistan and India. These riots had a great impact on the status of minorities in the two nations. Due to brutal killings by the majority community, a huge number of Muslims migrated from India, and Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan. This problem escalated during the late 1940s and early '50s. It seemed as if India and Pakistan were about to fight their second war in the first three years of their independence. At this critical juncture in the history of South Asia, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, issued a statement emphasizing the need to reach a solution to the problem. He also proposed a meeting with his Indian counterpart to determine how to put an end to the communal riots and the fear of war.
The two prime ministers met in Delhi on April 2, 1950, and discussed the matter in detail. The meeting lasted six days, and on April 8 the two leaders signed an agreement. This pact provided a "bill of rights" for the minorities of India and Pakistan. Its aim was to address three issues:
To alleviate the fears of the religious minorities on both sides.
To elevate communal peace.
To create an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their other differences.
According to the agreement, the governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agreed that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territories, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, and a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honor.
It also guaranteed fundamental human rights of the minorities, such as freedom of movement, speech, occupation and worship. The pact also provided for the minorities to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other offices and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces.

Dixon Plan
Sir Owen Dixon, a Judge of the Australian High Court who came to the subcontinent as the United Nations' Representative for India and Pakistan pursuant to the Security Council's Resolution of March 14, 1950. He had a "high reputation for independence, integrity and ability", Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Kashmir's Prime Minister, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, on April 6 .[xiii]Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), knew him when both were envoys in Washington (1942-44).
The Report he submitted to the U.N. Security Council on September 15, 1950 is a classic; unexcelled for its elegant style, incisive analysis and transparent honesty. No U.N. mediator received a warmer welcome. No mediator before or since came so close to success.
The five-member U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (1948-49) secured accord on terms for plebiscite in its resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949; arranged a ceasefire (New Year's Day) and drew up a ceasefire line on which both sides agreed on July 27, 1949. It proved unequal to the task thereafter, so did Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada. The six reports of mediator Frank Graham (1951-1953 and 1956) reflect incompetence and a passion for survival. Gunnar Jarring (1958) was escapist. They did much harm.
When they met in London three years later, Nehru told him, as Dixon recorded in his diary (June 1, 1953), that "of all the people who had dealt with the Kashmir question, I was the only man who came to grips with it".
That was "The Dixon Plan". It assigned Ladakh to India, the Northern Areas and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK) to Pakistan, split Jammu between the two, and envisaged a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan demurred at first, but agreed. It fell through because Nehru did not accept the conditions in which the plebiscite could be held; precisely the issue on which the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and Graham failed. They, because of their ineptness; Dixon because he lost patience.
Major William Alan Reid was an Observer with the U.N. Military Observers Group in Kashmir (UNMOGIP). He was obliged to return in 1981 and retire from the army as he had sustained serious injuries in a jeep accident on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road. in New Delhi before Dixon's arrival that both Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel were "even prepared to risk public opinion, if the need arose" to get the plebiscite-cum-partition plan through. Before the end of 1948 — if not earlier — Nehru had developed second thoughts on a plebiscite in Kashmir .[xiv]But he told the British High Commissioner Archibald Nye on September 9, 1949 that a proposal for "a plebiscite being confined to the Valley and the area north of it [excluding Gilgit] was worthy of consideration" .[xv]
Patel and Nehru were agreed "that a plebiscite is unreal" .[xvi] He feared that "once the talk starts the non-Muslims in Jammu Kashmir would start feeling uneasy and we might be faced with an exodus to India." He had warned Nehru earlier (June 27) that Nixon was "going to try... to bring about an agreement on the question of demilitarisation. If we are not careful, we might land ourselves in difficulties because once demilitarisation is settled, a plebiscite would be, as it were, round the corner" .[xvii]Ergo, scuttle all demilitarisation proposals by the mediator. But was Patel opposed to the Dixon Plan?
We get a fair idea of what was afoot in his daughter Maniben's diary. On April 23, she wrote: "Vishnu Sahay clarified from map that we should give up Kashmir Valley — retain Jammu-Ladakh." Dixon arrived in New Delhi on May 27, 1950 and met Nehru, Bajpai and Sahay. He met Patel on May 29 and July 30. Maniben recorded on July 24, "Vishnu Sahay pointed out partitioned border about Kashmir on map" presumably the line Nehru proposed to offer to Pakistan at the summit.
At the MEA, Bajpai told the U.S. Ambassador, Loy Henderson, on April 8, that during the Nehru-Liaquat talks that month on the refugee influx from East Pakistan, the Secretary-General of Pakistan's Cabinet, Mohammed Ali "suggested that it would be helpful if Pakistan and India could come to an understanding over Kashmir before arrival of mediator. Bajpai agreed and outlined various methods for settlement or dispute including his own favourite method which he described to Ali as `Lippmann's suggestions', that is, partition plus plebiscite in Vale of Kashmir. All said Pakistan was so deeply committed to `over-all plebiscite' he did not see how any other method could be approved at this time" .[xviii]Dixon knew that "a just and enduring settlement could be achieved only through a pragmatic agreement which recognised the situation as it now stood".
At the outset Dixon felt handicapped by the lack of a political adviser "thoroughly familiar" with India. It proved fateful. Dixon met Nehru, first on May 27, 1950 when "Nehru reiterated that confirmation of the accession of Kashmir to India ought to be done through a Constituent Assembly" (emphasis added, throughout). It was elected in 1951.
Dixon went on a tour of Kashmir from June 7 to July 11 and was unimpressed: "The valley of Kashmir lost all its beauty for me. The lakes became nothing but stagnant swamps, the green rice fields became quagmires of exhausted earth and water in which primitive man and his oxen continued to wallow, and the picturesque house boats... insanitary repositories of furniture and other junk by which infections and contagions were passed from one lessee to another, season after season, I saw it all through a bacteriological haze and wondered why either side wanted it." He met on June 8 and several times later socially, Sheikh Abdullah who ran his fiefdom as a "police state". Erik Colban (Dixon's aide) met Abdullah who "claimed that he was keen to bury the past and try to work `hand in hand' with the leaders of the Azad Kashmir government. Moreover, they should push for a `united' Kashmir that could determine to which country it would accede, `or to other forms of cooperation' with both states. Abdullah wanted Dixon to propose a joint meeting to discuss this." He complained of the UNCIP's failure to negotiate with him and of the omission of the option of independence in the plebiscite.
Maulana Azad met Dixon in Kashmir: "He raised, as Nehru had done, the question of determining the disposal of Kashmir by a Constituent Assembly. Dixon replied that the actual communication accepting the instrument of accession did not use any such term but said that the fate of Kashmir should be decided by an expression of the people's will. Also, in any number of speeches, Nehru had said that this meant by plebiscite, and that was what India and Pakistan had agreed to. Azad, although claiming that India would win a plebiscite, still recommended Partition with a vote only in the disputed areas. This would minimise any migration of refugees and avoid the need for demilitarisation... When Azad concluded by stating that Pakistan's army must be withdrawn, Dixon replied pointedly: `I could say no more than that you did not take votes where there were troops who might be used as instruments of coercion'."
Dixon stayed in the "musty and repellent atmosphere of No. 1 Guest House, Srinagar" and prepared papers on major issues. One concerned demilitarisation, another, forms of Partition and related details.
Back in New Delhi, Dixon proposed to Nehru a summit with Liaquat. Nehru agreed after much persuasion, so did Liaquat but wondered if Nehru was agreeable to plebiscite. Dixon assured him that he was. The summit was held in Delhi from July 20 to 24 without aides. They spent 18 hours, Nehru holding forth for 10. Nehru found his main interlocutor Dixon, "a patient listener... " Liaquat spoke for less than 30 minutes saying "little or nothing except by way of intermittent protest against Mr. Nehru's statements". The possibility of a partition-cum-plebiscite "had been raised". Liaquat's silence preserved his options.
Dixon's proposals on the overall plebiscite were rejected by Nehru on the grounds he recorded in his report. "But he was in no doubt why they were put," as he mentioned privately in a letter: "If such a plebiscite were taken freely and fairly (India) would undoubtedly lose it." Bajpai agreed, expressing his "personal view".
Dixon even explored "the possibility of removing the ceasefire line as the political boundary" so that the State could be brought under one administration. He did not favour a coalition comprising Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas of the PAK. But the proposals he made were starkly unrealistic. Any competent political adviser would have warned him against making it.
He proposed putting the State "Government in commission"; that is, "replacing the regular constitutional administrators with appointed persons". Ministers would continue to hold office "but they would be relieved of their responsibilities. No Indian Prime Minister could possibly have accepted that. It went beyond the terms for plebiscite in the UNCIP's Resolution of January 5, 1949. This was to prove fatal, eventually, on the limited plebiscite.
"Before the conference adjourned, Dixon sought an indication about India's attitude towards Partition, with a limited plebiscite (the Valley and some adjacent country), or plebiscites in specified areas. Nehru proffered `great interest' and, despite the disadvantages of being seen to compromise, undertook to provide India's view. Although not liking it, Liaquat did not object to the proposal being raised, so long as it came from India... "
After the collapse of the summit, Dixon received from Nehru a tentative proposal: "In Jammu the ceasefire line would become the boundary, Azad Kashmir going to Pakistan, the remainder to India. Since the latter included territory north of the Chenab River, India would also agree not to reduce `sensibly, substantially or materially' its flow. The Northern Areas would be conceded but Buddhist Ladakh in the east would remain with India. As to the Valley, which Nehru defined generously, he agreed that prima facie it was in doubt and that a plebiscite must be taken... This would, inter alia, minimise refugee movement while simplifying demilitarisation and administrative arrangements. The Valley, overwhelmingly Muslim but also Sheikh Abdullah's power base, would be subject to a vote. The major difference that arose was about the territory that India claimed automatically. Because of strong pro-Pakistan areas to the east of the ceasefire line in Jammu, Dixon felt it both unwise and mistaken to follow this closely and warned that he would argue against it."
The 1941 Census was to be taken as the basis "modified by demographic, geographic and other features and `present conditions' " in order to minimise refugee movement. Dixon met Patel on July 30 who opposed a plebiscite ("an impracticable solution (that) had never been possible.") They discussed a partition line in Jammu. Patel said a "settlement would not be allowed to fail over a couple of Tehsils here or a couple of tehsils there. The issues were too big."
Dixon was informed by Francis Stuart, the Acting Australian High Commissioner, that before the Prime Ministers' summit, the Cabinet had "unanimously" agreed that a solution must be found quickly; rejected an overall plebiscite; but "a settlement which gave Kashmir substantially Pakistan, provided it included settling satisfactorily other outstanding issues, would be acceptable; but Jammu must remain in India while losing Ladakh would be resisted. The Army also supported an immediate political solution."
Dixon went to Karachi, the then capital of Pakistan, and proposed another summit to discuss a limited plebiscite. Mohammed Ali was sceptical whether Nehru would agree to conditions for a fair poll; Liaquat, facing a divided Cabinet, proposed outright partition, with the Valley going to Pakistan. Dixon returned to Delhi on August 9 and secured Nehru's agreement on a new course of action. Dixon would propose a "definite" plan for limited plebiscite with "the territorial boundaries India might not like". Nehru would attend a conference provided Liaquat did not reject the idea itself. Dixon proposed to give Pakistan "much of Jammu west of the Chenab river". The plebiscite area would be defined precisely. Dixon went to Karachi to secure Liaquat's consent to this. He spent a week there (August 11-18). Liaquat accepted the plan, provided Nehru would agree to a neutral administration for the Valley. In an exchange of cables, Nehru rejected the idea — to Dixon's annoyance. They are annexed to the Report.
Dixon was being unrealistic and impatient. Reid writes: "Although the plan was similar in concept to that which Nehru had dismissed at the conference, in practice it would be much different — yet it had been rejected without any detail being sought."
True, the idea was "new". It had been aired at the summit when, admittedly, Nehru rejected it. It was new in the sense none had proposed it earlier. None with any political awareness would have proposed it in 1950, either; mechanically perfect, politically impossible. "The Government in Commission" was a concept for which the great jurist would have found hardly any precedent. He even envisaged participation of Pakistan's troops. Reid records that Dixon reminded Nehru that "when he, Dixon, had first used it Nehru had requested an explanation — and then opposed the concept strongly. But whether the proposal was old or new had nothing to do with its merits, nor with the need to exclude any possibility of the vote being seen as unfairly influenced. Bajpai then pointed to a paper given to Nehru during the conference and asked why its provisions would not do: this was what the Cabinet had expected Dixon to propose and it would not unduly interfere with the process of Government. Dixon pointed out that that paper was now `entirely insufficient' as its proposals applied to the whole State and dealt only with controlling the police... He had understood from post-conference discussions that India accepted that measures would be necessary in the Valley to ensure a vote free from intimidation and unfairness, but it had now denied him any chance to explain them." But the idea was fundamentally unsound. If his "paper" fulfilled the needs of a fair vote, why did he abandon it "now"?
One wishes that Dixon had persisted and amplified on the UNCIP's formula. Reid asks why Nehru rejected the idea though "the Cabinet wanted a genuine settlement". The Cabinet would have rejected any proposal for ousting Abdullah's government. Dixon's angry comments on Nehru later were unjust. Nehru, to be sure, reneged on his commitment on a plebiscite as this writer demonstrated.[xix]
U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles on July 8, 1952 that "India had always been interested in partition possibility as outlined in Dixon Report," provided that Sheikh Abdullah's continuance in office was not affected .[xx]
In 1952, V.K. Krishna Menon told the Australian High Commissioner that Nehru still favoured the Dixon Plan. Reid rightly holds: "Dixon came much closer to creating the conditions necessary for a lasting settlement than has previously been recognised. Moreover, his mission did provide some hope for a future settlement by outlining a sensible approach." The unremitting hard work, the exasperation he felt understandably in dealing with New Delhi and Karachi and his illness accounted for the mediator's refusal to work any further. But he would have returned, if both sides had invited him. They did not.
On July 29, Henderson reported to Acheson that an informant "sent to me by one of most powerful political figures" (was it Patel?) told him: "a). Indian Cabinet was extremely anxious for settlement of Kashmir in near future on basis which will leave as little bitterness as possible. b). It was absolutely out of question, however, for India to permit Jammu with its heavy Hindu population and its geographical position to go to Pakistan. c). Cabinet believed only solution was that of partition plebiscite as advanced by Dixon and believed that if Pakistan accepts this solution, GOI should be extremely liberal in making concessions redemilitarisation and U.N. control in Valley during course plebiscite even though it was confident that plebiscite under such conditions would yield Valley to Pakistan. In other words, Cabinet prepared now abandon idea of Valley going to India provided Jammu and Ladakh would be retained and decision of Valley would be based on plebiscite. d). Nehru, although somewhat reluctant, was willing go along with Cabinet in this regard... " [xxi] . Was Patel more conciliatory than Nehru, then?
Nehru expected to get "concessions from Pakistan in other spheres" as part of the deal. Dixon, on August 15, won Liaquat's clearance for his plan. Even after Dixon gave up on August 23, what Bajpai told Henderson on August 25 was significant. The U.S. Ambassador reported to Acheson: "I said it had been my impression GOI really desired solution of partition-plus-plebiscite and that if it could have most of Jammu and Ladakh it would be willing agree to conditions for plebiscite in Valley. Bajpai... said that had been GOI position and still was its position. GOI did not believe however, it would be necessary replace present Government Kashmir with UN administration in order have fair plebiscite... Public reaction in India would be so sharp that no government which had agreed to such arrangement could survive. This had been opinion not only of Nehru but also of other members of Foreign Committee of Cabinet — Patel, Rajagopalachari and Ayyangar. Dixon, however, had offered no alternative. He had taken position there could be no fair plebiscite under Abdullah regime. It was on this issue and nothing else discussions had broken down. GOI was still willing to discuss direct with GOP or under auspices SC solution involving partition with plebiscite in Valley under conditions which reasonable observers U.N. must consider fair".[xxii].
On August 28, Henderson gave his formula to Acheson. "present government of Kashmir could remain in office during period plebiscite so long as in opinion administrator it was loyally cooperating in facilitating fair plebiscite. Administrator would have authority, however, to appoint U.N. officials to arrange for and conduct plebiscite. He would also be empowered to appoint observers to local military units and to civilian institutions, including juridical and police, in order to make sure there was no direct or indirect intimidation of population, Kashmir Government would be required accept administrator's recommendation for removal of any of its officials who in opinion administrator were not loyally cooperating in order bring about fair plebiscite and to revoke any administrative or judicial order which in opinion administrator was likely interfere with fairness of plebiscite. Such Indian military establishment as might remain in Kashmir would also be required to remove or replace any of its personnel who in opinion administrator were not giving proper cooperation. Administrator should also be provided with sufficient U.N. civilian and military personnel to replace local personnel in case in his opinion such replacements would be advisable." This was negotiable .[xxiii]
In Srinagar, Henderson "had two secret discussions" with Sheikh Abdullah, at his request in September 1950. He "was vigorous in restating that in his opinion it (Kashmir) should be independent" .[xxiv]
When British and American officials met on September 18, J.J.S. Garner of the Commonwealth Relations Office "pointed out that Dixon's efforts did, after all, break down on a rather narrow point and that, if there really a will on the part of the two sides to settle the problem, it should not be impossible to devise a formula that would, on the one hand, avoid the complete withdrawal of the Abdullah Government, and, on the other, allow proper U.N. supervision of the plebiscite.
"Mr. McGhee, pointing out that partition-plus-plebiscite seemed to be the most likely solution ultimately, thought we might use Dixon's report as the basis for consolidating efforts in this direction.” [xxv]
So close and yet so far. The sub-continent would have been spared half a century's bitter travails if Dixon had received proper backing and was persuaded to renew his efforts. President Rajendra Prasad endorsed the Dixon Plan in a note to Nehru on July 14, 1953. "Last year, Dr. Radhakrishnan, (Vice-President) on his return from a visit to Kashmir, came and told me that even Sheikh Abdullah thought that we would lose in a plebiscite as Sheikh Abdullah himself had told him that ... but whether we win or lose in a plebiscite, with our commitments it is not possible to say that we shall not have a plebiscite if the other side presses for it." He feared a refugee influx. And preferred "the suggestion of Sir Owen Dixon and have plebiscite only in an area about which there is any doubt as to which way it would vote. It proceeds upon the assumption that the result of plebiscite in the areas which are left out of plebiscite is a foregone conclusion, and therefore both as a matter of expediency and convenience, the plebiscite should be confined to doubtful areas... One of the implications of this may be that we may lose the Kashmir Valley, but we shall be assured from the very beginning about getting Jammu and Ladakh, and Pakistan similarly about the Azad area" .[xxvi]
In this, he was not being communal — unlike Dr. B.R. Ambedkar who said, on October 11, 1951, after resigning from the Cabinet: "Give the Hindus and Buddhist parts to India and the Muslim part to Pakistan as we did in the case of India... If we cannot save the whole of Kashmir, at least let us save our kith and kin" — a sentiment Shyama Prasad Mookerjee echoed.
The Dixon Plan figured in discussions in the National Conference's Working Committee on June 9, 1953, "among the alternatives discussed was — a Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area" — Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was "emphatically of the opinion" that this should be put up "as first and the only practicable, advantageous and honourable solution of the dispute" .[xxvii]A variant figured in Nehru's letter to the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra on September 5, 1953 — overall plebiscite but partition based on the results in each region .[xxviii]He was only marking time. Having put Abdullah behind the bars on August 8, he could hardly risk a plebiscite. He said as much to Karan Singh (August 21) and sent A. P. Jain to Bakshi to explain matters .[xxix]
In 2002, Dixon's plan of 1950 cannot be revived. But, its spirit and his statesmanship can be. Reid deplores the nationalist historiography that mars Indian and Pakistani writing, on Kashmir. To both, Dixon's Report of September 15, 1950 (August 27) provides a devastating corrective. The classic repays study even now. "The question whether Pakistan had or had not been an aggressor had, to my mind, nothing to do with the results of a partition and the fairness and freedom of a partial plebiscite... to agree that the territory not immediately divided between India and Pakistan should pass to one or the other according to the vote of the inhabitants at a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations must be to agree a text involving an equal interest in both countries in the result." [xxx]

Resolution of the Security Council of March 30, 1951:
Having received and noted the report of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950;
Observing that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and of the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950, and have re-affirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;
Observing that on 27 October 1950 the General Council of the “All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference” adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the “future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir”; observing further from statements of responsible authorities that action is proposed to convene such a Constituent Assembly and that the area from which such a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir;
Reminding the Governments and Authorities concerned of the principle embodied in the Security Council resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948 and 14 March 1950 and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations; Affirming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the “All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference,” and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle;
Declaring its belief that it is the duty of the Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to aid the parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is of vital importance to the maintenance of international peace and security;
Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were:
(a) The procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and
(b) The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite;
The Security Council,
1. Accepts, in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon's resignation and expresses its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he carried out his mission;
2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon;
3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the Sub-continent and , after consulation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949;
4. Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Representative to the fullest degree in effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the Sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not effected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out;
6.Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United Nations Representative failing in his opinion to result in full agreement, to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the United Nations Representative in accordance with paragraph 5 above; such arbitration to be carried out by an Arbitrator, or a panel of Arbitrators, to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties;
7. Decides that the Military Observer group shall continue to supervise the cease-fire in the State;
8. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to ensure that their agreement regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan with such services and facilities as may be necessary in carrying out the terms of this resolution.

The Delhi Agreement, 1952
Accordingly, the representatives of Kashmir Government conferred with the representatives of Indian Government and arrived at an agreement. This arrangement was later on known as the "Delhi Agreement, 1952". The main features of this agreement were:
i. in view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State, the Government of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all states other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they vested in the State itself;
ii. it was agreed between the two Governments that in accordance with Article 5 of the Indian Constitution, persons who have their domicile in Jammu and Kashmir shall be regarded as citizens of India, but the State legislature was given power to make laws for conferring special rights and privileges on the ‘state subjects’ in view of the ‘State Subject Notifications of 1927 and 1932: the State legislature was also empowered to make laws for the ‘State Subjects’ who had gone to Pakistan on account of the communal disturbances of 1947, in the event of their return to Kashmir;
iii. as the President of India commands the same respect in the State as he does in other Units of India, Articles 52 to 62 of the Constitution relating to him should be applicable to the State. It was further agreed that the power to grant reprieves, pardons and remission of sentences etc; would also vest in the President of India'
iv. the Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag in addition to the Union flag, but it was agreed by the State Government that the State flag would not be a rival of the Union flag; it was also recognised that the Union flag should have the same status and position in Jammu and Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for historical reasons connected with the freedom struggle in the State, the need for continuance of the State flag was recognised
v. there was complete agreement with regard to the position of the Sadar-i-Riyasat; though the Sadar-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the State Legislature, he had to be recognised by the President of India before his installation as such; in other Indian States the Head of the State was appointed by the President and was as such his nominee but the person to be appointed as the Head, had to be a person acceptable to the Government of that State; no person who is not acceptable to the State Government can be thrust on the State as the Head. The difference in the case of Kashmir lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will in the first place be elected by the State legislature itself instead of being a nominee of the Government and the President of India. With regard to the powers and functions of the Sadar-i-Riyasat the following argument was mutually agreed upon
a. the Head of the State shall be a person recognised by the President of the Union on the recommendations of the Legislature of the State;
b. he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President;
c. he may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office;
d. subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office;
e. provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold the office until his successor enters upon his office"
vi. with regard to the fundamental rights, some basic principles agreed between the parties were enunciated; it was accepted that the people of the State were to have fundamental rights. But in the view of the peculiar position in which the State was placed, the whole chapter relating to ‘Fundamental Rights’ of the Indian Constitution could not be made applicable to the State, the question which remained to be determined was whether the chapter on fundamental rights should form a part of the State Constitution of the Constitution of India as applicable to the State;
vii. with regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it was accepted that for the time being, owing to the existence of the Board of Judicial Advisers in the State, which was the highest judicial authority in the State, the Supreme Court should have only appellate jurisdiction;
viii. .there was a great deal of discussion with regard to the "Emergency Powers"; the Government of India insisted on the application of Article 352, empowering the President to proclaim a general emergency in the State; the State Government argued that in the exercise of its powers over defence (Item 1 on the Union List), in the event of war or external aggression, the Government of India would have full authority to take steps and proclaim emergency but the State delegation was, however, averse to the President exercising the power to proclaim a general emergency on account of internal disturbance.
In order to meet the viewpoint of the State’s delegation, the Government of India agreed to the modification of Article 352 in its application to Kashmir by the addition of the following words:
"but in regard to internal disturbance at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State."
At the end of clause (1)
Both the parties agreed that the application of Article 356, dealing with suspension of the State Constitution and 360, dealing with financial emergency, was not necessary.
The facts analysed above make it clear that the State of Jammu and Kashmir enjoys a special position in the Union of India, and this position of the State has been permitted by Article 2 of the Constitution itself. " In arriving at this arrangement", declared Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, "the main consideration before our Government was to secure a position for the State which would be consistent with the requirements of maximum autonomy for the local organs of the State power which are the ultimate source of authority in the State while discharging obligations as a Unit of the federation".
The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly discussed this arrangement and finally adopted a motion of approach on August 21, 1952.
The agreement was discussed in the Union Parliament on August 7, 1952 and accepted.
But inspite of all these discussions and decisions in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, the implementation of the agreement was not forthcoming. This aroused suspicion in the minds of the public about the intentions of the leaders of the Government. In the working committee of the National Conference there was sharp criticism of the Government’s policy. There was a serious rift in the Cabinet itself. The difference of opinion reached a peak when Sheikh Abdullah, instead of implementing the agreement, started advocating secession, which would make Kashmir an ‘independent State’.

Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 765th meeting on 24 January 1957, concerning the India–Pakistan Question:
The resolution is a reaffirmation of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 that the convening of a Constituent Assembly and any action taken by it would not constitute disposition of the State in accordance with the will of the people of Kashmir expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It was introduced by Australia, Colombia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., and supported by 10 members of the Council, the Soviet Union abstaining.
The Security Council,
Having heard statements from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
Reminding the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in its resolutions of 21 April 1948 (S/726), 3 June 1948 , 14 March 1950 (S/1469) and 30 March 1951 (S/2017/Rev. 1), and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 (S/1100, para. 75) and 5 January 1949 (S/1196, para. 15), that the final disposition of that State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms the affirmation in its resolution of 30 March 1951 and declares that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference' and any action that Assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by the Assembly, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principles;
2. Decides to continue its consideration of the dispute.
24 January 1957

Indus Water Treaty and Kashmir
The British Viceroy Lord Mountbaten in the form of Kashmir imbroglio gave the parting kick at the time of partition of British India, by dividing Punjab and Bengal which mainly benefited India .Punjab, which provided India land route to Kashmir. Punjab earned its name because of the five rivers – Jhelum, Chinab, Ravi, Sutluj and Bias - regarded as one of grave conflict between India and Pakistan and to end the water disagreement a famous Indus water treaty was signed which is a water-sharing treaty between the Republic of India and Islamic Republic Of Pakistan. The treaty was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960 by the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. The World Bank (Erstwhile International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) is a signatory as a third party. The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab and three Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor exceptions, the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern rivers.
The countries agree to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the treaty. For this purpose, treaty creates the Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner appointed by each country.
The waters of the Indus basin begin in the Himalayan mountains of disputed state of Jammu Kashmir. They flow from the hills through the arid states of Punjab and Sind, converging in Pakistan and emptying into the Arabian Sea South of Karachi. Where once there was only a narrow strip of irrigated land along these rivers, developments over the last century have created a large network of canals and storage facilities that provide water for more than 26 million acres - the largest irrigated area of any one river system in the world.
The partition of the Indian subcontinent created a conflict over the plentiful waters of the Indus basin. The newly formed states were at odds over how to share and manage what was essentially a cohesive and unitary network of irrigation. Furthermore, the geography of partition was such that the source rivers of the Indus basin were in Indian administered area. Pakistan felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin.
During the first years of partition the waters of the Indus were apportioned by the Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual payments from the government of Pakistan. The accord was meant to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a more permanent solution. Neither side, however, was willing to compromise their respective positions and negotiations reached a stalemate. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral resolution.
By 1951, the two sides were no longer meeting and the situation seemed intractable. Which led to the deadlock and contributed to hostility. As one anonymous Indian official said at the time, "India and Pakistan can go on long over Kashmir, but an early settlement on the Indus waters is essential for maintenance of peace in the sub-continent" [xxxi]. Despite the unwillingness to compromise, both nations were anxious to find a solution, fully aware that the Indus conflict could lead to overt hostilities if unresolved.
In this same year, David Lilienthal, formerly the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the US Atomic Energy Commission, visited the region to write a series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen interest in the subcontinent and was welcomed by the highest levels of both Indian and Pakistani governments. Lilienthal was briefed by Indian State Department and executive branch officials, who hoped he could help bridge the gap between India and the United States and also gauge hostilities on the subcontinent. During the course of his visit, it became clear to Lilienthal that tensions between India and Pakistan were acute, but also unable to be erased with one sweeping gesture. In his journal he wrote:
India and Pakistan were on the verge of war over Kashmir. There seemed to be no possibility of negotiating this issue until tensions abated. One way to reduce hostility . . . would be to concentrate on other important issues where cooperation was possible. Progress in these areas would promote a sense of community between the two nations which might, in time, lead to a Kashmir settlement. Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a programme jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.[xxxii]
Lilienthal's idea was well received by officials at the World Bank, and, subsequently, by the Indian and Pakistani governments. Eugene R. Black, then president of the World Bank told Lilienthal that his proposal "makes good sense all round". Black wrote that the Bank was interested in the economic progress of the two countries and had been concerned that the Indus dispute could only be a serious handicap to this development. India's previous objections to third party arbitration were remedied by the Bank's insistence that it would not adjudicate the conflict, but, instead, work as a conduit for agreement.
Black also made a distinction between the "functional" and "political" aspects of the Indus dispute. In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan leaders, Black asserted that the Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional aspects of disagreement were negotiated apart from political considerations. He envisioned a group that tackled the question of how best to utilize the waters of the Indus Basin - leaving aside questions of historic rights or allocations.
Black proposed a Working Party made up of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers. The World Bank delegation would act as a consultative group, charged with offering suggestions and speeding dialogue. In his opening statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he was optimistic about the group's success:
One aspect of Mr. Lilienthal's proposal was that the Indus problem is an engineering problem and should be dealt with by engineers. One of the strengths of the engineering profession is that, all over the world, engineers speak the same language and approach problems with common standards of judgment. [xxxiii] Black's hopes for a quick resolution to the Indus dispute were premature. While the Bank had expected that the two sides would come to an agreement on the allocation of waters, neither India nor Pakistan seemed willing to compromise their positions. While Pakistan insisted on its historical right to waters of all the Indus tributaries, and that half of West Punjab was under threat of desertification the Indian side argued that the previous distribution of waters should not set future allocation. Instead, the Indian side set up a new basis of distribution, with the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the Eastern tributaries to India. The substantive technical discussions that Black had hoped for were stymied by the political considerations he had expected to avoid.[xxxiv]
The World Bank soon became frustrated with this lack of progress. What had originally been envisioned as a technical dispute that would quickly untangle itself became an intractable mess. India and Pakistan were unable to agree on the technical aspects of allocation, let alone the implementation of any agreed upon distribution of waters. Finally, in 1954, after nearly two years of negotiation, the World bank offered its own proposal, stepping beyond the limited role it had apportioned for itself and forcing the two sides to consider concrete plans for the future of the basin. The proposal offered India the three eastern tributaries of the basin and Pakistan the three western tributaries. Canals and storage dams were to be constructed to divert waters from the western rivers and replace the eastern river supply lost by Pakistan.[xxxv]
While the Indian side was amenable to the World Bank proposal, Pakistan found it unacceptable. The World Bank allocated the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers to Pakistan. Where India had stood for a new system of allocation, Pakistan felt that its share of waters should be based on pre-partition distribution. The World Bank proposal was more in line with the Indian plan and this angered the Pakistani delegation. They threatened to withdraw from the Working Party and negotiations verged on collapse.
But neither side could afford the dissolution of talks. India was eager to settle the Indus issue; large development projects were put on hold by negotiations and Indian leaders were eager to divert water for irrigation.
In December of 1954, the two sides returned to the negotiating table. The World Bank proposal was transformed from a basis of settlement to a basis for negotiation and the talks continued, stop and go, for the next six years.
One of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerned financing for the construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer water from the eastern Indian rivers to Pakistan. This transfer was necessary to make up for the water Pakistan was giving up by ceding its rights to the eastern tributaries. The World Bank initially planned for India to pay for these works, but India refused. The Bank responded with a plan for external financing supplied mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom. This solution cleared the remaining stumbling blocks to agreement and the Treaty was signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries in 1960.[xxxvi]
The agreement also set up a commission to adjudicate any future disputes arising over the allocation of waters. The Permanent Indus Commission has survived two wars and provides ongoing machinery for consultation and conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of data, and visits. The Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin. Either party must notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works which would affect the other party and to provide data about such works. In cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for mediation and arbitration. While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the kind of conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.[xxxvii]
The Indus Waters Treaty is the longest agreement that has been faithfully implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan.[xxxviii] But Indus Article XII does allow for modification of the treaty when agreed to by both parties.[xxxix]
Pakistani columnists, religious leaders, and policymakers are increasingly articulating their concern over the water dispute .In one such recent case, Ayaz Amir, a renowned Pakistani columnist, warned: "Insisting on our water rights with regard to India must be one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy. The disputes of the future will be about water."[xl]
Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), charged: "India has stopped our water."[xli]
Pakistan's Indus Basin Water Council (IBWC), a pressure group ,whose central purpose is to address Pakistani water has expresses concerns in the public debates over the issue. IBWC Chairman Zahoorul Hassan Dahir claimed that "India, working in conjunction with the Jewish lobby" is using most of the river waters, causing a shortage of food, water and electricity in Pakistan.[xlii]
In an editorial concerning the water issues, the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Ausaf accusing the Pakistani government of not developing a counter-strategy to confront India's "dangerous ambitions," the article alluded to external supporters of India's anti-Pakistani policy, claiming that, "India was given easy rides which helped it complete most work on Baglihar dam." [xliii]
Nizami aaccused India of blocking water from the Chenab River and further proclaimed that India wants to destroy Pakistan, saying: "Our crops are not getting water. If this situation continues, Pakistan will become Sudan and Somalia." [xliv]
Pakistani concern turned graver, regarding the water from the rivers started in the 1990s after India began constructing a hydroelectric power project on the Chenab River in the Doda district of Jammu Kashmir. Since the Chenab is the key tributary of the Indus, Pakistani policymakers, religious and political parties, and political commentators feared that India could exert control over the waters. Such control could be used to injure the Pakistani economy and livestock, or could be used to cause floods in Pakistan by the release of water during times of war. Discussions of Pakistan's concerns are most often centralized around the Baglihar dam, though it is only one of the several water projects being developed by India in its administered part of Jammu Kashmir.[xlv] Not to solve Kashmir issue was a hatched conspiracy in order to keep the two infant states India & Pakistan at war, for the benefit of the Anglo-American alliance, which later thrust the dagger of Israel in the hearts of Arabs in the Middle East.[xlvi]

Why water Tussle
Considering the renewed awareness of geo-strategic security concerns based on energy and resources, this should be no surprise. The combined forces of the world’s population demographics with the impending effect of global climate change has forced environmental and security strategists to acknowledge both each other and the potential devastating severity of such a crisis. Conflict over water has been a tendency of human behavior throughout history though it does not tend to fit the traditional mold of full-scale wars fought purely over water. Particularly since the 20th century, water has been a significant feature of the various conflicts rather than their sole purpose. However, now in the first decade of the 21st century, this may no longer be the case. With the increasing pressures, especially from rapid population growth, urbanization and climate change, this century may in fact witness a birth of full-scale wars for fresh water.[xlvii] The demand for water is rapidly overtaking the existing supply. Though water covers roughly two thirds of the planet, only 3 percent of the total water supply is fresh water, another two thirds of which is frozen in glaciers and the polar ice caps. Further, much of the rest is in underground aquifers or in the soil, leaving less than one percent available to the human population. Currently 2 billion people do not have enough water for even basic needs, approximately one third of the world’s population. Increasing demands from exploding populations is exacerbated as these societies become more affluent and developed because as such they tend to use more water. While the world’s population doubled between 1950 and 1990, global water use increased by 300 percent. Frank Rijsberman, director of the International Water Management Institute has said, “Globally, water usage has increased by six times in the past 100 years and will double again by 2050, driven mainly by irrigation and demands of agriculture.” The fact that many of the critical water sources in these areas are shared by two or more countries, coupled with the involved states’ rare agreement on how to divide up the available supply, means that disputes over access to the contested resources will become increasingly contentious. In fact, 145 of the world’s countries depend on shared water systems for at least some portion of their fresh water supply. Tensions arise whenever a member of the shared water resource system, a riparian, attempts to increase its share of the dwindling supply and the other members are likely to respond forcefully. In the same light, any effort by upstream countries to dam the river or other wise control its onward flow is almost sure to produce concern and hostility among the downstream states. Although attempts have been made at drafting equitable water-sharing agreements, discrepancy over the distribution of their flow persists. Studies by independent scientists, institutes and corporate analysts all agree the costs of increasing water shortage affect both wealthy and developing nations, and will include among them a significant rise in global violence. According to Michael Klare in his book Resource Wars, “unless more progress is made in negotiating cooperative arrangements, growing scarcity combined with rising population will produce and increasingly unstable environment.” That instability can quickly morph into something more severe; in water-scarce regions it is typical for states to view combat over vital sources of supply as a legitimate function of national security and survival. In the words of UNESCO Director-General Klaus Toepfer in 1999, “As [water] becomes increasingly rare, it becomes coveted, [and] capable of unleashing conflicts. More than over land or oil, it is over water that the most bitter conflicts of the near future may be fought.” Of the many parts of the world that will face increasing water scarcity, it will be a particularly extreme predicament in most of South Asia. Fresh water is emerging as its most crucial resource issue due to the massive population growth, its largely agricultural economies, and its rampant poverty in human and economic terms. The population of the region is expected to hit 1.5 billion by 2020 with 50 percent of that population below the poverty line. Further, the region’s water availability is limited and the demand is expanding rapidly. Such a high population density combined with a low per capita income and a predominantly agricultural economy in water scarce regions necessitates sustainable water management of shared sources.
Both countries of Sub-continent India and Pakistan face problems that include flooding or drought in multiple regions, inefficient and inadequate irrigation, inadequate supplies of clean water in both rural and urban areas, ground water depletion and contamination, lack of pollution control and treatment facilities, and insufficient and poorly maintained infrastructure. Some believe that as the gap between water availability and requirements widens, therefore it can shoot up the tension between two nuclear countries in the region . The two countries face similar, precarious predicaments. India has been steadily moving closer towards a ‘danger zone’ in terms of its water supplies. In the last fifty years, per capita availability of water has dropped by roughly 60 percent from over 5000 cubic meters in 1950 to 1800 cubic meters in 2005, a drop that may indeed be repeated in the next fifty years. Some provinces are already below the 1000 cubic meter threshold, the “water stress” limit per person per year as defined by the World Bank. Below this limit the possibility for serious economic and social consequences dramatically increases. Over-pumping underground water wells has been a serious problem for both states for many years; for example, water levels have been dropping at a rate of 5 percent annually in India’s Punjab and Haryana, escalating conflict between the states themselves as well as with the Indian national government over water allocation for their agricultural needs .As per recent report 1/4th of India’s Agriculture land gets converted into deserts for which deforestation is the main reason but ultimately it leads to the shortage of water [xlviii] . Meanwhile, Pakistan is rapidly nearing the same crisis levels: its per capita water availability has fallen from 5,600 cubic meters at the time of independence to 1,200 cubic meters in 2005, and its groundwater table has dropped in 26 out of 45 canal commands. Both countries face issues in water storage because of the high levels of silt carried by the Indus; in fact, by 2010 Pakistan may already see a 50 percent loss in its water storage capacity.
The water shortages would be enough to generate serious concern and tension between the two, but to add the projected human population growth is to raise the stakes to an entirely different level. The anticipated population increases between 1998 and 2050 run at approximately 57 percent to India and 142 percent to Pakistan. Assuming that current predictions prove accurate, India’s population will grow to three times what it was when it signed the Treaty, 1.3 billion by 2025. By that time Pakistan will have more than six times its original population at 270 million. These populations depend on the Indus system for drinking water, sanitation and the bulk of their food: as the natural precipitation patterns are already sparse in this largely arid region, and many local aquifers face total depletion, irrigated agriculture is the only reliable means of producing sufficient food. For example, 90 percent of Pakistan’s agriculture is dependent on the Indus water system, a country already facing a shortfall in food grain availability by about 4 million tons per year. It is feared that this number could triple by the end of the decade, representing a collapse of Pakistan’s agricultural productivity.[xlix] Therefore the insistence of integrated planning, development, and management, of looking at the basin’s water as a shared resource vital to a cooperative future rather than state by state interpretations. The EU Water Framework Directive (EUWFD), a model for water management and protection, emphasizes that the best model to manage river water is according to the natural geographical and hydrological unit, instead of according to the administrative or political boundaries. [l] A water-sharing agreement can positively contribute to peace and cooperation in the basin by addressing the future water needs of the riparian countries. International laws regulating trans-boundary water resources up to this point have been able to stave off major crises, but the century’s escalating demand could well ‘break the dam.’ The agreements must be sustainable, lasting and progressive. Further, it is vital to build upon institutions at a basin level for the rational use and appropriate, competent management of shared water systems. In the case of Pakistan and India, pending demand will require much more of the Indus Waters Treaty in the near future, particularly in addressing the needs of Jammu Kashmir.[li] An integrated development plan for the conservation and sustained management of the Indus Basin presents a powerful opportunity to open a new pathway to a negotiated settlement of the 62 year old conflict in Kashmir. The approach necessitates a plan jointly developed by Pakistan and India and would involve creative solutions to the political stalemate that could move from water management to broader bilateral rapprochement. “A holistic approach to water resources—recognizing the interaction and economic linkages between water, land, the users, the environment and infrastructure—is necessary to evade the impending water crisis in the subcontinent.”[lii] Kashmir is at the headwaters for the Indus Rivers as well as the broader conflict between Pakistan and India. Its situation is inextricable from that of its water, and its future depends on finding an equitable, sustainable outcome for the region’s most valuable resource. Failing to address the acute and escalating water issues will generate increasingly dire consequences, particularly considering the rising pressures of population growth and climate change. Integrated water cooperation and sharing between Pakistan and India is important enough in its own right, but perhaps finding a new way to navigate Kashmir’s waters will provide the path to peace for the people of Jammu Kashmir, hence Kashmiris must be taken into confidence while going for the negotiations ,thinking on futuristic lines another upsurge in Jammu Kashmir is in offing which might engulf both India and Pakistan severely , therefore another storm is gathering which is to be looked seriously .

The Indo-Pak Water Conflict from a Strategic Perspective by applying Game Theory (Looking for the settlement )
Indo-Pak Water Conflict has experienced 62 years from their Independence which led to the escalation of tension between two neighbouring warring countries of the sub-continent , now both are having nuclear warheads, which they have arrayed at each other . In this section, a game-theoretic view of the conflict , Pakistan treated as one player, and the India , as the other player, in the period preceding 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT) Agreement is discussed. The central conflict is highlighted along with its dynamics .
Two basic strategic stances the two sides could take are considered. One is a hard-line stance, denoted by H. For India, this supports the refusal to negotiate with Pakistan , as well as the maintenance of India’s status quo over water resources of Kashmir . For Pakistan , it meant a refusal to accept any resolution short of complete control over the waters . In this scheme, no compromise might be reached. Each side, as an alternative strategy, could take a conciliatory stance , denoted by C.
For India, such a stance is meant a willingness to negotiate a compromise solution to the Water conflict giving a space for a more democratic approach . For Pakistan , C indicates a similar willingness to compromise, including halting its activities which lead to tension at least temporarily. Please see pic 11

Next, a rank of these four states is set for both sides as follows: 4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; 1 = worst. Thus, the higher the number, the greater the payoff to a player. These numbers, however, do not signify any numerical value or utility a player attaches to a state. Rather, they indicate only that each player prefers a higher-ranked state to a lower-ranked one. This also what makes classic-game theoretic approach is more limited compared to, for instance, AHP analysis. In the payoff matrix shown in Figure 1, these ranks are given by the ordered pair (x,y), where x is the ranking of the row player (Pakistan) and y is the ranking of the column player (India). The following is brief justification of these rankings for each player, starting with the upper-left state and moving clockwise around the matrix:
Compromise: (3,3). This is the next-best state for both players involving a compromise on the issue of control to waters . [liii]For both India and Pakistan , the benefits of this state include an end to the escalation and the possibility of long-term peace on Water conflict .
Pakistan Capitulates: (2,4). This is the best state for India because it has all the benefits of a compromise without having to make any concessions. It is the next worst state for Pakistan because Water conflict achieves some level of normalcy, India status quo remains almost intact .
Escalation of Tension : (1,2). This is the next-worst state for India because, although it maintains control over Waters , Pakistan complaints continue; in addition, India faces pressure from international community, especially World Development Bank , to bring an end to the tension . It is the worst state for Pakistan , because both India succeeds and tension continues.
India Capitulates: (4,1). This is the worst state for India which loses all control over Waters . By contrast, Pakistan achieves its best state by gaining full control without the need to compromise its hard-line position. The apparent expected solution to this game is the (3,3) compromise, but this is not the solution that standard game theory predicts. The reason is that India has a dominant strategy of H: it is a better strategy than C whatever strategy Pakistan chooses. If Pakistan chooses C, then (2,4) is better for India than (3,3); If Pakistan chooses H, (1,2) is better for India than (4,1).
Presuming that India chooses H, because it is unconditionally better than C, what will Pakistan do? Observe that Pakistan does not have a dominant strategy: H is better if India chooses C, giving (4,1) rather than (3,3). But C is better if India chooses H, giving (2,4) rather than (1,2). In a game in which all parties have complete information (symmetric game), lets us assume that Pakistan can anticipate that India will choose its dominant strategy of H. Accordingly, its best response would be to choose C, obtaining its next worst state of (2,4) rather than its worst state of (1,2).
The strategies that yield (2,4) or capitulation by Pakistan , are what game theorist called a Nash quilibrium, because if either player departs unilaterally from its strategy associated with this state (C for Pakistan , H for India), it does worse: by changing its strategy from C to H, Pakistan would move the situation to (1,2) or escalation of tension ; by changing its strategy from H to C, India would move the situation to (3,3), or compromise. By contrast, if the players both chose C, leading to compromise, each would have an incentive to depart from C to try to achieve its best state—(2,4) for India and (4,1) for Pakistan .
The states of (4,1) and (1,2) are also unstable in the sense that at least one player would have an incentive unilaterally to change its strategy. Hence, (2,4) is the unique stable state in this game.
The dominance of H for India helps to explain that parties’ refusal to keep the Pre -(IWT) alive. However, the actions of Pakistan before–commencing diplomatic pressure tactics or activities after 1990 , suspending them temporarily and gives support for negotiations, both India and Pakistan resuming them afterwards, suspending them again contradict the supposed stability of (2,4). Within the limits of classical game theory, any use of pressure politics of two would seem to be irrational .[liv]In order to account for the changes in strategy by Pakistan , we next turn to the theory of Moves(TOMs), which allows for strategy shifts by players as they attempt to implement desired outcomes. It also allows for the exercise of threats by a player that has the power and will carry them out if the response it seeks from the threatened party is not forthcoming.

TOM and Threats
Game theory, as developed initially by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, is an approach that is, in their own words, “thoroughly static.”[lv] Classical game theory has little to say about the dynamic process by which players’ choices unfold to produce outcomes, at least in strategic-form games that are defined by payoff matrices like that shown in Figure 1. By contrast, TOM adds a dynamic dimension by assuming that players look ahead before making a move, switching strategies in anticipating of the possible moves of an opponent.
A key concept of TOM, and one which is very helpful in analyzing the Water conflict , is the notion of “threat power”. A player has threat power when it can better endure an Inefficient state than can an opponent.[lvi]
An inefficient state is one that is worse for both players than some other state. Thus in the Figure 1 game, (1,2) in an inefficient state, because it is worse for both players than either (2,4) or (3,3).
Consider the situation in Water conflict , as depicted in Figure 1, and how the two sides have attempted to assert their threat power signaling its willingness to endure the mutually harmful (i.e. inefficient) state of (1,2). Observe that by choosing H, Pakistan ensures that India is faced with its two worst states, (4,1) and (1,2). Presented with this choice, India would presumably select (1,2) over (4,1) by choosing H as well.
If by asserting its threat power, Pakistan took a hard-line stance—but not because it preferred the conflict at (1,2) to capitulation at (2,4). Instead, it hoped to force India to take conciliatory stance.
If India has a dominant strategy of maintaining its own hard-line position (H), which is better for it whatever Pakistan does. But when India implements its dominant strategy at the same time Pakistan threatens India’s two worst states with its choice of H, the result to escalation of tension . The state held throughout after 1990s, when India started building some dams on Chenab, Indus(Kishan Ganga) and Jehleum for Hydel power generation especially by NHPC along with Baglihar .
One way out of this situation is for both sides to agree to move to the mutually beneficial compromise state. In the late 1999 to early 2003 there were talks to try to arrive at such a settlement. The India position was that Pakistan would have to renounce its hard-line stand .In essence, India ,if insisting that Pakistan move from H to C first, shifting the game from (1,2) to (2,4).
On the other hand, if India moves first to C, the situation would shift from (1,2) to (4,1), at least temporarily. Then Pakistan could move to C, resulting in the (3,3) compromise state. But this sequence of moves could be interpreted by Indian pressure groups as India’s accepting Pakistan’s position at (4,1), which will be unacceptable to India and also entails the risk that Pakistan would not subsequently move on to (3,3). Hence, it is expected that New Delhi will insist that Pakistan should make the first conciliatory move.
If Pakistan agrees to the conditions of India demanding a reciprocal move from India, which if agreed . This can be seen as a move by Pakistan from (1,2) to (2,4), which is better for both players, yielding an efficient in asymmetrical state.
If Pakistan halts its activities and ready to negotiate, thus the situation will stand at (2,4), if India is not responsive and remains adamant on status quo which Pakistan will consider as an offensive position. While (2,4) is India’s best outcome, from which it has no motivation to move, Pakistan still possessed the threat power to move back to (1,2). In short, the threat is that if India did not move to a conciliatory stance, leading to (3,3), Pakistan would return to a hard-line stance, reinstating the inefficient state of (1,2).
If India, doesn’t seem to have no (IWT ) conditions applied on it, further unless Pakistan renounces its hard-line stand .Thus, the situation will halt at (2,4) after the Pakistan declares its readiness . If India demands that Pakistan go one step further a, sought to eliminate its adversary’s threat power—that is, its power to revert to H and, once again, to inflict on India one of its two worst outcomes. If Pakistan did return to H, India would continue to implement its own hard-line stance (because it preferred [1,2] to [4,1]), which would mean a return to escalation to tension at (1,2).
By refusing to move from (2,4) to (3,3) by accepting (IWT) conditions , India may pass an important opportunity to achieve a lasting peace. If India did little while it actually possesses more power in the game.
Then Pakistan will refuse to fully shun its activities which rockets the tension , prior to further settlement, for a very good reason:
Giving up would deprive it of the only leverage it has and would “tantamount to Surrender .” In the absence of a Pakistan threat, and the resolve and resources to carry it out, India had no incentive to move away from its best state of (2,4).
If India completely rejects go for settlement with Pakistan .In term of this particular analysis,if India is unwilling to move from (2,4) to (3,3). While India’s stay-put strategy is short run because it enjoys its best state at (2,4), it is irrational, Pakistan is capable of reverting to (1,2),it will be , unquestionably, if New Delhi ’s decision not to negotiate will resume to the escalation of tension ,thereby returning the situation to the destructive (1,2) state.

A Path Towards Peace
The (IWT)signed in 1960 offered hope that a peaceful resolution to the Water conflict between India and Pakistan . In what follows, the moves and counter-moves of India and Pakistan are analyzed by applying game-theoretic model ,efforts that laid the roundwork for final negotiations of IWT in 1960 .
If Pakistan stops to escalate tension would have to precede any substantial conciliatory moves on the part of the India. If India insists on the conciliatory move. In theory, the game presented in Figure 1 can be moved from conflict at (1,2) to compromise at (3,3)via two paths. One path to compromise would involve India’s changing from a hard-line to a conciliatory stance first, followed by a reciprocal change of strategies on the part of Pakistan . As a result, the situation would initially move from (1,2) to (4,1), and subsequently from (4,1) to (3,3). In fact, then Pakistan will try to see if India is willing to make some concessions, even before (IWT), by one-sidedly announced its intention to meaningful negotiations .Then India could easily be seen as having caved into defeat in terms of right wing political parties especially those , who want a no-talk option with the Pakistan then Indian leadership in power need to take a bold decision .
The second possible path toward peace would require that if Pakistan changes from a hard-line to a conciliatory stance first, followed by a reciprocal change on the part of India. In this scenario, the situation would initially move from (1,2) to (2,4), and subsequently from (2,4) to (3,3).
With its readiness to compromise, asserting “peace power” then Pakistan will make the first move, shifting the situation to (2,4). But, as the breaking of the (IWT) norms leveled by Pakistan after 1990 , conciliatory stance is not sufficient. In some respects, India’s unwillingness to consult and build further hydel power generation units on Jehleum,Indus(Kishan Ganga) and even on Chenab will lead to more intimidations . Thus creating a complete wide crack to the game then only option in that case is to leave the game for both and consult third party mediation .

Indo –China War 1962
The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan), and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created PRC[lvii]. At the time, Chinese officials issued no declarations of control over Aksai Chin. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1956 argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement since China did not regard the region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border[lviii].
This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama, who was fleeing Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule.
Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the PLA took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line[lix], and two months later in Aksai Chin a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen[lx].
On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs over China. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) went so far as to prepare a self-defensive counterattack plan. Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made[lxi].
As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line , China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory. In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drops its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet[lxii]. India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[lxiii] India's stance was that China should withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation. China's continuing patrols south of the McMahon Line provoked an Indian response known as the "Forward Policy". According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This programme created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China, the aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line (McMahon).[lxiv]
China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling B.M Kaul(Chief) was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.[lxv] Indeed at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with both forces attempting to outmanoeuver each other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.[lxvi]
On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker. On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory. Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.[lxvii] In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge. Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s, it was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be "substantially accurate"[lxviii]
On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the Indian state of Sikkim (an Indian protectorate at that time). Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory. Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October. They gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs. At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines so that the Indians could not make contact with CHQ. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry, who had been positioned behind the Indians in the night, made their surprise attack and forced the Indians to leave their trench positions. The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians. Proceeding attacks from flanking positions south of the McMahon Line overwhelmed the Indian troops and caused withdrawal from Namka Chu. Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops escaped into Bhutan. However, Chinese forces respected the border and ignored Tsang Le .Now the Chinese troops had occupied the area which was under dispute in the confrontations at Thag La, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA. On 23 October, Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance, On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. China quickly and efficiently got rid of remnants of Indian troops. On 20 October, operations in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake were successful for the PLA .Many outposts and garrisons comprised were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts fought and were either killed or taken prisoner. India did not support its troops, as the Galwan post had been surrounded by China in August and had received no land support from India since then. After the 20 October attack, this post was not heard from again. Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched various attacks throughout the western theatre. By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared .
Later on 24 October, there was a battle on the Rezang La Ridge to defend an air strip from impending Chinese takeover.
After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn so that they could regroup and be ready if China probed south of their claim line.[lxix]
On the Eastern theatre , the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 November. These positions were defended by the Indian 4th Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops.
Se La was very high, and faced with this strategic problem, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La. On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2 platoons of Indian troops at Gurung Hill.
The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area. The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 118 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences. The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed. Indians suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line - many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties. The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance. China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance further, and on 19 November it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated;
Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.
Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles,but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.
Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees. The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet.[lxx]

Aftermath: According to the China's official (communist) military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in the western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilized along the Line of Actual Control, however it is believed that India has suffered huge casuality in the war ,although no authentic or official record of causalities is available, which both countries have incurred in Sino-Indo War .

1965(Indo-Pak War)
Date: August 1965
Location: Jammu Kashmir Administered India
Territorial Changes : No changes but ends in
cease-fire
Strength:
India: 100,000 - 200,000
Pakistan: 5,000 - 40,000
Commanders
India : Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri,Harbakhsh Singh and Gurbaksh Singh
Pakistan : Ayub Khan,Musa Khan,Tikka Khan and Nasir Ahmed Khan
Casualties and losses
India : 3000 Killed,[lxxi] 175 tanks destroyed,59 aircraft lost (Indian claim) , 60-75 air craft lost (neutral)and 110 aircraft destroyed (Pakistani claim)
Pakistan:3800 Killed [lxxii] - 280 tanks destroyed ,20 aircraft lost (Pakistani claim),20 aircraft lost (Neutral claim) 73 aircraft lost (Indian claim)
The estimate of deaths by independent sources were 10234 Indian soldiers and 7000 Pakistani soldiers including Pakistani armed Volunteers.[lxxiii]
Before proceeding to full swing war of 1965 , initially “Operation Gibraltar” was the name given to the master plan by Pakistan to infiltrate Jammu Kashmir and start a rebellion against Indian rule. Launched in August 1965, guerrillas, disguised as locals, entered Jammu Kashmir from Pakistan with the intention of fomenting an armed rebellion among Kashmiri Muslims. However, the strategy went awry from the outset as it was not well-coordinated and the infiltrators were soon found. The debacle was followed by an Indian counterattack…..!

The operation was a significant one as it sparked a large scale military engagement between the two neighbours, the first since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Its success, as envisaged by its Pakistani planners, could have given Pakistan control over a unified Kashmir; something that Pakistan desired to achieve at the earliest opportunity. However, the plan misfired and triggered a war (the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965) where Pakistan was put on the defensive and forced by the Indian army to retreat back to normal borders.
Following the First Kashmir War which saw India gaining the majority of the disputed area of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win back the areas lost. The opening came after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 after India's war with the China and as a result the Indian Military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armour over India, which Pakistan sought to utilise before India completed its defence build-up. The Rann of Kutch episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed, resulted in some positives for Pakistan. Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic [lxxiv]from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Kashmiri Muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt. [lxxv]
These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir. [lxxvi]
Assuming that a weakened Indian Military would not respond, Pakistan choose to send in "Mujahideens" into Jammu Kashmir,administered by India.
The original plan for the Operation, code named Gibraltar, was prepared as early as the 1950s; however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward given the scenario backed by then Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained volunteers , highly motivated and well armed. It was reason that the conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the words of retired Pakistani General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war."[lxxvii] Pakistani author Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema notes that Musa Khan, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, was reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action. Although Initially, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Musa Khan opposed Gibraltar on the grounds that if the operation was a non-starter, then Pakistan would not be able to defeat India in the ensuing war. Many senior officials also were against the plan, as a failure could lead to an all-out war with India, which many wanted to avoid.[lxxviii]
As a result, groundwork and intelligence gathering for execution of the plan was laid by launching "Operation Nusrat", the purpose of which was to locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) that were to serve as entry points for the armed volunteers[ Mujahideen], and to gauge the response of the Indian army and the local population. [lxxix]
Despite initial reservations by the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, the operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources put it at 24 July), [lxxx] armed volunteers began to cross the Cease Fire Line dividing and were — called "Gibraltar Force" — were given different code names, mostly after historically significant Muslim rulers.[lxxxi] The operation's name, Gibraltar, itself was chosen for the Islamic connotations. [lxxxii]
The 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from Gibraltar, a situation not unlike that Pakistan envisaged for Indian administered Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Operation Gibraltar. The areas choosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in the populous Kashmir Valley.
The plan was multi-pronged. [Mujahideens ] would mingle with the local populace and incite them to a rebellion. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare commenced , destroying bridges, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking airfields,[lxxxiii] with a view to create the conditions of an "armed revolt" in Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed that India would neither counter-attack,[lxxxiv] nor involve itself in another full-scale war, and the liberation of Kashmir would rapidly follow.
Indian soldiers hoisting their national flag atop a peak in the Haji Pir pass, which was captured soon after the infiltrators were discovered.
Despite the operational planning, [Mujahideens] were detected by Indian forces in Kashmir. With the exception of four districts which did revolt, the local Kashmiris cooperated with Gibraltar Force mostly in the districts of Baramullah, Budgam , Srinagar and Anantnag by serving food and in some areas dynamic shelter also , except few , who conveyed news of the planned revolt to the local authorities. Gibraltar Force was soon facing attacks from the Indian Army who moved in immediately to secure the border. The some of the infiltrators were captured by the Indian troops, although mostly managed to escape. India accused the Pakistani government of sending and aiding the guerillas[ Mujahideens] although Pakistan denied any complicity.[lxxxv] On 9th August Indian forces torched Batamaloo Srinagar because local populace was giving dynamic shelter to [Mujahideens] although New Delhi maintained that episode happened in the cross firing . On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the border and launched an attack on the territory of Kashmir administered by Pakistan. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked while assessments from India and neutral sources cite this as a response to Pakistan's infiltration into Jammu Kashmir as part of Operation Gibraltar.[lxxxvi]
Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers into Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
On September 1, 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further South.
India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6, marking an official beginning of the war.[lxxxvii] On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counter attack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6th September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[lxxxviii] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment [lxxxix]to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21st September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.
On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th armoured division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.
The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning - "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent - "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed(Indian claim ) or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.
The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (545 km²) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[xc] while Pakistani land gains were primarily south in deserts opposite to Sindh . The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since they achieved independence from Britain . Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.
The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Star fighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1.[xci]
The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of Soviet and European aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, although some defence experts say IAF planes were in parity with Pakistan . [xcii] IAF's de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who lead the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war.[xciii]
The F-86 claimed a fair share of Indian planes, though remaining vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer".[xciv] The PAF's F-104 Star fighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Air Cadre (retired) Sajjad Haider who flew with the PAF's No.19 Squadron, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region."[xcv] It can be argued that, although the IAF is believed to have feared the Star fighter,[xcvi] in combat it was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[xcvii]
The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 35. According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Star fighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[xcviii]
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[xcix] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[c] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[ci]
At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions - the latter being in the process of formation. The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr I Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th cavalry Poona Horse, the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Royal Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions,. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[cii] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar.[ciii];[civ] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armored Division at Assal Uttar.
Although India's tank formations experienced same results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armored Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by newly raised 6th Armoured Division(ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. The Indians lost 12 tanks at Chawinda. The Pakistanis followed up with Operation Windup, which forced Indian forces back further. One true winner to emerge was India's Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, which proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.[cv]However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such a the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes. The navies of India and Pakistan did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this.[cvi] On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the Indian coastal town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it did not fulfill its primary objective of disabling the radar station and there was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, some of the Indian fleet sailed from Bombay to Dwarka to patrol the area and deter further bombardment. Foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant bombardment"[cvii] of the town was a "limited engagement, with no strategic value."[cviii]
According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[cix] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.[cx] There were, however, unconfirmed reports of underwater attacks near Bombay by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American-supplied Pakistani submarines.
The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[cxi] On September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[cxii] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army or police[cxiii] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation[cxiv]
Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[cxv]
India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani paratroopers.[cxvi] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[cxvii]but these rumours were later determined to be unfounded.[cxviii]
On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.
Finally Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan)

Tashkent Agreement
On 10 January 1966, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, who had met in Tashkent at the invitation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, announced their agreement that the withdrawal of all armed personnel of both sides to the positions they had held prior to 5 August 1965 should be completed by 25 February 1966 and that both sides should observe the terms of the ceasefire on the ceasefire line.
The principles of a plan and schedule of withdrawals were subsequently agreed upon by military representatives of India and Pakistan, who had held meetings for that purpose since 3 January 1966 at Lahore and Amritsar under the auspices of General Marambio, the Secretary-General's representative on withdrawals. The plan for disengagement and withdrawal was agreed upon by the military commanders of the Indian and Pakistan armies in New Delhi on 22 January.
At a joint meeting on 25 January, under the auspices of the Secretary-General's representative, the parties agreed upon the ground rules for the implementation of the disengagement and withdrawal plan. The plan was to be implemented in two stages and the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were to be requested to ensure that the action agreed upon was fully implemented. In the event of disagreement between the parties, the decision of General Marambio would be final and binding on both sides. The good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were similarly requested for the implementation of the second stage of the agreement, as were the good offices of the Secretary-General's representative with regard to withdrawals of troops.

Mystery of Shastri's Death
Although officially it was maintained that Shastri died of heart attack, his widow, Lalita Shastri kept alleging that her husband was poisoned. Many believed that Shastri's body turning blue was an evidence of his poisoning. Indeed a Russian butler attending to him was arrested on suspicion of poisoning Shastri, but was later absolved of charges.[cxix]
In 2009, when Anuj Dhar, author of CIA's Eye on South Asia, asked the Prime Minister's Office under an RTI plea (Right to Information Act), that Shastri's cause of death be made public, the PMO refused to oblige, citing that this could lead to harming of foreign relations, cause disruption in the country and cause breach of parliamentary privileges.[cxx]The PMO did inform however that it had in its possession one document related to Shastri's death, but refused to declassify it. The government also admitted that no postmortem examination had been conducted on him in USSR, but it did have a report of a medical investigation conducted by Shastri's personal physician Dr. R.N. Chugh and some Russian doctors. Furthermore, the PMO revealed that there was no record of any destruction, or loss, of documents in the PMO having a bearing on Shastri's death. As of July 2009, the home ministry didn’t respond to queries whether India conducted a postmortem and if the government had investigated allegations of foul play.[cxxi]Circumstances of Shastri's death do indeed make a case for close inquiry. On the night of January 11, Shastri was awakened by a severe coughing fit. Dr. R.N. Chugh came to his aid. Shastri was unable to speak and pointed to a flask kept nearby. A staffer brought some water which Shastri sipped. Shortly afterward, Shastri became unconscious and attempts to revive him proved futile.

Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 20 September 1965 :
The Security Council;
1. demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, Sept. 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;
3. calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;
4. Decides to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution of Sept. 6 has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Alfatah
(An Indegineous Armed Resistance Movement )
January 1966 local Kashmiri youth launched an armed resitance group under the operation code named Alfatah , which was totally an indigenous move , under the commandership of Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer(GRZ) alias Rehman alias Maqbool with its headquarters at Barsoo Awantipora of South Kashmir . This kind of militant struggle was peculiar in nature , it resorted to two decoties to raise the finances for keeping the struggle running , one in 1969 at Pulwama where they took away Rupees seventy thousand(70,000) , the salary of teachers to which they purchased land at Barsoo and another at Hazrat Bank around January 1970, where they have taken forcibly Rupees one Lac(0.1million IR) , one activist who participated in the dacoity was spotted and arrested from Srinagar medical college where he was pursuing degree in medicine and surgery , identified as Farooq Ahmad his arrest led to the exposure of whole Alfateh squad – remaining active for more than 4 years , whole of its members which include ; Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer, Bashir Ahmad Bhat, Nisar Ahmad Mir , Mohammad Saleem Gilkar, Abdul Hai Baderwahi, Mohammad Syed Khan, Mohammad Iqbal Beigh(Doda) Gull Mohammad Ganie, Gulzar Ahmad Khaki,Ghulam Hassan Shaksaz, Mohammad Iqbal Sheikh , Bashir Ahmad Zarger, Gull Rafiqi, Peer Mohammad Hussain, Abdul Rashid Dar, Mohammad Yousuf Mir , Nazir Ahmad Wani, Fazal-ul- Haq Qureshi , Ghulam Mohammad Naikoo, Advocate Mohammad Shabaan Vakil, Mohammad Amin Bhat and Abdul Rashid Shawl were arrested , and lodged at Jammu Central jail during jail period Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer floated an idea to raise pro-independent political organization under the name and style Peoples Revolutionary Front (PRF) later launched after his release , it is worth to mention that PRF was an amalgam of Young Man’s League, Youth League , Unity Meet and Alfateh , which Zehgeer ,on 7th May 1977 merged with Pro-Independent political organization Mahaz-e-Azadi , although the move taken by GRZ and was supported by Bashir Ahmad Bhat, Nisar Ahmad Mir , Mohammad Saleem Gilkar, Abdul Hai Baderwahi, Mohammad Iqbal Beigh, Gulzar Ahmad Khaki,Ghulam Hassan Shaksaz , Bashir Ahmad Zarger, , Mohammad Yousuf Mir, Mohammad Maqbool Malik , while as Nazir Ahmad Wani , Fazal Haq Qureshi , Ghulam Mohammad Naikoo and Abdul Hamid Bhat founded Peoples League a Pro-Pakistan political organization after their release, in which afew members of youth League and Alfateh amalgamated in 1974 .[cxxii]
Here it is worth to mention that Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer(GRZ) prior to Alfateh formation around 1962 has led Red Kashmir(RK) and was charged for murduring one Indian Security person at Nawakal along with Nazir Ahmad Wani, Fazal-ul- Haq Qureshi and Farooq Rehmani when all went to underground during subversive period GRZ floated an idea to launch an indigenous armed struggle , when Farooq Rehmani was caught by police it led to arrest of all the members of RK after the release of GRZ ,launched an armed outfit and the operation was given the name Alfateh .
A Person Who Changed Political Consciousness Of Kashmiris
On 10th June 1966 the first group of armed NLF members secretly crossed over to the Indian administered Kashmir commanded by Maqbool Butt and started armed resistance against India for the complete Independence.
Maqbool Butt born on 18th February 1938 from a peasant family in Trahagam village Tehsil Handwara, district Kupwara. His father’s name was Ghulam Qadir Butt: his mother died when Maqbool Butt was 11 years old pupil in the village’s primary (junior) school . He had a younger brother Ghulam Nabi Butt. To provide mothering for his children Ghulam Qadir married again—from second wife he had two sons, Manzoor Ahmed Butt and Zahoor Ahmed Butt and three daughters. The early years of Maqbool Butt’s life, like thousands of other Kashmiri children were shaped by the harsh living conditions that characterised the life of peasants , who were toiling hard during the reign of cruel autocratic Dogra ruler. “The feudal system in the Maharaja’s Kashmir , forced Maqbool Butt to participate in the first political action in his life long struggle against suppression, occupation and for equality, freedom and social justice.”[cxxiii]
After completing his secondary school certificate, Maqbool Butt moved on to St. Joseph College in Baramula. This was a private missionary college. Here he gained his first degree (BA) in history and political science. The journey on that road to great sacrifice for Maqbool Butt was started while still a student at St. Joseph College.[cxxiv]
Thus went to other side of LOC[Azad Kashmir]. First and foremost problem before Maqbool Butt in Pakistan was to continue his education and at the same time find a job to meet the expenses; without that “it was hard to live in Pakistan’. Therefore, joined ’Anjam’ (end/conclusion/performance), a weekly magazine, as sub-editor and started working as a journalist - did his MA (from Pehswar university) in Urdu literature and worked with ‘Anjam’ till to the start of full time politics[cxxv]. As stated in the beginning ,on 10th June 1966 the first group of NLF members crossed over to the Indian administered Kashmir— Maqbool Butt, Aurangzeb, a student from Gilgit, Amir Ahmed and Kala Khan, a retired Subedar (non commissioned officer from AJK force) went deep into Valley ,while Major Amanullah and subedar Habibullah remained near to the division line. The former were to recruit Kashmiris into NLF while the latter were responsible for training and weapon supply. Maqbool Butt along with three of his group members worked underground for three months and established several guerilla cells in Kashmir. Later arrested in Kashmir and lodged in Srinagar central jail and given death sentence , where he started planning to escape from the prison and within a month and half of his arrest managed to escape. [cxxvi]
The event that brought Maqbool Butt and the Kashmir Issue in limelight in Kashmir, South Asia and at international level was the hijacking of an Indian Fokker plane ‘Ganga’[cxxvii]. . With NLF dismantled and PF demoralised, Maqbool Butt once again crossed over to the Indian administered Kashmir against the advice of many of his friends and colleagues ,in May 1976. This time he entered valley with Abdul Hammed Butt and Riaz Dar. Within few days of crossing they were spotted and arrested by the Indian forces. In 1978 the Indian Supreme Court restored death sentence on Maqbool Butt and he was transferred to Delhi’s Tihar Prison. After eight long years in prison Maqbool Butt was hanged on 11th February 1984 , while the legal team was waiting for Maqbool Butt’s case to be reopened on the grounds of flaws in the trial that convicted Maqbool Butt of murder. His execution was carried out in haste to avenge the killing of an Indian diplomat in Birmingham,Rovendra Mahatre[cxxviii]. Thus ended the life of one of the greatest revolutionary of modern Kashmiri history and was born what Kashmiris remember as Shaheed- e- Azam [the greatest martyr]. The hanging of Butt in Tihar changed the fate and fortunes of Kashmir, the momentous change evolved in the form of an armed revolution, which some experts on Kashmir Imbroglio believe and say , thus became an icon for countless political groups both within and outside the valley of Kashmir.
There is no doubt that democratic traditions and institutions in India are far well established, when it comes to Kashmir ,Indian democratic norms proved otherwise the mortal remains of Maqbool Butt were not even handed over to his legal heirs , which is the negation to the democratic doctrines on the part of India.

Indo-Pakistan War of 1971
Date: 3 December – 16 December 1971
Location: Eastern front: Current Day Bangladesh (then East Pakistan)
Western front: Border between India and Pakistan (then West Pakistan)
Result :Eastern front: former East Pakistan becomes the independent state of Bangladesh.
Western front:Ceasefire agreed between then West Pakistan and India.
Territorial changes:Eastern front: Bangladesh becomes an independent state.
Commanders
India: Sam Manekshaw,J.S. Arora,G.G. Bewoor,K. P. Candeth
Pakistan : Gul Hassan Khan,Abdul Hamid Khan,Tikka Khan,A. A. K. Niazi
Strength
India: 500,000 troops Pakistan : 365,000 troops

Causalities
India :3,843 killed 9,851 wounded[cxxix]
1Frigate,1 Naval Plane
Pakistan : 20,000 killed,4,350 wounded,97,368 captured[cxxx],2 Destroyers [cxxxi],1 Minesweeper[cxxxii]
1 Submarine[cxxxiii]3 Patrol vessels, 7 Gunboats
As per independent sources it is believed that 1,000,000-3,000,000 Bangladeshis were killed as a result of this war while almost 12000 Pakistani and 4000 Indian soldiers also got killed.[cxxxiv]

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis. The Bangladesh Liberation war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Rahman, President Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis to suppress dissent. Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements, the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25th March 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25–26 March 1971 at about 1:30 a.m. (as per Radio Pakistan’s news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan.
On 27th March 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a rebellious major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur Rahman . In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. A guerrilla troop of civilians, the Mukti Bahini, was formed to help the Bangladesh Army.
The Pakistan army conducted a widespread attrocities against the Bengali population of East Pakistan[cxxxv], leading to approximately 10 million[cxxxvi] people fleeing East Pakistan and taking refuge in the neighbouring Indian states[cxxxvii] The East Pakistan-India border was opened to allow refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. On 27th March 1971, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, expressed full support of her government to the struggle for independence by the people of East Pakistan. Exiled East Pakistan army officers and members of the Indian Intelligence immediately started using refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.By November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter, when the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On 23 November, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told his people to prepare for war . On the evening of 3 December Sunday, at about 5:40 PM, the Pakistani air force launched a pre-emptive strike on eight airfields in north-western India, including Agra which was 300 miles (480 km) from the border. During this attack the Taj Mahal was camouflaged with a forest of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its marble glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight This attack, called Operation Chengiz Khan and Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India. As a result, Indian runways were cratered and rendered non-functional for several hours after the attack[cxxxviii] In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the airstrikes as a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial airstrikes that very night that were expanded to massive retaliatory airstrikes the next morning . This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched the full-scale invasion. Indian forces responded with a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight and quickly achieved air superiority . The main Indian Objective on the Western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan . Pakistan's PNS Ghazi, was the only submarine operated by either of the warring nations in 1965.
In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of Vice Admiral Kohli, achieved success by attacking Karachi's port in the code-named Operation Trident on the night of 4-5 December which resulted in the sinking of the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber as well as the PNS Shajehan, and a minesweeper PNS Muhafiz. This resulted in tactical Indian success with Pakistan losing 720 sailors killed and wounded apart from losing reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict(Claims India). Operation Python followed Operation Trident which was on the night of 8-9 December in which Indian rocket-armed motor torpedo boats attacked the Karachi Roads that resulted in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks, as well as the sinking of three Pakistani commercial ships in Karachi Harbour. [cxxxix]
In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by establishing a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy as well as eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed in which its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. Pakistan responded by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi to negate the threat. Though Indians claim to have laid a trap to sink the submarine[cxl], the Ghazi sank off Vishakapatnam's coast under unclear circumstances thus reducing Pakistan's control of Bangladeshi coastline.[cxli] . But on 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank the frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors[cxlii].
The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out of commission and resulting in Indian air superiority in the east [cxliii].
Bangladesh became an independent nation, the world's third most populous Muslim state. Mujibur Rahman was released from a West Pakistani prison, returned to Dhaka on 10 January 1972 and to become first President of Bangladesh and later its Prime Minister.

Hamoodur Rahman Commission
In aftermath of war Pakistan Government constituted the Hamoodur Rahman Commission headed by Justice Hamdoor Rahman in 1971 to investigate the political and military causes for defeat and the Bangladesh atrocities during the war. The commission's report was classified and its publication banned by Bhutto .When it was declassified, it showed many failings from the strategic to the tactical levels. It confirmed the atrocities by the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan now Bangladesh . The Commission has recommended public trial on several people involved in 1971 defeat.

Simla Agreement
The government of P akistan and Government of India are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so the both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India have agreed as follows:
i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries;
ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance and encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations;
iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbor lines and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity; and sovereignty and non-interference in each other internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;
iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means;
v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality;
vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.
In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:
i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including over flights.
ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other countries.
iii) Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.
iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.
In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that:
i) Pakistani and Indian forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.
ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of this Line.
iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.
Both governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian, resumption of diplomatic relations.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Indira Gandhi
President Prime Minister
Islamic Republic of Pakistan Republic of India
Simla, the 2nd July, 1972

Sheikh–Indira Accord, 1975
Agreed Conclusions
1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir which is a constituent unit of the Union of India, shall, in its relation with the Union, continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
2. The residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the State; however, Parliament will continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution.
3. Where any provision of the Constitution of India had been applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with adaptation and modification, such adaptations and modifications can be altered or repealed by an order of the President under Article 370, each individual proposal in this behalf being considered on its merits ; but provisions of the Constitution of India already applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without adaptation or modification are unalterable.
4. With a view to assuring freedom to the State of Jammu and Kashmir to have its own legislation on matters like welfare measures, cultural matters, social security, personal law and procedural laws, in a manner suited to the special conditions in the State, it is agreed that the State Government can review the laws made by Parliament or extended to the State after 1953 on any matter relatable to the Concurrent List and may decide which of them, in its opinion, needs amendment or repeal. Thereafter, appropriate steps may be taken under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The grant of President’s assent to such legislation would be sympathetically considered. The same approach would be adopted in regard to laws to be made by Parliament in future under the Proviso to clause 2 of the Article. The State Government shall be consulted regarding the application of any such law to the State and the views of the State Government shall receive the fullest consideration.
5. As an arrangement reciprocal to what has been provided under Article 368, a suitable modification of that Article as applied to State should be made by Presidential order to the effect that no law made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, seeking to make any change in or in the effect of any provision of Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir relating to any of the under mentioned matters, shall take effect unless the Bill, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, receives his assent ; the matters are: -
a. the appointment, powers, functions, duties, privileges and immunities of the Governor, and
b. the following matters relating to Elections namely, the superintendence, direction and control of Elections by the Election Commission of India, eligibility for inclusion in the electoral rolls without discrimination, adult suffrage and composition of the Legislative Council, being matters specified in sections 138,139, 140 and 50 of the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
6. No agreement was possible on the question of nomenclature of the Governor and the Chief Minister and the matter is therefore remitted to the Principals.
Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg
G. Parthasarthi
New Delhi, November 13,1974.

From 1988 onwards , once again an armed revolution re-emerged with full public support thus Kashmir got wracked by brutal violence. Confrontation between militants and security forces led to thousands of deaths, the imposition of draconian laws, and massive violations of civil liberties; and the cost ordinary people have had to pay for a conflict . Initially current armed resistance launched by Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)in 1989 , which gave full flip to the independence ideology in Jammu Kashmir administered by India and brought complete collapse of Indian state writ at the same time several militant organization in Kashmir came to fore like Hizbul Mujahidin, Al Jehad , Al Umer , Harkat-ul Mujahidin, Harkat-ul Ansar and late Lasker-e-Toiba, Jaish Mohammad who had intoduced new type of gurillea warfare (Fidayeen Attacks) . The conflict in Jammu Kashmir between the Indian military and armed Kashmiri separatist groups that began in 1989 has had devastating consequences. More than 60,000 people( Alhtough Indian authorites confirm figures less than 50,000) have died about 10,000 missing in custody and many more have been injured or left homeless. India has over 75,00,000 troops stationed in Kashmir directed . According to international human rights groups, the Indian security forces have carried out widespread detention without trial, torture and extra-judicial killings in a bid to terrorise the local population and stamp out sympathy for the resistance groups.[cxliv]
The fighting is also costly for both the Indian and Pakistani governments. “The approximate annual cost of defending Kashmir [for India] is over 54.75 billion rupees ($US1.24 billion).” The 11 weeks of fighting in the Kargil heights area in 1999 cost India an estimated $450 million. According to India, Pakistan spends $110 million for supporting resistance in Kashmir —an allegation Pakistan denies.[cxlv]

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT(AFSPA)
An Act to enable certain special powers to be conferred upon members of the armed forces in the disturbed areas in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Forty-first Year of the Republic of India as follows :-
1. Short title, extent and commencement.- (1) This Act may be called the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990.
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 5th day of July, 1990.
2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "armed forces" means the military forces and the air forces operating as land forces and includes any other armed forces of the Union so operating ;
(b) "disturbed area" means an area which is for the time being declared by notification under section 3 to be a disturbed areas;
(c) all other words and expressions used herein, but not defined and defined in the Air Force Act, 1950(45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950(46 of 1950), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts.
3. Power to declare areas to be disturbed areas.- If, in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Governor of the State or the Central Government, is of opinion that the whole or any part of the State is in such a disturbed and dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of the civil power is necessary to prevent -
(a) activities involving terrorist acts directed towards overawing the Government as by law established or striking terror in the people or any section of the people of alienating any section of the people or adversely affecting the harmony amongst different sections of the people ;
(b) activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution of India,
the Governor of the State or the Central Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the whole or any part of the State to be a disturbed area.
Explanation.- In this section, "terrorist act" has the same meaning as in Explanation to article 248 of the Constitution of India as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
4. Special powers of the armed forces.- Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a disturbed area,-
(a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of fire-arms, ammunition or explosive substances ;
(b) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms dump, prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed attacks are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to be made, or any structure used as a training camp for armed volunteers or utilised as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence ;
(c) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest ;
(d) enter and search, without warrant, any premises to make any such arrest as aforesaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to be stolen property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises, and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary, and seize any such property, arms, ammunition or explosive substances ;
(e) stop, search and seize any vehicle or vessel reasonably suspected to be carrying any person who is a proclaimed offender, or any person who has committed a non-cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a non-cognizable offence, or any person who is carrying any arms, ammunition or explosive substance believed to be unlawfully held by him, and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary to effect such stoppage, search or seizure, as the case may be.
5. Power of search to include powers to break open locks, etc. - Every person making a search under this Act shall have the power to break open the lock of any door, almirah, safe, box, cupboard, drawer, package or other thing, if the key thereof is withheld.
6. Arrested persons and seized property to be made over to the police.- Any person arrested and taken into custody under this Act and every property, arms, ammunition or explosive substance or any vehicle or vessel seized under this Act, shall be made over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest, or as the case may be, occasioning the seizure of such property, arms, ammunition or explosive substance or any vehicle or vessel, as the case may be.
7. Protection of persons acting in good faith under this Act.- No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.
8. Repeal and saving.- (1) The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Ordinance, 1990(Ord.3 of 1990), is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.

At political front in 1993 , All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was established to give political dimension to the resistance movement . Meanwhile in 1994 JKLF announced unilateral ceasefire to start nonviolent political resistance movement in Kashmir although some contradicted with the decision of Yasin Malik , which led to the diversion! .

Indo-Israeli economic, military and strategic relationship

During the tenure of the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), relations between India and Israel blossomed. The relations have continued to grow ever since the Indian National Congress (INC) came to power in 2004. By 2008, bilateral trade between India and Israel exceeded US$4 billion and Israel was India's second-largest military supplier after Russia. It was expected that Israel would overtake Russia as the largest arms supplier to India, which it did in 2009.
As of 2008, India has bought more than US$5 billion worth of Israeli equipment since 2002. In addition, Israel is training Indian military units and discussing an arrangement to give Indian commandos instruction in counter-militant tactics and urban warfare. There is also growing space cooperation between the two. In February 2008, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) launched an Israeli spy satellite to monitor the activities of Iran.[cxlvi]

International Commission of Jurists' Report, 1995
Human Rights in Kashmir: Report of a Mission by Sir William Goodhart (UnitedKingdom) Dr. Dalmo de Abreu Dallari (Brazil Ms Florence Butegwa (Uganda) Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn(Thailand) Geneva, Switzerland .
The members of the ICJ Mission were the first representatives of any international human rights organisation to be authorised by the Indian Government to visit Kashmir in 1995, since the start of the popular upring in Indian administered Kashmir in 1989.
After visiting Delhi, the ICJ mission spent two days in Srinagar and two days in Jammu. Regrettably, the Indian authorities severely restricted its movements in Srinagar. The ICJ mission had been assured in Delhi that it would be allowed to hold meetings in a hotel in central Srinagar, to which anyone who wished to meet the mission would have access. However, this assurance was overruled by Lt. Gen. Zaki, the Governor's security adviser in Srinagar, who also refused to allow the members to accept an invitation to visit the Bar Association's offices in the Court precinct. As a result, the ICJ mission had to hold its meetings in a State guesthouse in a military cantonment outside Srinagar.
Recent years have been a tragedy for Kashmir. One aspect of the tragedy manifested itself to us on a fine summer evening in Kashmir, looking out from an empty Pari Mahal over an empty Dal Lake, once swarming with activity. Another aspect manifested itself in the refugee camps of Jammu and Azad Kashmir, where victims of the tragedy demonise each other and maimed men and assaulted women are presented to tell their well-rehearsed stories.
International standards of human rights pertain to Jammu and Kashmir as elsewhere. Significantly, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes universal benchmarks in relation to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for measuring the practices of States against international norms.
In regard to India, it is all the more significant that the country is also a party to the 1966 ICCPR which reinforces universal standards in the civil and political field, closely linked with the Rule of Law. The human rights propounded in this instrument include the right to self-determination, the right against arbitrary arrest, security of the person, freedom from torture, and equality before the law. India is also a party to the 1966 ICESCR and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Regrettably, Pakistan has not become a party to either the ICCPR or the ICESCR.
At the time of accession to the ICCPR, India showed her reluctance to accept the totality of human rights standards by entering reservations to articles 9 (right against arbitrary arrest and detention), 19 (freedom of expression), 21 (right of peaceful assembly) and 22 (freedom of association). Articles 19, 21 and 22 were made subject to reasonable restrictions referred to in article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Of particular concern has been the failure of India to abide by the standards set by the ICCPR because of a variety of legislative discrepancies dealt with below. These have been aggravated by numerous malpractices on the part of governmental personnel operating in Jammu and Kashmir, documented extensively but both national and international sources.
India has treated the situation of Jammu and Kashmir as a state of emergency but has avoided classifying it as such in international terms, thereby obstructing the call for accountability and transparency inherent in the comments of the Human Rights Committee.
India has been reluctant to classify the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir as a non-international armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions for fear of internationalising the Kashmir issue. At the time of the ICJ mission's visit to India, it had not allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a key international organisation, offering protection and assistance in such situations, to operate in Jammu and Kashmir. This has regrettably prevented access to affected parties and has impeded the quest for assistance and protection of innocent persons.
The special status of Jammu Kashmir has been eroded in recent times by legislative and executive encroachment form India; article 370 has been diluted by India so as to confer greater powers upon it to administer Jammu and Kashmir.
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978
By this Act, the Government may detain a person “with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial…to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order.
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1987
The Act established special courts or “designated courts” to try those arrested for terrorist acts and disruptive activities. It confers broad discretion upon the authorities to arrest persons and to try them.
Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1990
This Act gives the Governor or the Central Government power to declare the whole or part of the State to be a disturbed area and to authorize the use of the armed forces in aid of the civil power.
Other laws
Other laws have been promulgated or revived recently with negative impact on human rights. In February 1992, an ordinance was issued under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution extending presidential rule in relation to Jammu and Kashmir from the previous period of three years to four years; this prolonged the use of presidential rule as opposed to reversion to an elected system. In July 1992 the Indian Parliament passed the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature (Delegation of Power) Bill which transferred parliamentary powers to deal with that state to the President of India. In 1992, the Jammu and Kashmir Government also recommended that the central government should revive a variety of old laws so as to be able to administer the region more closely. These included the Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Law Amendment Act, which permitted the confiscation of property of unlawful bodies without the need to seek approval from a designated tribunal.
There have been grave breaches of human rights by the Indian security forces in Kashmir.
Extra-judicial executions
The deliberate killing of people in police or military custody is simple murder and is the most serious of all the allegations against the security forces. The ICJ mission has no doubt that such killings have occurred on a significant scale. What is far more difficult is to estimate the numbers, particularly as the security forces often claim that the victim has been killed in “crossfire”.
Torture
Numerous incidents of torture committed by government personnel have been documented by a variety of sources.
Torture is virtually a matter of routine use in interrogation. The forms of torture range from electric shocks to beatings, other forms of violence and sexual abuse. To prevent hospitals from documenting torture evidenced by patients' symptoms, since 1990 medical records have been removed from hospitals.
Disappearances These practices occur sporadically. Most of the disappearances do not involve killing but arise because a detainee has been held incommunicado or been moved out of the State without notice. This is compounded by the fact that the applications for habeas corpus are not responded to effectively by the courts.
Rape
The most serious allegation relates to the village of Kunan Poshpora, where it is alleged that at least 23 women were raped by soldiers of the 4th Rajputana Rifles on the night of 23/24 February 1991.
The Indian Government was initially slow to take action against members of the security forces accused of rape, apart from one case where a Canadian tourist was raped. In recent months, it appears that more action has been taken. Many rapes took place in the course of crackdowns, where men and women in the districts being searched were separated. Changes in crackdown procedure - including the presence of women members of the security forces with the units conducting the crackdowns - appear to have had some effect in reducing the number of rapes. There is no evidence that the government has encouraged rape or used it as a deliberate policy. It would indeed have been insane to do so, as nothing would be more calculated to strengthen support for the militants.
Assaults
Innumerable assaults have been witnessed in Jammu and Kashmir. Many are in relation to the cordon-and-search operations, which often end in violence. Particularly vulnerable groups included women and children.
Doctors and other medical personnel have also been assaulted and harassed by security forces while trying to help the injured. The patients themselves have been assaulted while undergoing treatment and have at times been prevented from receiving medical care. These assaults have taken place when security forces raid hospitals.
Destruction of property and theft
There are many incidents of arson by the security forces. These have led to hundreds of houses and shops being burnt, along with other property such as barns and haystacks. There have also been many cases of looting and theft.
Constraints upon personal and family life
In substance, there is a state of emergency in Kashmir and this undermines much of daily personal and family life. The curfews and instances of violence already noted prevent children from attending school. The abuses committed by government forces against men and women disrupt personal and family life continually. Health services have also been affected by raids and curfews, resulting in depletion of health personnel, particularly in rural areas. The situation is now aggravated by the fact that militants are increasingly violent towards innocent civilians.

Conclusions
Regarding the right of self-determination:
The peoples of the State of Jammu and Kashmir acquired a right of self-determination at the time of the partition of India.
The right has neither been exercised nor abandoned and therefore remains capable of exercise.
Full or limited independence for Kashmir is a possible option.
The parties should be encouraged to seek a negotiated solution to be put to the peoples of the state for ratification in a referendum.
Both India and Pakistan should recognize and respond to the call for self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir within its 1947 boundaries, inherent in the relevant United Nations resolutions. The United Nations should re-activate its role as a catalyst in this process

Joint Statement
The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan held a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of UN General Assembly in New York on 23rd September, 1998.
Their discussions covered the whole range of bilateral relations. The two Prime Ministers also carried out a detailed review of new developments in the region during the past few months.
They reaffirmed their common belief that an environment of durable peace and security was in the supreme interest of both India and Pakistan, and of the region as a whole. They expressed their determination to renew and reinvigorate efforts to secure such an environment. They agreed that the peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, was essential for this purpose.
The two leaders reiterated their commitment to create conditions which would enable both countries to fully devote their resources, both human and material, to improving the lives of their people, particularly the poorest among them.
The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between the Foreign Secretaries on operationalizing the mechanism to address all items in the agreed agenda of 23rd June, 1997 in a purposeful and composite manner. They directed the Foreign Secretaries, accordingly, to resume the dialogue on the agreed dates.
New York September 23, 1998

LAHORE DECLARATION SIGNED ON THE CONCLUSION OF PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA 'S VISIT TO LAHORE : 21 FEBRUARY, 1999
The Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan , and the Republic of India : -
Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;
Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;
Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence;
Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;
Committed to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;
Recalling their agreement of 23 September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective government: -
• shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issues of Jammu and Kashmir .
• shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
• shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
• shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
• reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realization of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.
• reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.
• shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Signed at Lahore
on the 21st day of February 1999.

Joint statement
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Sartaj Aziz and the Minister of External Affairs of India, Shri Jaswant Singh met today on the sidelines of the 21st Session of the SAARC Council of Ministers at Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka.
They reiterated the historic significance of the Lahore Declaration which embodies the vision of the Prime Ministers of the two countries for ending the legacy of tensions and conflicts of the past fifty years and for ushering a new era of peace, security and prosperity. They discussed ways and means to build on the Lahore Declaration which commits the two countries to build trust and confidence, develop mutually beneficial cooperation and intensify their efforts to resolve all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir.
The two Foreign Ministers agreed on the urgency of taking concrete measures for implementation of the Lahore Declaration, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Statement issued during the Lahore Summit. In this context, the Ministers agreed that the composite and integrated dialogue process must be intensified.
The Ministers agreed to the following :
(i) The meetings of Experts for implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding will be held over the next two months.
(ii) The next round of the composite and integrated dialogue process in accordance with the agreed agenda will commence in May 1999 in New Delhi and Islamabad and will be held over a period of six weeks.
(iii) They will meet shortly after the conclusion of the May - June Round of the composite and integrated dialogue process.
(iv) The Committee on humanitarian issues composed of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and the Ministers of State of External Affairs of India set up the Prime Ministers at the Lahore Summit will meet in April 1999 to formalize the agreement on the issue of release of civilian prisoners as well as to discuss other humanitarian issues.
(v) That both sides have agreed to relax the visa regime for several categories of visitors. The specific visa relaxation measures shall be announced by the two Governments shortly.
(vi) Delegations of experts from India shall visit Pakistan during April 1999 for identifying areas of cooperation in information technology, Y2K and WTO-related issues.
Sri Lanka March 19, 1999.

Kargil War(1999)
Date: May-July 1999
Location : Kargil district, Kashmir
Territorial changes : Status quo
Commanders
India: Ved Prakash Malik
Pakistan : Pervez Musharraf
Strength
India: 30,000, Pakistan: 5,000
Casualties and losses
Indian Official Figures[cxlvii]:527 killed,1,363 wounded,1POW
Pakistani figures[cxlviii] :
357 Killed mainly Mujahideen(Militants) and some Pakistani troops,665 wounded ,8 POWs
As per independent sources estimates of deaths are not clearly indicated.

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict,[cxlix] was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC)[cl]. Which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan claimed that the fighting was entirely started by independent Kashmiri militants , but Indian blamed for the involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces[cli], led by General Ashraf Rashid.[clii]
Indian side of the LoC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and millitants. With international diplomatic support especially America and UK, the Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw from positions held along the LOC. The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which poses significant logistical problems for the combating sides. This was only the second direct ground war between any two countries after they had developed nuclear weapons, after the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969; The conflict led to heightened tension between the two nations and increased defence spending by India. Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified.
The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In an article in May 2000 Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles [cliii].
Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt ,the fighting ceased on July 26 ,the day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India[cliv].

Later on November 19,2000 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that Indian troops would halt all offensive actions against Kashmiri separatist[Pro-freedom]groups in the state of Jammu Kashmir during the Islamic month of Ramadan. While the military would remain on “full alert against any attack,” it would suspend combat operations as of November 28.
Pakistan cautiously welcomed the move and, responding to mounting international pressure, announced on December 2 that its armed forces would exercise “maximum restraint” along the Line of Control that separates Jammu Kashmir from Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir. Pakistan's military ruler General Pervez Musharraf called for tri-partite talks between the two countries and Kashmiri groups, and offered to fly to New Delhi on 24-hours notice to meet with Vajpayee if an invitation was forthcoming.
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar hinted in a statement that Islamabad might be prepared to accept a greater status for the Line of Control.[clv] He said his government was prepared to stand by the July 4, 1999 statement signed by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif .Although Pakistan insists that Kashmir's future be decided by a referendum in both the Pakistani- and Indian- controlled parts, as laid down in a 1948-49 UN resolution.
But the tentative nature of the process was underscored when India ruled out any tri-partite talks. Indian external affairs spokesman Raminder Singh commented that, while India was ready to negotiate with all groups in Kashmir, there was no role for Pakistan. India has always insisted that Kashmir is an internal matter and has repeatedly opposed any Pakistani or international involvement.
Attempts to start negotiations floundered on the same issue. Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest armed Kashmiri separatist organisation, declared a unilateral three-month ceasefire in July 2000. Unprecedented talks between representatives of the group and the Indian government took place in the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar but rapidly broke down when the Indian government rejected Hizbul's demands for Pakistan to be included in any negotiations over a permanent solution.[clvi]

Joint Statement
(January 06, 2004)

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met during the SAARC Summit in Islamabad .
The Indian Prime Minister while expressing satisfaction over the successful conclusion of the SAARC Summit appreciated the excellent arrangements made by the host country.
Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalization of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends set by the CBMs would be consolidated.
Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan 's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. President Musharraf emphasized that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.
To carry the process of normalisation forward the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004. The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir , to the satisfaction of both sides.
The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for our peoples and for future generations.

Islamabad
January 06, 2004

Joint Statement
1. The President of Pakistan, His Excellency General Pervez Musharraf and Begum Sehba Musharraf visited New Delhi as guests of the Prime Minister of India and Shrimati Gursharan Kaur on 16 to 18 April 2005.
2. While in New Delhi , the President of Pakistan called on the President of India. He also had a meeting with the Prime Minister of India, who hosted a dinner in his honour. The President also watched the last one-day international cricket match between India and Pakistan .
3. The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India used the opportunity provided by the visit to review progress in Pakistan-India relations. They assessed positively the progress that had been made so far through confidence building, people-to-people contacts and enhancing areas of interactions and determined to build on the momentum already achieved.
4. They reaffirmed the commitments made in the Joint Press Statement of January 6, 2004 and the Joint Statement issued after their meeting in New York on September 24, 2004 and expressed satisfaction on the progress in the peace process and the improvement of relations between the two countries that has since been realized.
5. Conscious of the historic opportunity created by the improved environment in relations and the overwhelming desire of the peoples of the two countries for durable peace and recognizing their responsibility to continue to move forward towards that objective, the two leaders had substantive talks on all issues. They determined that the peace process was now irreversible.
6. In this spirit the two leaders addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to continue these discussions in a sincere and purposeful and forward looking manner for a final settlement. They were satisfied with the discussions and expressed their determination to work together to carry forward the process and to bring the benefit of peace to their people.
7. They also agreed to pursue further measures to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LoC including agreed meeting points for divided families, trade, pilgrimages and cultural interaction.
8. They condemned attempts to disrupt the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and welcomed its successful operationalisation. The two leaders pledged that they would not allow terrorism to impede the peace process.
9. They decided to increase the frequency of the bus service and also decided that trucks would be allowed to use this route to promote trade. They also agreed to operationalise additional routes including that between Poonch and Rawalakot. They also look forward to early start of the bus service between Amritsar and Lahore and to religious places such as Nankana Sahib.
10. They agreed to re-establish the Khokhrapar-Munnabao route by 1 st January 2006 .
11. They agreed that the Consulates General of the two countries in Mumbai and Karachi respectively would be opened before the end of the current year.
12. They endorsed the decisions taken in the meeting of Foreign Secretaries of the two countries on 27-28 December 2004, and the Foreign Minister on 15-17 February 2005, on the schedule of meetings later in the year, the agreements to be worked upon through these meetings and the measures to be taken to alleviate the situation on prisoners.
13. On the issues of Sir Creek and Siachen, they instructed that the existing institutional mechanisms should convene discussions immediately with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to both issues expeditiously.
14. It was agreed that the Ministers of Petroleum and Natural Gas would meet in May to explore cooperation in the sector including on the issue of pipelines.
15. Both leaders agreed that enhanced economic and commercial cooperation would contribute to the well-being of the peoples of the two countries and bring a higher level of prosperity for the region. The two leading economies of South Asia should work together for the greater prosperity of the region.
16. The leaders decided to reactivate the Joint Economic Commission as early as possible. They also agreed that the Joint Business Council should meet soon.
17. The President of Pakistan conveyed his gratitude for the hospitality provided during the visit and invited the Prime Minister to visit Pakistan . The invitation was accepted in principle. Mutually agreed dates would be worked out through diplomatic channels.

New Delhi
April 18, 2005 .

Joint Statement
President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had a cordial, frank and detailed exchange of views on all aspects of India-Pakistan relations.
Desirous of carrying forward the dialogue process, the leaders reiterated their commitments and determination to implement the joint statement of 6 January 2004, 24 September 2004, 18 April 2005 and 14 September 2005.
The leaders agreed that the peace process must be maintained and its success was important for both countries and the future of the entire region.
In this context, they directed the Foreign Secretaries to resume composite dialogue at the earliest possible.
The two leaders met in the aftermath of Mumbai blasts. The leaders strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a scourge that needs to be effectively dealt with.
They decided to put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.
The leaders decided to continue the joint search for mutually acceptable options for a peaceful negotiated settlement of all issues between India and Pakistan including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in a sincere and purposeful manner.
On the Jammu and Kashmir issue, there have been useful discussions. There is a need to build on convergences and narrow down divergences.
The two leaders also directed the Foreign Secretaries on the following:
The Foreign Secretaries should meet shortly in New Delhi to continue the Composite Dialogue.
To arrange consultations for an early solution of the Siachen issue. Experts should meet immediately to agree on coordinates for joint survey of Sir Creek and adjoining area, without prejudice to each others position on the issue. The survey should commence in November 2006. The experts should start discussion on the Maritime boundary.
The two sides will facilitate implementation of agreements and understandings already reached on LoC related CBMs, including bus services, crossing points and truck service.
The President of Pakistan renewed his invitation to the Prime Minister of India to visit Pakistan .
Thanking the President, the Prime Minister indicated that he looked forward to a purposeful visit at a time to be determined through diplomatic channels.

(Meeting between President of Pakistan and Prime Prime Minister of India on the sidelines of NAM Summit , Havana on 16 September 2006)
Demographics of Kashmir; historical
Perspective
In the 1901 Census of the British Indian Empire, the population of the princely state of Kashmir was 2,905,578. Of these 2,154,695 were Muslims, 689,073 Hindus, 25,828 Sikhs, and 35,047 Buddhists. The Hindus were found mainly in Jammu, where they constituted a little less than 50% of the population. [clvii]In the Kashmir Valley, the Hindus represented "only 524 in every 10,000 of the population (i.e. 5.24%), and in the frontier wazarats of Ladhakh and Gilgit only 94 out of every 10,000 persons (0.94%)." [clviii]In the same Census of 1901, in the Kashmir Valley, the total population was recorded to be 1,157,394, of which the Muslim population was 1,083,766, or 93.6% of the population. [clix]These percentages have remained fairly stable for the last 100 years. [clx]In the 1941 Census of British India, Muslims accounted for 93.6% of the population of the Kashmir Valley and the Hindus constituted 4%. [clxi]and those of Hindus 4%; the same year, in Jammu, the percentage of Hindus was 67% and those of Muslims 27%. [clxii]In the Census of 1901, four divisions were recorded among the Muslims of the princely state: Shaikhs, Saiyids, Mughals, and Pathans. The Shaikhs were the most numerous, with clan names (known as krams) including "Tantre," "Shaikh," "Mantu," "Ganai," "Dar," "Damar," "Lone" etc. [clxiii]The Saiyids, it was recorded "could be divided into those who follow the profession of religion and those who have taken to agriculture and other pursuits. Their kram name is "Mir." While a Saiyid retains his saintly profession Mir is a prefix; if he has taken to agriculture, Mir is an affix to his name[clxiv]The Mughals who were not numerous were recorded to have kram names like "Mir" (a corruption of "Mirza"), "Beig," "Bandi," "Bach," and "Ashaye." Finally, it was recorded that the Pathans "who are more numerous than the Mughals, ... are found chiefly in the south-west of the valley, where Pathan colonies have from time to time been founded. The most interesting of these colonies is that of Kuki-Khel Afridis at Dranghaihama, who retain all the old customs and speak Pashtu[clxv]The Hindu population of Kashmir Valley in 1901 was recorded to be 60,641. [clxvi]Among the Hindus of Jammu province, who numbered 626,177 (or 90.87% of the Hindu population of the princely state), the most important castes recorded in the census were "Brahmans (186,000), the Rajputs (167,000), the Khattris (48,000) and the Thakkars (93,000)." [clxvii]

The language geography of the State has changed after 1947 when a large chunk of the State was either administered by Pakistan or India .The new ground situation is that all the Kashmiri, Dogri, Gujari and Ladakhi speaking areas along with some small pockets of Dardi speaking people-Buddhist Brukpas in Da Hanu area of Ladakh, people of Dras (Ladakh) and Gurez (Baramulla) lie within the Indian administered part of Jammu Kashmir. Similarly, all the Pothawri (Lahanda) speaking areas in Poonch, Mirpur etc. remain within the Pak- administered Kashmir. As regards the Baltis, they are divided between those living in Kargil in Indian administered Ladakh and across the Line of Actual Control in Baltistan (Northern Areas part of Kashmir adminsered by Pakistan ). From within the Kashmiri speaking community, almost the entire Kashmiri Hindu minority of more than three lakhs left valley 1980-90 when militancy surfaced in Kashmir . Precarious condition of these minority community persons living in various parts of India and struggling for survival[identity], their language and culture are likely to be the worst casuality .
A study of the language demography of Jammu Kashmir State establishes the fact that the Lahnda (Pothwari) speaking area falls almost entirely across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Pak-administered Kashmir. That the LAC on the western side coincides with the specific language culture area, provides a natural permanence to the Line of Actual Control on ethno-linguistic lines in this sector. This should provide a key to finding lasting solution to vexed Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan. However, this is not true of Balti speaking area, which remains divided by the Line of Actual Control between Kargil area of Jammu Kashmir in Indian Aminsitered and Baltistan region of Pak-adminsitered Kashmir. Regarding the evolution and affinities of various mother tongues in Jammu Kashmir, it is established that most of the languages are rooted in or have close affinities with the Indo-Aryan languages. Whereas Dogri is closely related to Punjabi, Gujari is akin to Rajasthani. Grierson's theory subscribe that Kashmiri belongs to the Dardic branch of languages.Grierson's theory has been used as premier by an American geographer, J.E. Schwartzberg and advocated the merger of Kashmir valley with the Dardic speaking areas of Pak-adminstered Kashmir(Azad Kashmir ) on the basis of linguistic and cultural affinity, as a separate entity .
Kashmiri is the main language spoken in the State, its spatial distribution being limited to the central valley of Kashmir and some parts of Doda. Though Kashmiri has no 'functional role as a written language' now, it is "overwhelmingly the language of personal and in-group communication. It is the medium of dreams, mental arithmetic and reflection, of communication within the family, with friends and in market places, in places of worship etc.'' According to a survey, the Kashmiris view their language as "an integral part of their identity" and want it to be accorded its due role in the fields of education, mass-media and administration. The neglect of mother tongues by the various rulers is the most salient language issue in Jammu Kashmir, and the earlier it is remedied, the better. However, the only silver lining is that Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims have identified Kashmiri as their mother tongue.
Though Pahari has not been enumerated as a separate language in the JK State Census Reports of 1961, 1971 and 1981, of late there have been demands for grant of some concessions to 'Paharis' in the State. The Pahari versus Gujar issue is a potential source of ethnic conflict as both the Pahari and Gujar interests are in conflict with each other. Both the Pahari and Gujar identities overlap in certain aspects particularly their hill settlement pattern and some common language features. The grant of Scheduled Tribe status on 19th April 1991 by the central government of India The non- Gujar Muslims of the State have been peeved at the conferment of Scheduled Tribe status and its benefits to the Gujars. They have now demanded similar concession and the privileges associated with it for the 'Paharis' of Rajouri, Poonch, Kupwara and Baramulla districts, i.e., where the Gujars are in sizeable numbers. On 17 May 1992, the non-Gujar 'Pahari Board' was set up, with eight Kashmiri Muslims, eight Rajput Muslims, two Syeds and four non-Muslims as its members. On 18 December 1993, the State Governor, General K. V. Krishna Rao issued a statement urging the central government to declare the Paharis as Scheduled Tribes.
The existing spatial distribution of Gujar speakers, does provide some sort of linguistic territorial homogeneity, which however, needs to be further consolidated to help in preservation and promotion of Gujari language and ethno- cultural heritage and fulfilling their socio-economic and political aspirations within the State. Gujars are concentrated in specific border belts surrounding the main Kashmiri speaking area, which mostly fall within the Indian administered side of Line of Control, is yet another aspect of political importance because on other side similar linguistic group do occur , both have strong relation with each other, although emotions seem to suppressed but can erupt any time like a sleeping Valcano` . Therefore it demonstrates that major adjustments are to taken up .
As already stated, all the Census reports have made a clear distinction between the Ladakhi (Bhotia) and Tibetan speaking persons in Ladakh, former being indigenous Ladakhis and the latter being Tibetan refugee settlers.

Please see Pic 10 , See pic 9,See pic 8

Gilgit/Baltistan
Gilgit-Baltistan is administratively divided into two divisions which, in turn, are divided into seven districts, including the two Baltistan districts of Skardu and Ghanche, and the five Gilgit districts of Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Astore, and Hunza-Nagar. The main political centres are the towns of Gilgit and Skardu, which is under the direct control of Pakistan . The region is home to some of the world's highest mountain ranges—the main ranges are the Karakoram and the western Himalayas. The Pamir Mountains are to the north, and the Hindu Kush lies to the west. Amongst the highest mountains are K2 (Mount Godwin-Austen) and Nanga Parbat, the latter being one of the most feared mountains in the world.
Three of the world's longest glaciers outside the polar regions are found in Gilgit-Baltistan — the Biafo Glacier, the Baltoro Glacier, and the Batura Glacier. On 29 August 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, was passed by the Pakistani cabinet and later signed by the President. It granted self-rule to the people of the former Northern Areas, now renamed "Gilgit-Baltistan," by creating, among other things, an elected legislative assembly, elections were held in November, 2009 and there is elected assembly now. See Pic 7

[i])http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/80699, By :Sagar a social activist and a senior coloumnist on Kashmir affairs)
[ii] )Kunal Chattopadhyay ,blackwellrefrence.com/public/tocnode?id
[iii]) Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten on the eve of tribal invasion on J&K in 1947, Hari Singh October 26, 1947

[iv] ) A research from British sources quoted by Victoria Schofield, author of Kashmir in Conflict/ Alaistar Lamb, author of a series of books on Kashmir.
[v] ) Cited in Riyaz Punjabi, ‘Kashmir imbroglio: the socio-political roots’, Contemporary South Asia, 4:1 (1995), p.47. However, as Punjabi notes, Sheikh Abdullah declared in a public meeting in September 1947 that “Our first demand is complete transfer of power to the people in Kashmir. Representatives of the people in a democratic Kashmir will then decide whether the state should join India or Pakistan” (Punjabi, 1995, p.46). 39 Cited in Punjabi (1995), p.49.

[vi] ) Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh’s letter , Mountbatten of Burma ,October 27, 1947
[vii] ) a b Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA - Parliament of India Website. It is believed that this figure only gives the Indian Army casualties and not the State Forces
[viii] ) Library of Congress Country Studies / Battle Casualties of Azad Kashmir Regiment during 1947-1948
[ix] ) Library of Congress Country Studies/ Battle Casualties of Azad Kashmir Regiment during 1947-1948
[x] ) ( British war Magazine, London , 1952)
[xi] ) Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA - Parliament of India Website. It is believed that this figure only gives the Indian Army casualties and not the State Forces: Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Thomson Press (India) Limited. New Delhi 1987. This is the Indian Official History.
[xii] ) “Kashmir has been wrongly looked upon as a price for India or Pakistan. People seem to forget that Kashmir is not a commodity for sale or to be bartered. It has an individual existence and its people must be the final arbiters of their future. …….” Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru (The first Prime Minister of Free India) (Speech in All India Congress Committee on July 9, 1951
[xiii] ) (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Second Series; Volume 14, Part I, page 205; cited as SWJN).
[xiv] ) ( article "India-Pakistan summit, 1955"; Frontline, August 8, 2001).
[xv] ) (SWJN; Volume13; page 225).
[xvi] ) (Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50; Volume 1, page 317. Patel's letter of July 3, 1950).
[xvii] ) (SPC; Volume 10, page 353).
[xviii] ) (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950; Volume V, S. Asia; 1978; page 1,407).
[xix] ) ((Frontline, August 3, 2001).
[xx] ) (SWJN; Volume 18; page 430).
[xxi] ) FRUS; page 1,417).
[xxii] ) (FRUS; page 1,426
[xxiii] ) (FRUS; page 1,428).
[xxiv] ) (FRUS; page 1,434).
[xxv] ) (FRUS; page 201).
[xxvi] ) (Dr. Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents; Volume 16; pages 91-92).
[xxvii] ) (For text vide A. G. Noorani; The Kashmir Question; 1964; page 63).
[xxviii] ) (White Paper on correspondence 1954; pages 18 and 42).
[xxix] ) (SWJN; Volume 23; page 346).
[xxx] ) ( Front Line : Volume 19 - Issue 21, October 12 - 25, 2002)

[xxxi] ) Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
[xxxii] ) ibid,93, Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
[xxxiii] ) ibid,116, ibid, Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
[xxxiv] ) Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources," Policy Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank, May 1994
[xxxv] ) Verghese, B.G., Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH Publishing: New Delhi, 1990
[xxxvi] ) Indus Case Study. Adapted from Beach, H.L., Hamner, J., Hewitt, J.J., Kaufman, E.,Kurki, A., Oppenheimer, J.A., and Wolf, A.T. (2000). Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Annotated References. United Nations University Press. Hosted at the Transboundry Freshwater Dispute Database, Oregon State University.
[xxxvii] ) Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources," Policy Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank, May 1994.
[xxxviii] ) Indus Water Treaty Information about the treaty (including the full text), hosted at the World Bank's website.
[xxxix] ) .( Sridar, “Indus Waters Treaty.”)
[xl] ) The News, Pakistan, May 1, 2009.
[xli] ) Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), charged: "India has stopped our water."
[xlii] ) Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, May 6, 2008. Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan Dahir emerges as the most vocal Pakistani personality on Indian water projects on Kashmir. However, his organization Indus Basin Water council, though sounding like a government authority, is a pressure group.
[xliii] ) Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, March 15, 2008.
[xliv] ) Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[xlv] ) According to Roznama Express newspaper of June 3, 2008, Pakistan is also worried that another hydroelectric power project being built by India on Kishan Ganga river, a tributary of Jhelum, will curtail water supply to Pakistan. The Roznama Express noted that Pakistan has also threatened to take the matter to the World Bank. According to The Times of India newspaper of July 29, 2004, India’s Tulbul Navigation Project on Jhelum
[xlvi] ) Mr. Ali Ashraf Khan is a Pakistani Businessman and Ex-Politician who bid good bye to politics in order to concentrate on more useful service benefit of the political intrigues prevalent in the National Political life of Pakistan. He frequently writes for English and Urdu newspapers in Pakistan.
[xlvii] ) Peter Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security”, International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer, 1993), pg. 79-112./ United Nations, Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World, Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. E/CN.17/1997/9, 4 February 1997, pg. 8-9.
[xlviii] )BBC Urdu and Hindi Service, dated 25th November, 2009(8.00P.M to 8.30P.M IST)
[xlix] ) United Nations, Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World, Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. E/CN.17/1997/9, 4 February 1997, pg. 8-9./] Michael Klare. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001. pg. 139./ A.T. Wolfe, J.A. Natharius, J.J. Danielson, B.S. Ward and J.K. Pender, “International River Basins of the World”, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 15, 4 (1999)./ Sandra L. Postel, Aaron T. Wolf, “Dehydrating Conflict”, Foreign Policy, No. 126 (Sep. - Oct., 2001), pp. 60-67./ Stephen Leahy, “Thirstier World Likely to See More Violence”, Inter Press Service, 16 March 2007./ John Vidal, “Cost of Water Shortage: civil unrest, mass migration and economic collapse,” Guardian Newspapers, 17 August 2006./ Klare, 147./ From an interview in the 1 January 1999 edition of Environmental Science and Technology, as cited in “Water Wars Forecast If Solutions Not Found,” Environmental News Service, 1 January 1999, electronic document accessed at http://ens.lycos.com/ens/archives/Jan99/1999L-01-01-02.html./ Ashok Swain. Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Routledge: London, 2004. pg. 44./ Col. Steven W. Peterson, “Water Issues in India and Pakistan”, course 5604 paper, National Defense University, National War College, Washington DC. Accessed online at: http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/writing/AY04/5604/04a.pdf on 10 June 2007./ S. Waslekar, The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2005), pg. 54-62./ Waslekar, 54-62./ “Asia: Nor Any Drop to Drink; Water in India”, The Economist, Vol.364, issue 8287, 24 August 2002, pg.31-32./ Waslekar, 54-62./ “Anticipated Population Growth in Selected Countries of the Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus River Basins”, World Resources 1998-1999, Washington DC, World Resources Institute, 1998. pg 244./ Klare, 187./ Swain, 46./ Daniel Nelson, “Water War Warning As Tension Escalates in Kashmir”, OneWorld.net, published on 21 May 2002. Accessed online at Common Dreams News Center: http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines02/0521-07.htm.
[l] ) Albert Lepawsky, “International Development of River Resources”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 39, No. 4 (Oct., 1963), pp. 533-550./ Kaiser Bengali (ed.), The Politics of Managing Water, (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, and Oxford University Press, 2003)./ Swain, “Managing Water Conflict”, 170.
[li] ) ibid;Swain, “Managing Water Conflict”, 171-177.
[lii] ) Waslekar, 79.
[liii] ) ( Various schemes of compromises can be taken into account “The Water conflict to be addressed through Brotherly Dialog”, a conference among civil society supported by International Forum for Water conflict and reputed Global Peace Centers of various influential countries along with workshops and seminars. )
[liv] ) . (But see the alternative ranking of this game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma in the Appendix, in which case the H-H state is a Nash equilibrium.)
[lv] ) ”( Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953: 44)
[lvi] ) .( A rigorous definition of threat power, which only one player assumed to possess, and an analysis of its effect in all 2 x 2 ordinal games, is given in Brams (1994, ch. 5). Here, its effect will only be explained for the situation in the Figure 1 game and, briefly, in Chicken and Prisoners’ Dilemma in the Appendix.)
[lvii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.
[lviii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
[lix] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm. Retrieved 2006-06-14. /a b c A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process", India's National Magazine, 29 August 2003. /a b c India's Forward Policy, Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of Oriental and African Studies
[lx] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game", Rediff, 23 June 2003.
[lxi] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver /^ a b c d e A.G. Noorani, "Fact of History", India's National Magazine, 30 September 2003. /^ "The Shade of the Big Banyan" Time, Dec. 14, 1959.
[lxii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver /^ a b c VK Singh resolving the boundary dispute
[lxiii] )ibid: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
[lxiv] ) a b c d e f g h Battle of Chushul
[lxv] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
[lxvi] ) a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
[lxvii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.
[lxviii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
[lxix] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Battle of Namka Chu / Burkitt, Laurie; Scobell, Andrew; Wortzel, Larry M. (July 2003), THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AT 75, Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 340-341, ISBN 1-58487-126-1, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf /^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah the original on ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
[lxx] ) Ibid:^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College./ibid: a b c d e f g h Battle of Chushul/ Chushi Gangdruk "Chushi Gangdruk: History", ChushiGangdruk.Org/^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
[lxxi] ) Indo-Pakistani War of 1965/^ "Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from 2009-11-01. http://www.webcitation.org/query?id=1257038004976878. /^ Encyclopedia of the developing world By Thomas M. Leonard, page 806 / http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070506/spectrum/main1.htm/^ a b Encyclopedia of the developing world By Thomas M. Leonard, page 806/http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pWRjGZ9H7hYC&pg=PA806&lpg=PA806&dq=pakistani+casualties+in+battle+of+lahore+1965&source=bl&ots=C8A8bQcxSk&sig=LDNtNeO2EMkuVzRlF7QQAxvZW2g&hl=en&ei=ldseSs HdyZjAeX7JWLDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5#PPA806,M1-
[lxxii])Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from the original on 2009-11-01. http://www.webcitation.org/query?id=1257038004976878./ Indo-Pakistan Wars The Tribune June 2, 2005. Archived 2009-11-01./^ Opinion: The Way it was 4: extracts from Brig (Retd) ZA Khan's book May 1998, Defence Journal/^ Ayub misled nation in ’65 war: Nur Khan 8 September 2005 Khaleej Times /^ Library of Congress Country Studies/Ibid: Encyclopedia of the developing world By Thomas M. Leonard, page 806

[lxxiii] ) ( British war Magazine, London , 1972)
[lxxiv] ) http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-4#cite_note-4)
[lxxv] ) ( http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-5#cite_note-5)
[lxxvi] ) (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-6#cite_note-6)
(http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-7#cite_note-7)
(http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-8#cite_note-8)
[lxxvii]) http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-9#cite_note-9
[lxxviii] ) (ibid:http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-11#cite_note-11)

[lxxix] ) http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-10#cite_note-10)
[lxxx] ) (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-11#cite_note-11)
[lxxxi] ) . (ibid:http//en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-12#cite_note-12)

[lxxxii] ) (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-14#cite_note-14)
[lxxxiii] ) , (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-15#cite_note-15)

[lxxxiv] ) , (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-16#cite_note-16)
[lxxxv] ) , (ibid:http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-12#cite_note-12)
(http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-17#cite_note-17)
[lxxxvi] ) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965"]. Globalsecurity.com.
[lxxxvii] ) "The Lahore Offensive". Storyofpakistan.com. 1 June 2003
[lxxxviii] ) ^ Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006
[lxxxix] ) ^ The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Opinions
[xc] The Story of My Struggle By Tajammal Hussain Malik 1991, Jang Publishers, pp 78
[xci] ) John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue published 1969, page 89. URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-200111.html?search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205, retrieved: 03 November 2009
[xcii] ) Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International, issue published 5 May 1984 (page 1208). Can be viewed at FlightGlobal.com archives, URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1984/1984%20-%200797.html?search=F-86%20Pakistan Retrieved: 22 October 2009
[xciii] ) http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499
[xciv] ) ^ See the main article Sabre Slayer for the complete list on this issue including sources.
[xcv] ) .^ a b Ahmad Faruqui, "The right stuff", published by Dawn News on Monday 14 September 2009, URL: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499 Retrieved: 01 November 2009. Also published under title "The Debt Owed" on 16 September 2009 by [outlookindia.com], URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?261856
[xcvi] )Ibid: ^ a b Ahmad Faruqui, "The right stuff", published by Dawn News on Monday 14 September 2009, URL: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499 Retrieved: 01 November 2009. Also published under title "The Debt Owed" on 16 September 2009 by [outlookindia.com], URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?261856

[xcvii] ) http://books.google.com/books?id=MG5wioBJyK0C&pg=PA164&dq=india+1965+pakistan+Sabre+slayer&lr=&as_brr=3&client=firefox-a /http://books.google.com/books?id=p40nOZgeh84C&pg=PA161&dq=1965+pakistan+air+force+Sabre&lr=&as_brr=3&client=firefox-a#PPA162,M1
[xcviii] ) ^ John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue published 1969, pages 89 and 90. Can be viewed at Flight International archives: page 89 URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200111.html?search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205, page 90 URL: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200112.html. Retrieved: 03 November 2009
[xcix] ) A history of the Pakistan Army - Defence Journal, Pakistan
[c] ) ^ 90mm M36 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE “Jackson” Post W.W.II, the M36 was employed by the US Army in Korea and was distributed to friendly nations including France, where it was used in Indo-China (Vietnam), Pakistan..
[ci] ) The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis Major A.H. Amin, December 30, 2001 Orbat
[cii] ) The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy By Selig Seidenman Harrison Published 1978 Free Press, pp 269
[ciii] ) The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia By Devin T. Hagerty Page 70 Published by MIT Press
[civ] ) India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Stanley J. Heginbotham, William Howard Wriggins. By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Published 1971, pp 254
[cv] ) Ibid:India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Stanley J. Heginbotham, William Howard Wriggins. By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Published 1971, pp 254
[cvi] ) . ^ a b, South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77
[cvii] ) ^ India's Quest for Security: defence policies, 1947-1965 By Lorne John Kavic, , 1967, University of California Press, pp 190
[cviii] )Ibid: a b South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77
[cix] ) ^ THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy by Vice Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, Indian Navy (Retired), Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
[cx] ) ^ Iqbal F Quadir - Pakistan's Defence Journal
[cxi] )Ibid: Iqbal F Quadir - Pakistan's Defence Journal
[cxii] ) a b Defence Journal: SSG in the 1965 War
[cxiii] ). ^ Pak Def - SSG Regiment
[cxiv] ) ^ a b The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
[cxv] Defence Journal: The Way it was Extracts from Pakistan Army Brigadier (Retd) ZA Khan's book
[cxvi] ) Ending the Suspense September 17, 1965, TIME magazine
[cxvii] )Ibid: The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
[cxviii] ) Remembering Our Warriors Brig (Retd) Shamim Yasin Manto S.I.(M), S.Bt, Q&A session: ("How would you assess the failures and successes of the SSG in the 1965 War?") February 2002, Defence Journal
[cxix] ) .(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lal_Bahadur_Shastri#cite_note-hindustantimes_july11_2009-20#cite_note-hindustan_times_july_2009-20)
[cxx] ) . ibid:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lal_Bahadur_Shastri#cite_note-hindustantimes_july11_2009-20#cite_note-hindustan_times_july_2009-20)
[cxxi] ) . ibid:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lal_Bahadur_Shastri#cite_note-hindustantimes_july11_2009-20#cite_note-hindustan_times_july_2009-20
[cxxii] ) (Source: Advocate Bashir Ahmad Bhat Vice Chairman JKLF)
[cxxiii] ) Telling this story on 12 April 1972 from Camp Prison Lahore in a letter written in reply to Azra Mir, the daughter of veteran Kashmiri political activist and intellectual, G.M. Mir who was in prison with Maqbool Butt in relation to the hijacking of an Indian plane ‘Ganaga.’
[cxxiv] ) Responding to a question about crossing over to Pakistan in an interview that was recorded in room number 26 of Mujahid Hotel International, Maqbool Butt said.
[cxxv] ) Source: Khawaja, 1997.
[cxxvi] ) Maqbool Butt later wrote in great detail about the escape and submitted that before the Special Trial Court in Pakistant where he was tried along with other NLF members for ‘Ganga’ hijacking.

[cxxvii] ) Although there are several official and common theories about the background , but we must believe in the version which Maqbool Butt has submitted in the special trial court in Pakistan . “Ganga, an Indian airliner was hijacked on 30 January 1971 at 1305 hours while on its routine flight from Srinagar to Jammu. In total it was carrying 30 people including four crew members. The Hijackers were two young Kashmiris Hashim Qureshi and Ashraf Qureshi, they brought the plane to Lahore”
[cxxviii] ) Rovendra Mahatre was kidnapped in the first week of February 1984 from his Birmingham office by unknown group Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA) who demanded among other things the release of Maqbool Butt.
[cxxix] ) Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA, Parliament of India Website.
[cxxx] ) Quantification of Losses Suffered
[cxxxi] ) Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Global Security. /http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1971.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxxxii] ) The Sinking of the Ghazi". Bharat Rakshak Monitor, 4(2). http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-2/harry.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxxxiii] ) Operations in the Bay of Bengal: The Loss of PNS/M Ghazi". PakDef. http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/lossofghazi.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxxxiv] ) ( British war Magazine, London , 1980)
[cxxxv] ) ^ a b c "The U.S.: A Policy in Shambles". Time Magazine, 20 December 1971. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878970,00.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxxxvi] ) ibid: ^ a b U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere, 31 March 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
// a b c d e "India: Easy Victory, Uneasy Peace". Time Magazine, 27 December 1971. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905593,00.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxxxvii] ) http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761588350_3/Indo- Pakistani_Wars.html#s29. Retrieved 2009-10-20.// ibid:^ a b c "The U.S.: A Policy in Shambles". Time Magazine, 20 December 1971. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878970,00.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxxxviii] ) ^ "PAF Begins War in the West : 3 December". Institute of Defence Studies. http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/1971war/warinwest.html. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
[cxxxix] )ibid: ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1971.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxl] ) ^ a b c "The Sinking of the Ghazi". Bharat Rakshak Monitor, 4(2). http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-2/harry.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxli] ) ^ a b "Operations in the Bay of Bengal: The Loss of PNS/M Ghazi". PakDef. http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/lossofghazi.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxlii] ) ^ "Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi". Bharat Rakshak. http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/44-Attacks-On-Karachi.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxliii] ) ibid:^ a b Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA, Parliament of India Website //ibid: ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1971.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[cxliv] ) By Sarath Kumara,12 December 2000

[cxlv] ) Jane's Security News indicates:
[cxlvi] )http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-10# cite_note-10/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-11# cite_note-11/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-9# cite_note-9/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-8# cite_note-8/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-7# cite_note-7/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-6# cite_note-6/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-5# cite_note-5
[cxlvii] ) ^ Government of India site mentioning the Indian casualties, Statewise break up of Indian casualties statement from Indian Parliament /^ "Breakdown of casualties into Officers, JCOs, and Other Ranks". Parliament of India Website. http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=51302. Retrieved 2009-05-20. /^ "Complete Roll of Honour of Indian Army's Killed in Action during Op Vijay". Indian Army.
[cxlviii] ) ^ a b c "President Musharaffs disclosure on Pakistani Casualties in his book". Indian Express. http://www.indianexpress.com/story/14208.html. Retrieved 2009-05-20./ ^ a b "Over 4000 soldier's killed in Kargil: Sharif". The Hindu./http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/08/17/stories/2003081702900800.htm. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
[cxlix] ) Government of India site mentioning the Indian casualties, Statewise break up of Indian casualties statement from Indian Parliament
[cl] ) a b c d e f "1999 Kargil Conflict". GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
[cli] ) ^ Tom Clancy, Gen. Tony Zinni (Retd) and Tony Koltz (2004). Battle Ready. Grosset & Dunlap. ISBN 0-399-15176-1. /^ "Pak commander blows the lid on Islamabad's Kargil plot". June 12, 2009. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-spell-binding-as-the-guns-of-navarone/475330/. Retrieved 2009-06-13. /^ "Sharif admits he let down Vajpayee on Kargil conflict". 2007-09-10. http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/10/stories/2007091059781400.htm. Retrieved 2007-10-06.
[clii] ) Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, p. 420 (2007)
[cliii] ) India had deployed Agni during Kargil, Article from "Indian Express" 19/6/2000 /=^ "Musharraf moved nuclear weapons in Kargil war". The Nation. Archived from the original on 2007-12-23. http://web.archive.org/web/20071223045736/http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/july-2006/6/index16.php. Retrieved 2009-05-27.
[cliv] ) Pakistan and the Kashmir militants". BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/386537.stm. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
[clv] ) The Times of India on November 24,1999
[clvi] ) By Sarath Kumara,12 December 2000
[clvii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clviii] ) a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clix] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clx] ) a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clxi] ) ibid:^ a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102. In 2003, the percentage of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley was 95% ^ a b Rai, Mridu. 2004. Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects: Islam and the History of Kashmir. Princeton University Press. 320 pages. ISBN 0691116881. page 37.
[clxii] ) ibid: ^ a b Rai, Mridu. 2004. Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects: Islam and the History of Kashmir. Princeton University Press. 320 pages. ISBN 0691116881. page 37.
[clxiii] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clxiv] ) ." ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clxv] ) ." ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.

[clxvi] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[clxvii] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.

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