Jammu Kashmir Resolution Through Reconciliation

UK’s foreign policy over Kashmir

“First, I wish to reiterate my Government’s position on the status of Kashmir and on the question of self-determination. This was made clear most recently by our sponsorship of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 January 1957. According to that resolution, the Council ‘reminded the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in its resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948, 14 March 1950 and 30 March 1951, and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.’ My Government stands firmly by the principles enunciated in that resolution today.”[i]
Recent moves;
1) Britain fears that real threat of war between and drag in larger nuclear powers such as China.
Tony Blair has held an intensive round of discussions with George Bush over the holiday period to coordinate Anglo-American efforts to quell tensions on the Indian subcontinent, he warned of the dangers ahead if the bellicose words of the two nuclear nations were turned into action.
As he arrived in the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, at the start of a six-day tour of south Asia, Mr Blair declared that the military build-up in the disputed territory of Kashmir presented "enormous problems for the wider world".
He said: "As we saw on September 11 the danger is that when these events occur they do not stop at the borders of any one country. Attention has focused on India and Pakistan because of the enormous problems the whole of the wider world would face if they get it wrong."
He arrived in Dhaka amid tight security. Police with automatic weapons dispersed a crowd of religious leaders and seminary students who shouted slogans accusing Mr Blair of being a "mastermind of torturing and killing Muslims across the world".
The protests cast a pall over Mr Blair's trip, when he hopes to act as a "calming influence" between India and Pakistan, the region's two nuclear powers. Downing Street is understood to be concerned that the Kashmir dispute, which was reignited when Indian parliament was brought under attack , could escalate beyond the subcontinent and drag in China.
Officials have noted with alarm that General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani president, travelling via China for regional summit in Nepal. Beijing, a long-term foe of India's, has played a key role in helping Pakistan to build up its arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Asked whether Gen Musharraf's China visit demonstrated that tensions between India and Pakistan could destabilise the wider region, Mr Blair said: "There is a reason why President Bush and I have been speaking regularly over the holiday period. That is because it is a very serious issue with potentially far reaching consequences if the tensions get out of hand."
His remarks indicated that his discussions with Mr Bush went well beyond Afghanistan and tensions on the Indian subcontinent to encompass wider questions about world stability. Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, is so alarmed by the Kashmir dispute that he has told British officials he fears another Arab-Israeli conflict.
There is no immediate fear that China would launch any attacks. But clear Chinese support for Pakistan would alarm India and further destabilize the region.
During his stop in Beijing , Gen Musharraf was reported to have told Premier Zhu Rongji he was willing to work to ease tensions with India through dialogue.
"Pakistan hopes for peace, opposes war, and is willing to work to ease the tensions through dialogue," Xinhua news agency quoted him as saying.
Mr Blair said he would deliver tough messages in separate talks with Gen Musharraf and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister. "I cannot start telling each country how to run their own affairs," he said. It is very important that, given the military capability of both powers, we do everything we possibly can to calm the situation."
He added: "I hope that by putting over the view on behalf of everybody in the international community I can have a calming influence."
Mr Blair, who was accompanied by his wife Cherie, held talks with the Bangladeshi prime minister, Khaleda Zia, and asked Dhaka to contribute troops to the multinational force supporting the interim government in Kabul. [ii]
2) British Foreign Secretary David Miliband’s trip to India, billed as a ‘solidarity visit’ following the deadly Mumbai attacks, was dubbed ‘upsetting’ by the government. Miliband raised Indian hackles by linking the Kashmir dispute to the Mumbai attacks and because of what government sources called his ‘aggressive style’ during his three-day visit.
Miliband’s “aggressive style, the tone and manner in which he conducted himself during talks with the prime minister (Manmohan Singh) and the foreign minister (Pranab Mukherjee) were also upsetting,” a government source told to media . A report in the Hindu newspaper quoted a senior foreign ministry official as dismissing Miliband, who is 43, as “a young man”. “I guess this is the way he thinks diplomacy is conducted,” the unidentified official said. The Hindu quoted another Indian official as saying the two government meetings with Miliband were “pretty awful”. Even when Miliband was in India, the government made its displeasure known. “We do not need unsolicited advice on internal issues in India like Kashmir,” said foreign office spokesman Vishnu Prakash. Another Indian official called the foreign ministry criticism of Miliband ‘unprecedented’, saying it was the first time New Delhi “had ticked off a government minister from a UN Security Council member country while the visit was ongoing”.[iii]
3) The British Foreign Office said Foreign Secretary David Miliband’s remarks on Kashmir, which infuriated the Indian government, were “fully consistent” with Britain’s stated view that any conflict likely to be exploited by those who have the agenda[otherwise]innocent people must be resolved quickly. Miliband had not been “off-message,” nor did he deviate from the government line while calling upon India to resolve the Kashmir dispute urgently media reports said. This contradicts the perception in New Delhi that Mr. Miliband made the remarks off his own bat. When the External Affairs Ministry first protested, its spokesman Vishnu Prakash said Mr. Miliband’s views were “clearly his own and are evolving.” But the British Foreign Office sources were keen to emphasize that Mr. Miliband was simply articulating the British government’s official line, adding that it has always been our view that where there is conflict that could play into wrong hands , it is important to resolve it in order to deny them a pretext to any harm . It is in this context that he emphasized the importance of resolving the Kashmir issue,” one official said. The sources also expressed surprise at New Delhi’s strong reaction, claiming that India was aware of the British position as it had come up “frequently” in discussions with the Indian government. “Mr. Miliband’s remarks have been misinterpreted and blown out of all proportions,” they said. But so long as the Kashmir issue remains it would continue to provide ammunition.” one source familiar with India-Pakistan relations said. Mr. Miliband sparked a diplomatic row when, writing in The Guardian on the eve of his visit to India, he called for New Delhi to settle the Kashmir issue as a way of dealing with cross-border terrorism. “Although I understand the current difficulties, resolution of the dispute over Kashmir would help deny extremists in the region,” he wrote. Natasha Khan, a Foreign Office spokesperson, said normalisation of India-Pakistan relations was “vital to regional security” and the British government continued to urge both countries to seek a “lasting resolution of the issue of Kashmir which takes into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.” However, it was not for the U.K. government to prescribe a solution and it was for the parties directly involved to decide how best to resolve it, she added. Meanwhile, there was concern that the row sparked by Mr. Miliband’s remarks and the way he conducted himself during his visit might have “damaged” India-U.K. relations. William Hague, shadow foreign secretary, said: “Good relations with India are very important to Britain and must be handled with care and consistency. If David Miliband’s comments caused a diplomatic storm in Delhi, then those relations will have been damaged by his visit.” The Foreign Office said India and the U.K. enjoyed a “very strong strategic partnership” which covered a very broad agenda. “We are confident that the common interests we share and our strong relationship will continue,” it said.[iv]








Australian foreign policy over Kashmir
“In an attempt to move towards a constructive solution, the Council has declared the rights of the people of Kashmir to determine their own political future and has placed faith in the recognized democratic method of a plebiscite, to be conducted in conditions that would ensure a free vote without any coercion.”[v]
Recent stand
Australia continues to monitor the human rights situation in Kashmir and encourages India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir to work towards a political solution, said Mr. Gary Quinlan, Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, National Security, Defence and Trade. “The Australian Government always welcomes progress on the ‘composite dialogue’ between Pakistan and India. Australia supports a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir dispute through continued negotiations and we encourage parties [India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir] to work towards a political solution,” states the Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister.[vi]



China’s diplomatic Stand over Kashmir
China has played a lead role during the discussion of Kashmir at the UN Security Council. At the 241st meeting of UN SC held on 5 February 1948 China made a serious case for ‘pacification’. The representative of China expressed the view that the Security Council might well recommend to the Government of Pakistan that it’s legal and moral influence should be thrown in the direction of pacification and that the tribesmen should be stopped from further fighting. In addition, he recommended that the Council should appeal to the Government of India to withdraw its troops gradually from Kashmir. He suggested that, after the fundamental principles had been determined by the Council, large discretionary powers should be left to the Commission.

China which shares a border with Kashmir came up with articles of settlement. On 18 March 1948 at the 269th meeting of the Council, the President speaking as the representative of China introduced a draft resolution S/699. It asked the Security Council to recommend to the parties that:

(a) To secure the withdrawal from Jammu and Kashmir of intruding tribesmen and Pakistan nationals

(b) To prevent any further intrusion into the State by denying transit through and bases in Pakistan territory, and by forbidding the furnishing of military and other supplies to all elements engaged in hostility or violence against the State

(c) To persuade all intruders that the present Articles of Settlement, accepted by India and Pakistan, provided full freedom to all inhabitants of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of accession of the State, and that therefore, they should cease fighting and co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.

“I should like to say that a plebiscite was not only agreed on before the two parties came to this Council; it was the unanimous belief of the members of the Council that a plebiscite was the solution. Furthermore, what is a plebiscite? A plebiscite, in terms of the Charter, would mean the self-determination of a people. Self-determination is expressed through a plebiscite. The setting of conditions should not be allowed to obstruct the main purpose, that is, to allow the people of Kashmir to have the right of self-determination.”[vii]
“I think the Charter is a sufficient basis for an appropriate settlement of this [the Kashmir] dispute. The particular principle which would be applicable to this dispute would be the principle of self-determination of peoples.”[viii] “All colonial empires have the backing of law. All of them have been fortified with treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements and what not. The British empire in India had ample legal foundation. In the face of India’s claim to self-determination, all British legal claims were swept aside. These claims were solidly based on treaties duly signed and ratified, and even sanctified by time and tradition. When the Indian people demanded self-determination, the legal documents in the hands of the United Kingdom seemed to have no moral or political relevance. What the Indian people demanded and won from the United Kingdom should, I hope, be granted to the people of Kashmir.”[ix] “The final word in this whole problem does not belong to any member of the Security Council, or to the Council as a whole, or to the representatives of India or Pakistan who are sitting at this table. The final word as to the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to the people of Kashmir. When that final word is given to the world through a free and fair plebiscite, the problem will be solved. Until that final word is given, I am afraid that the problem will remain with us.”[x] “It is only fair to all parties concerned to say that, in the eyes of the Security Council, nothing has happened in Kashmir that changes the legal status of that territory. The status of Kashmir remains what it was fourteen years ago. In the absence of an agreement between India and Pakistan, it cannot be determined without regard to the principle of self-determination. This has been the position consistently taken by the Security Council on the Kashmir question. I do not see how it is possible for the Council to take any other position. The plebiscite elaborately worked out by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, agreed to by the parties and approved by the Security Council, is the means by which the principle of self-determination is to be put into practice in Kashmir. It is the means by which the people of Kashmir are to express freely, under fair and equitable conditions, their will as to the future of the country.”[xi] “The position taken by the Security Council on the Kashmir question is well known. All the relevant resolutions are in the books. The Council has been consistent in all these sixteen years in holding that, in the absence of an agreement between India and Pakistan, the question cannot be solved without regard to the principle of self-determination.”[xii]
Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s. China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990 imposition of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, the Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship was further strengthened. Analysts taking a realist, power political perspective view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful India. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s region-wide influence.
In April 2005, the Chinese Prime Minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and China signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. President Musharraf’s five-day visit to Beijing in February 2006 saw bilateral discussions on counterterrorism, trade, and technical assistance. Chinese President Hu’s November 2006 travel to Islamabad was the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years; another 18 new bilateral pacts were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and plans for joint development of airborne early warning radars. Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including potential provision of complete power reactors, especially in light of Washington’s categorical refusal of Pakistan’s request for a civil nuclear cooperation similar to that being planned between the United States and India. In May 2007, Prime Minister of Pakistan visited Beijing, where Pakistan and China signed 27 new agreements and memoranda of understanding to “re-energize” bilateral cooperation in numerous areas, including defence, space technology, and trade. No public mention was made regarding civil nuclear cooperation. The Chinese government has assisted Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near the border with Iran; Islamabad and Beijing, a major commercial outlet for Central Asian states. Some analysts are concerned that the port may be used for military purposes and could bolster China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most important strategically.[xiii]
On other hand India and China together account for one-third of the world’s population, and are seen to be rising 21st century powers and potential strategic rivals.
New Delhi’s sense of insecurity have been suspicions regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in
South and Southeast Asia. In fact, a strategic orientation focused on China appears to have affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Beijing’s economic support for Pakistan that is widely understood to have included technology of highest standards — is a major and ongoing source of friction; past Chinese support for Pakistan’s Kashmir position has added to the discomfort of Indian leaders. New Delhi takes note of Beijing’s security relations with neighboring Burma and the construction of military facilities on the Indian Ocean. The two countries also have competed for energy resources to feed their rapidly growing economies; India’s relative poverty puts New Delhi at a significant disadvantage in such competition.
Despite historic and strategic frictions, high-level exchanges between India and China regularly include statements that there exists no fundamental conflict of interest between the two countries. During a landmark 1993 visit to Beijing, Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao signed an agreement to reduce troops and maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control that divides the two countries’ forces at the disputed border. A total of 32 rounds of border talks and joint working group meetings aimed at reaching a final settlement have been held since 1981 — 10 of these since both countries appointed special representatives in 2003 — with New Delhi and Beijing agreeing to move forward in other issue-areas even as territorial claims remain
unresolved.
A 2003 visit to Beijing by Prime Minister Vajpayee was viewed as marking a period of much improved relations. In late 2004, India’s army chief visited Beijing to discuss deepening bilateral defence cooperation and a first-ever India-China strategic dialogue was later held in New Delhi. Military-to-military contacts have included modest but unprecedented combined naval and army exercises. During Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s April 2005 visit to New Delhi, India and China inked 11 new agreements and vowed to launch a “strategic partnership” that include broadened defence links and efforts to expand economic relations.[xiv]
In a move that eased border tensions, China formally recognized Indian sovereignty over the former kingdom of Sikkim, and India reiterated its view that Tibet is a part of China. Moreover, in 2006, dubbed the “Year of India-China Friendship,” the two countries formally agreed to cooperate in securing overseas oil resources. In July of that year, India and China reopened the Nathu La border crossing for local trade. The Himalayan pass had been closed since the 1962 war. Sino-India trade relations blossomed — bilateral commerce was worth nearly $19 billion in 2005, almost an eight-fold increase over the 1999 value.
Indo-Chinese relations further warmed in November 2006, when Chinese President Hu Jintao made a trip to India, the first such visit by a Chinese president since 1996. There India and China issued a Joint Declaration outlining a “ten-pronged strategy” to boost bilateral socio-economic ties and defence cooperation, and to “reinforce their strategic partnership.” The two countries, which declared themselves “partners for mutual benefit” rather than rivals or competitors, also signed 13 new pacts on a variety of bilateral initiatives. The Joint Declaration notably contained an agreement to “promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy,” although no details have been provided on what form such cooperation might take.
Prime Minister Singh intended to visit China during the second half of 2007. India’s Army Chief spent a week in China in May 2007, providing fresh impetus to bilateral defence cooperation.[xv]
Every cold war has its proxies. In a swath of Himalayan mountains wedged between the northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and China, they can take the shape of things as mundane as the empty beer bottles and cigarette butts left behind by soldiers on patrol. Up in the mountains, the Indian and Chinese armies monitor a boundary whose line the two countries don't agree on. In certain parts of that murky borderland, the soldiers on night patrols often leave behind evidence of their presence. When relations between the two countries are good, it's litter; when the situation is tense, the detritus is marked in the official record as evidence of "aggressive border-patrolling." Without any direct military confrontation, the tension between Asia's two aspiring superpowers is ratcheting up.[xvi] India and China have never been close, but of late they have become engaged in increasingly sharp rounds of diplomatic thrust and parry. In September 2009 , India signaled its approval of a planned visit by the Dalai Lama to the border town of Tawang, the site of a famous Tibetan Buddhist monastery — a move that China interpreted as a provocation. Beijing then objected to a visit by Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister, to Arunachal Pradesh, claiming it was part of Tibet, which belongs to China. Outraged that China presumed to tell an Indian leader not to go to territory legally recognized as India's, New Delhi then objected to a new power plant that China is building in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, territory that India claims. Almost no one expected 2009 year’s harsh words to escalate into military action, but the hostility is real. "China is trying to see how far India can be pushed," says Pushpita Das of the Institute for Defense Studies & Security Analyses in New Delhi.
China and India share a border 2,175 miles (3,500 km) long. On the Indian side, it runs from states in the northeast that are plagued by insurgency to the glaciers of Ladakh, on the edge of Kashmir. On the Chinese side, the region is just as troubled, encompassing Tibet and Xinjiang, home of the Uighurs, some of whom clashed violently with Chinese earlier in the year 2009 . India and China skirmished again in 1967, but since 1993 the two countries have coexisted more or less peacefully. What's at stake now isn't territory so much as influence and global status. China is an economic powerhouse, but ever since signing of a civilian nuclear agreement between the U.S. and India, Beijing has become increasingly uneasy with India's growing clout. "It's a competition between two systems: chaotic, under-governed India and orderly, over governed China.[xvii] That competition continues, with the U.S. trying to keep close ties to both sides in a difficult balancing act that may turn out to be the most important geopolitical challenge facing Washington this century.
The tiny Indian hill-station town of Tawang is the unlikely center of the current confrontation. It was there that Chinese troops entered India during the 1962 war, and ever since, Tawang has been the headquarters of an Indian-army brigade. The soldiers are hard to miss because they are so numerous — 15,000 among a population of 80,000 in Tawang and the surrounding countryside.
Most of the time, the troops just busy themselves with field exercises in the local farms and orchards. But every so often, things heat up. Summer, 2009, China pressured the board of the Asian Development Bank to block a $2.9 billion loan to India, arguing that part of the money would go to a flood-control project in Arunachal Pradesh. The governor of the state, a retired army general named J.J. Singh, then announced that India would deploy 50,000 more troops up there. [xviii] With or without extra soldiers, India is watching the border. Singh says the Chinese army staged a massive training exercise in Tibet, with 50,000 personnel.
Some two-dozen Chinese soldiers converged earlier in year 2009 on a family of nomads who wouldn't budge from a winter grazing ground that locals say Indian herders had used for generations. China claims the pasture is part of Tibet, not northern India. The soldiers tore up the family's tent and tried to push them back toward the Indian border town of Demchok, Indian authorities say.
Chering Dorjay, the chairman of India's administered , Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, says he arrived on the scene with a new tent and Indian intelligence officers and urged the herders to stay put. "The Chinese, it seems, are gradually taking our territory," he says. "We will feel very insecure unless India strengthens its defenses."
The military details obscure a more significant, if less glamorous, theatre of conflict: infrastructure. It's telling that India has demanded that China cease work on the $2 billion Kohala power plant in Pakistan administered Kashmir.[xix] The plant is part of a systematic effort by China to assert its presence on the rim of the subcontinent, where India has long been the acknowledged superpower. In both Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the Chinese are funding new ports. The Chinese Foreign Minister visited Nepal December 2008, to launch construction of a new highway connecting central Nepal to China, and soon after, China announced plans to extend a controversial railway to Tibet as far as the border with Nepal. India is countering: after Beijing agreed to develop a massive copper field in Afghanistan, New Delhi pledged more than $1 billion in development aid to Kabul.
China's economy is more than twice the size of India's, and Indian officials are sensitive about the gap. "China is trying to become No. 1," says Brajesh Mishra, a former national-security adviser for India. "This is the seed of conflict between China, India and the U.S." On Oct. 15, 2009 Indian heavy-industries minister Vilasrao Deshmukh asked the finance ministry to impose taxes on imports of inexpensive Chinese power equipment. "We don't want India to be turned into a dumping ground,"[xx] Indians, bristle over the flood of Chinese imports and China's increasingly cozy ties with India's neighbors, including Nepal, Sri Lanka and arch-rival Pakistan. In a speech in November 2009 , Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, then its foreign minister, identified an expansionist China as one of India's top challenges. "Today's China seeks to further her interests more aggressively than in the past." [xxi]









Russian foreign policy over Kashmir
“[T]he right path towards settling the Kashmir question […] can only be found if the settlement is inspired by the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples proclaimed in the United Nations Charter.”[xxii]
The end of the cold war and disintegration of the federation left Russia in the lurch. After a period of preoccupation with internal economic crisis and structural adjustments, the Russian ruling class and the society as a whole are out to search for like-minded countries on the international scene for a possible realignment of sorts that can be a counter balance against what some nations have begun to perceive as increasing American hegemonism in the New World Order. Mr. Putin's stepped up rhetoric against the U.S. may be reflective of the deep and intensified anti-Western resentment within Russia. Renewed emphasis on strengthening ties with China. Russia’s made common cause with China by advocating multipolarity as the sine qua non for an unborn new world order in the context of their objections to the U.S.'s National Missile Defence System, harbours a desire for a new geo-political realignment . Russia cannot any more provide the bulwark of the Cold War era, but it continues to be a P-5 member and still a more reliable ally in the UN Security Council than India's new friends - whether on nuclear issue or India's bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council . Russia can always be trusted to mute any criticism of India.[xxiii] Between India and Russia, mutually shared dimensions have always determined the bilateral interaction with common geo-political concerns outweighing post cold war differences. [xxiv]While acknowledging that India is a deserving candidate for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Russia did not announce formal support for India's candidature for the seat.[xxv] Russian parallel suggestion for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute "on a bilateral basis through compromise,"it stands to reason that Mr. Putin, in the totality of his brief observations on Kashmir.[xxvi]
After 9/11 a drastic change of Russian foreign policy has taken place , which recommends that the issues which are the bone of contention between various countries must be addressed and advocates for the bilateral arrangements for the settlement of Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan , although Pakistan was looking for Indo-Pak mediation by Russia over Kashmir . Russian present stance is akin to its old stand to solve the Kashmir issue through negotiable settlement between India and Pakistan .





Canada’s Stand over Kashmir
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien had once , on behalf of his government, offered "to facilitate" India-Pakistan dialogue.
He, however, encouraged "that the leaders of the two countries recently re-launched bilateral discussions at Agra, and vowed to continue them during an early visit by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Pakistan."
In a letter to Liberal Member of Parliament James Karygianns, a copy of which was made available to rediff.com, Chretien said he would "continue to voice Canada's support for dialogue as the best means of achieving a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue and of addressing other pressing bilateral matters."
Soon after the Agra summit, in a personal letter Karygiannis had suggested that Chretien should offer to mediate between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute and that Canada should invite "representatives of India and Pakistan to hold future negotiations on the Kashmir issue in Canada."
To that suggestion, Chretien has responded by emphasising that "Canada has already offered its good offices to the governments of India and Pakistan" to facilitate their dialogue.
Soon after the Agra summit, Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs' spokesman Sanjeev Chowdhury had told rediff.com that "despite evident setback in failing to issue a joint statement by Indian and Pakistani leaders at the end of the summit, we continue to urge both countries to sustain a peaceful dialogue and to exercise restraint to make this possible."
Karygiannis has travelled to India and Pakistan several times, especially during the Gujarat earthquake, and has many friends in both countries, including former Indian defence minister George Fernandes.
Canada reiterated that it has not changed it position on Kashmir.
The clarification came after a Kashmiri group , wrote a letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper about human rights violations rendered by India in the Kashmir valley.
Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon, who had replied to the letter , told parliament that Canada has not deviated from it long-held position on the Kashmir issue.
“Canada’s position on Kashmir has not changed. Canada has not deviated from its approach that supports efforts by both India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir and other issues through the composite dialogue process,” the foreign minister said.
He said, “We want to see the Kashmir issue resolved through peaceful means to be able to reiterate to the High Commission for India to Canada .”
Kevin Sorenson, an MP for the ruling Conservative party, had raised the issue, saying that “ reports state that Canada has changed its position regarding the disputed Kashmir region.”
The MP wanted the foreign minister to clarify whether Canada’s position “on this very important and sensitive issue” has really changed.
“Canada also engages in dialogue with like-minded partners to promote sustainable peace in South Asia, including with the members of the G8-Canada regularly presses India to ensure that human rights, including the rights of Kashmiris, are respected…,” the foreign minister is quoted as assuring the group.[xxvii]




Saudi foreign policy over Kashmir
An influential and powerful royal family members of Saudi Arabia, Prince Turki al-Faisal has urged the US President, Barack Obama to push India and Pakistan for resolving the Kashmir dispute for his AfPak policy to make any progress for that purpose Saudi Arabia could play a supporting role in settlement of the dispute.
US had cordial relations with both, Pakistan and India and if it started efforts for amicable solution of the long-standing Kashmir dispute, Saudi Arabia could play the role of a mediator.[xxviii]








Turkey’s Stand over Kashmir
Their multi-dimensional relationship showed the same spirit of brotherhood as prevailed during centuries-old ties between South Asian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire until 1947 as Republic of Turkey.
For over half century, Turkey and Pakistan remained close friends. Ideologically, they were poles apart - Turkey pursuing secularism while Pakistan is following Islam as a basic doctrine .But the difference of ideology, with its reflection on respective external outlook, never hampered the course of friendly ties. Since secular Turkey has economic and political stakes in Central Asia, it does not like the growing influence in Afghanistan of the Taliban, which threatens to cause a spillover of religious extremism into the Central Asian region. It shares the concern of Central Asian states and Russia on the matter. Ankara's inclination towards anti-Taliban forces is clear from the fact that the Afghani-Uzbek leader, Rashid Dostum, after being ditched by General Abdul Malik from his own faction, Jumbish-e-Milli, in June 1997, took refuge in Istanbul. His Tadjik partner in the northern alliance against Taliban, Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, visited Ankara in April 1998. Turkey has traditionally supported Pakistan's official standpoint on Kashmir, which says that a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir under the supervision of the UN should take place, as was specified in the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. Ankara still supports the UN option for a Kashmir settlement, but over the last few years, it has started to stress the importance of India-Pakistan bilateral talks in settling the issue. The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the "Lahore process provides the most appropriate ground for resolution of the dispute between India and Pakistan." After 9/11 things have changed but Pakistan has made clear to Istanbul that it is supporting ongoing freedom struggle politically , morally and diplomatically . Trade, business, investment, defence production, tourism, educational and cultural cooperation are all areas where the perceptions and interests of Turkey and Pakistan converge at a strength . India has deployed nearly 750,000 troops to quell the armed Kashmiri resistance struggle in Indian-administered Kashmir on the basis of military might to which Turkey takes a serious note .

















Belgian stand over Kashmir
The Prime Minister of Belgium, Herman Van Rompuy has called upon India and Pakistan to hold constructive dialogue for resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The Prime Minister said, “We will make sure that the Kashmir dispute remains on the European Union agenda, and continue to stress the need for a common European position on the principles governing basic human rights for the Kashmiri people in accordance with international law.”[xxix]













Libyan stand on Kashmir


The stand taken by Muammar al-Qadhafi, Leader of the Revolution of Libya and of the African Union on the Rights Movement of the people of Kashmir at the UN is a significant development. This is significant because the decision has not any input or influence of Pakistan.
In a lucid 90 minutes speech in UN General Assembly about Kashmir said , “Kashmir should be an independent state, not Indian, not Pakistani. We should end this conflict, it should be an Independent [Ba’athist] state between India and Pakistan.”[xxx]

Libyan stand on Kashmir at the UN General Assembly has given new dimension to Kashmiri perception in general and to those who have pro-Kashmir plank in particular , it is an admitted fact that when Maqbool Butt was hanged to death in Tihar Jail by Indian authorities Qadhafi has officially condemned the act along with PLO Chief Yasir Arafat. Present move demands rethinking among the resistance leaders of Kashmir and to the diplomatic stand of Pakistan .







OIC Contact Group Supports Kashmir Struggle
OIC Kashmir Contact Group meeting held in a very concerning environment in year ending 2009, the Member States of OIC in general and Members of the Contact Group in particular in their opening remarks at the plenary expressed their concern about the long lingering, oldest unresolved dispute of Kashmir. The secretary General of OIC, Mr. Ekmelledin Ahsanoglu, in his address to the plenary explicitly asserted his view point that the dialogue between India and Pakistan should focus their attention towards the centrality of this dispute. In a similar manner, Dr. Abdullah Gul, President of Peoples Republic of Turkey was highly concerned with the plight of Kashmir. Tajikistan pleaded for the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. The Chairman of the host country in his opening remarks referred to the dispute of Jammu Kashmir.

The Contact Group Meeting was a reflection of an overall concern about Kashmir at the OIC Summit. The meeting was chaired by the Secretary General OIC, Turkey, Pakistan, Niger, Saudi Arabia and Senegal were represented. Kashmiri delegation included Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Chairman, All Parties Hurriyet Conference, [Jammu Kashmir]; Professor Nazir Shawl, Executive Director, Justice Foundation[Kashmir Center] London; and Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive director,[ Kashmiri American Council;Kashmir Center, Washington].

Addressing the Contact Group on Jammu Kashmir Prof. (Dr.) Ekmeleddin Ahsanoglu asserted, “We reaffirm our full support for and solidarity with the people of Jammu Kashmir in their legitimate struggle for their fundamental human rights including the right to self-determination. In fact, the question of Jammu Kashmir has been one of the oldest unresolved issues on the agenda of the OIC and the continued support of the organization to the Kashmiri people in realizing their aspirations has remained strong and unwavering and this is why the issue has continued to feature in all Islamic Summit and foreign ministers conferences.”

He further said, “OIC continues to encourage (peaceful and negotiated settlement of Jammu Kashmir dispute and to sustain and push forward peace process in order to resolve all outstanding issues while associating the Kashmiri people in a result oriented dialogue.”

Mr. Inaamul Haq, the foreign minister of Pakistan said, “Pakistan remains deeply concerned over the widespread and continued human rights violations in Indian Administered Kashmir. He further said, “In South Asia durable and lasting peace can be achieved only by amicably resolving the core dispute of Jammu Kashmir in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.”
Dr. Ali Baba Jan, the foreign minister of Turkey welcomed the India-Pakistan engagement but said any negotiation can move forward by recognizing the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.
Dr. Madani, The State Minister of foreign affairs said Saudi Arabia favours the realization of the Kashmiri aspirations in letter and spirit and the legitimate right of the people of Jammu Kashmir should be redeemed in lie of their aspirations.

The Senegalese Secretary General for foreign affairs promised the people of Jammu Kashmir the full support of his Government and people and he said that they supported the Kashmir cause in the past and we will do that in future as well.

The representative of Niger said the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu Kashmir is a basic human right and we assure the Kashmiri delegation of our complete and unconditional support to their just cause.[xxxi] Meanwhile OIC has appointed a special envoy on Kashmir to look for the amicable and durable solution of Kashmir.





Statements given by some more countries about Kashmir in United Nations

Argentina
“Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations lays down the following as one of the purposes of the United Nations: ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures so strengthen universal peace.’ Now that the disputes between India and Pakistan have been submitted to the jurisdiction of the Security Council, the delegation of Argentina will not be able to vote in favour of any draft resolution which does not leave the solution of the problem to be decided by a plebiscite, freely prepared, freely conducted and freely scrutinized under the authority of the Security Council.”
[xxxii] “In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to make the following declarations: […] Kashmir is not a territory of India – no Power will either propose or accept a plebiscite to surrender a part of its territory, as India’s Government did; […] the cause of the present war is the rebellion of the Kashmir people against their Ruler, and the only remedy is to look to the will of these people….”[xxxiii]

Brazil
“A plebiscite is a well-known and well-defined method of international law. By placing the plebiscite under the direction of the United Nations, the parties reinforced the guarantees of its fair and impartial implementation. The acceptance of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission not only curtailed the discretion of the opposing sides, but also accrued a right to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, namely, the right to decide by vote, under pre-established conditions, their choice of sovereignty.”[xxxiv]
“The Anglo-American draft resolution [S/2017/Rev.1] embodies certain principles of international law to which Brazil has unswervingly adhered and which fall within the spirit and letter of the Charter. I refer specifically to the spirit of self-determination of peoples which accounts for the provision for a United Nations-sponsored plebiscite whereby the people of Jammu and Kashmir may choose their political status.”
[xxxv] “As to the question of self-determination for Kashmir, the principle in itself is a cherished one which my Government recognizes as fundamental to the building of world peace. We have been faithful to this principle in all those circumstances in which its application was valid. We are told that a plebiscite would raise more problems than it would solve. We are not in a position to judge what the impact of the full implementation of the principle of self-determination in Kashmir would have throughout the Indian subcontinent. One thing, however, remains true and evident to us: no settlement of any territorial question will last if the will of the people who live and toil in these lands is not fully respected.”[xxxvi]
Cuba
“This statement by the Prime Minister of India [in a telegram dated 8 November 1947 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan; see p. 6 below], which does him very great honour and is fully in accordance with the principles of the Charter and with the right of peoples to self-determination, is exactly what we [the co-sponsors of draft resolution S/3778] propose in the first part of our draft resolution when we say that ‘the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.’”[xxxvii]

“The delegation of Cuba therefore considers that the draft resolution [S/3778] is a reaffirmation of the Council’s position, of the clear and binding provisions of the Charter, and of the right of peoples to self-determination.”[xxxviii]

“As far as the Cuban delegation is concerned, the fundamental element of this problem is that the sovereignty of Kashmir rests exclusively with the people of Kashmir. […] When the Nabob [ruler] of Junagadh decided by a resolution of his own to accede to Pakistan and did so, the Government of India declared that that was illegal because it violated the principle of the people’s self-determination. And when the Nizam [ruler] of Hyderabad also wanted to remain neutral, that is, not accede to either India or Pakistan, the Government of India similarly declared that the Nizam could not do so because he was violating the freely expressed will of the people of Hyderabad. These are recorded facts which in the opinion of the Cuban delegation, have been proven through documents, and we have no doubt whatsoever that the same principle should be applied to the case of Kashmir as a general basis for judging these problems.”[xxxix]
“In the opinion of the Cuban delegation, this [statements by the representative of India] proves that the position of the delegation of India is that the offer made previously by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, will be carried out, namely that the people of Kashmir will decide upon their own future. That in short, is the same thesis that the representative of India brilliantly expressed on 12 February in the First Committee of the General Assembly when he vigorously and enthusiastically contended that Algeria also has a right to determine its own future. In other words, it would be unjustifiable, in the Cuban delegation’s view – and I say this with all due respect to the representative of India – that the Algerian people should have the right to exercise freely the principle of self-determination and that the Kashmiri people should not. This is all the more true since in the case of the people of Kashmir, there has been no discussion, as in the case of Algeria, whether it was in effect an integral part of another State, because both parties have recognized that Kashmir has existed as a State for ten centuries, though for many years under the rule of the United Kingdom.”
[xl] “[T]he resolutions of the Council exist; Kashmir exists; the people of Kashmir exist; the principle of self-determination exists in the Charter of the United Nations….”[xli]
“We have given consideration and study to all the arguments advanced by the Indian Government; but, in our opinion, none of them is sufficiently weighty to prevent the people of Jammu and Kashmir from deciding their own destiny in the final instance.”[xlii]
“These are two Governments worthy of our respect which have always fulfilled their obligations in the United Nations, and which have proclaimed and defended the principle of the self-determination of peoples; inasmuch as our goal is self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, we believe that the task of the Security Council becomes less difficult.”[xliii]
East Timor
“I therefore urge everyone wishing to bring peace, democracy and social justice to this troubled region to join in supporting a free, fair and binding plebiscite for all the people of Kashmir, that the world may finally know and abide by their long deferred aspirations.”[xliv]
Egypt
“The work of the Security Council and of the Security Council’s Commission for India and Pakistan, and the statesmen-like attitude of both the Governments of India and Pakistan are all to the credit of the structure of the United Nations and its aims of peace, and also to the credit of all concerned in this matter. This is particularly gratifying to my delegation and to the Egyptian Government, in view of the fact that we in a very clear and unequivocal manner, endorse and express the conceptions of democracy of the United Nations Charter, in particular the great principle of self-determination which is one of the main pillars of our Organization.”[xlv]
Iraq
“When the question was brought to the attention of the Security Council in 1948, the Kashmir situation was no doubt viewed in the framework of the circumstances which surrounded the whole process of the creation of the two Dominions on the one hand and, on the other, in conjunction with the principle of self-determination. […] The idea of a plebiscite no doubt had been in line, on the one hand, with the traditional struggle for liberation conducted by all the people of the Indian sub-continent and, on the other, with the principle of self-determination.”[xlvi]
“This [a plebiscite] is, in our opinion, the solution to the problem, a solution which takes into consideration, and rightly so, the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination.”[xlvii]
“We make a special appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to facilitate the solution of this dispute by bringing to bear more efforts and more co-operation, so that the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination may be safeguarded. [xlviii]
“It would not do justice to the case before us or to the people of Kashmir if we or others were to create or entertain the impression that our judgement was in any way related to or based upon considerations other than the merits of the case, the resolutions of the Council and the principles of the United Nations Charter – the most important of which is the principle of self-determination.”[xlix]
Ivory Coast
“However, before dealing with the [Kashmir] problem itself, my delegation would like to restate certain fundamental principles. First, we accept all the resolutions of the Security Council and we also recognize their dynamic nature; secondly, we reaffirm our devotion to the sacred principle of self-determination; thirdly, we also condemn racial and religious discrimination.”[l]
Jordan
“It is not open, at this stage, for either India or Pakistan to claim that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of its territory. This will be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves. They have the right to choose their destiny, and until such time as they do, both parties are stopped from making any claims of sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. […] Needless to say, self-determination is a right we always support. But annexation which does not stem from the free will of the people is something we do not endorse. It does not convey a right. It imposes a duty – a duty on the people to oppose it, and a duty on us here to protect the legitimate right of the people to choose their own destiny.”[li]

Netherlands
“We are then, we may earnestly hope, in the presence of a common and uncontested desire that the future of the territory and the population which are involved in the dispute should be decided through the free exercise of the right of self-determination by the people most directly concerned. The Netherlands Government has always considered the principle of self-determination as being of primary importance for human happiness and the peace of the world. It continues to believe in that principle, now that the Council is again confronted with the Jammu and Kashmir case.”[lii]
“In that way the truce agreement could and should finally be effected, that is to say, the demilitarization, which is indispensable to the free exercise of the right of self-determination of and by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”[liii]
“But once the right to self-determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is – as it has been – recognized, once it is clearly accepted by the parties in dispute – as it has been – that they have no right to impose anything upon these people against their wishes and that therefore these wishes must prevail over the wishes and claims of the bordering States, it must be possible to find a procedure which will create the most favourable conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people, who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation. The issue should, in the last analysis, be decided by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and not by the rulers heretofore placed over them.”[liv]
“What he [the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan] in effect is expected to do is to bring into shape and being the indispensable prerequisite for a just, fair and free plebiscite by which the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be enabled to exercise their uncontested right to self-determination. […] The issue, I said, should in the 1ast analysis be decided by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir themselves. Their right of self-determination had been recognized by both the parties to this dispute and the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must therefore prevail.”[lv]
“The very serious issue before us, which has endangered the relations between two great nations of the Asiatic subcontinent for almost four years, has not yet found a just and reasonable solution acceptable to the parties. As a result of this absence of agreement it has remained impossible for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination, although this right is not contested by the parties. On the contrary, the right of self-determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been clearly and formally recognized and accepted by all concerned. The lack of agreement therefore does not concern this right of self-determination.”[lvi]
“But I submit that the issue before us should in the first place be determined by the need of self-determination of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir themselves.”[lvii]
“Our only interest in this matter is one of principle, namely, that the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be respected and implemented.”[lviii]
“[O]ur final and essential aim, in the present approach to this problem, is to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir their right to self-determination, that is, their right to choose which way they want to go, a right which is not contested by anyone and which we must therefore, after all these years, find a means to implement.”[lix]
“As is well known, the attitude of my country has always been that the Kashmir question should be solved on the basis of the free self-determination of the people of Kashmir and Jammu and that the decisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the Security Council on that subject offered a just means to achieve that aim. Therefore, we can sympathize with Pakistan’s apprehension on this aspect, namely that the basic political conflict might be left unsolved. If that were done, the Council would only be dealing with the symptoms of the disease and not with the disease itself, the underlying cause of all conflicts between India and Pakistan.”[lx]
Philippines
“In the view of both the Council and the Commission, neither India nor Pakistan can bring into question the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This position is crystal clear in the assurances given by the Commission to the Governments of India and Pakistan and which forms the basis of their resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Under the circumstances and pending the holding of a plebiscite, neither India nor Pakistan can claim sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”[lxi]
“All countries, great and small, have a stake in the principles involved in the [Kashmir] dispute: considerations of justice and equity, the honoring of international agreements, respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples, the integrity of decisions of the Security Council and its organs, and support of the Council’s efforts to comply with its primary responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.”[lxii]
Syria
“It is correct to say that the Maharajah of Junagadh, in declaring his accession to Pakistan, was not acting within the rules of our Charter, and that the people of Junagadh were not given the opportunity for self-determination, the chance to determine the fate of their future government. It was the same case in Kashmir.”[lxiii]

Uruguay
“[T]he Security Council is on the eve of facing other problems concerning the self-determination of peoples. Its legal, moral, and political authority depends on its subsequent acts and conduct. What the Council says and does now regarding this lamentable situation [the Kashmir dispute] will constitute a precedent for the situations with which the Council may have to deal tomorrow.”[lxiv]


Kashmir Conflict and Global priorities
Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq are predicted to be the dangerous places on earth says Obama . The exclusion of Kashmir from conflicts in other countries refers to political and strategic myopia because Kashmir at present has emerged more dangerous region than prospected about Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq as a possibility of nuclear war is looming and there is surging realization within stubborn approach that an alternative system has to be looked for that would be great service to humanity .The point is that external and some internal causes are to be taken care of .It should be tried out. The perception is dawning on both sides is that we need non-conventional approaches to look at the problem. Thus Non-Westphalia approaches is emerging as a dominant force to reckon with .
Even after sixty two years of independence of India – Pakistan: Kashmiris are still captive to the hidebound stand of the two countries ,although Pakistan has offered some concessions by means of willy-nilly course [Out of Box] but many observers find it perplexing that in the last six decades , India failed to offer any plan officially for the solution of the Kashmir imbroglio. In politically correct lexicon Kashmir issue is neither a communal conflict nor combat to protect secular symbol of India or to shield the jugular vein of Pakistan . Kashmir is an area of diverse religions, it is a habitat to huge majority of inhabitants belonging to different traditions like Muslims in Kashmir., Hindus and Dogras of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh.
The contradictory observation of different parties to a dispute gives origin to the contrary set of elucidations or solutions for which harmonized approach is to be developed. Jammu Kashmir for India is a symbol of secular identification and demonstrates the co-subsistence of a chiefly Muslim state within a Hindu majority country and for Pakistan it is a nationwide sentiment. In Kashmir the politicians and intellectuals have remained polarized since 1947 into Pro-Pak, Pro-India or Pro-independence. More often the politicians, thinkers and academicians have been unsuccessful to stand for local wishes, aspirations and desires. The provincial measures which have failed due to Indo-Pak stalemate like [ASEAN, SAARC, etc.]: would further go to build India, Pakistan, Kashmir even whole South Asia a new continent of peace and progress on the globe, when core issue is solved. If at all Kashmiris want to play a role in the crisis they need to comprehend the magnitude of bilateral and regional cooperation by promoting a viewpoint of dialogue, serenity and peace. The origin of Indo-Pak variance is Kashmir- thus solution to the sticky situation lies here only , therefore Kashmiri politics has more pivotal role to play rather than international pulls or pressures which is mounting on India and Pakistan , because West and its allies seem to be partial while dealing Kashmir , which might not befit all the three (Indians, Pakistanis and even Kashmiris) .



Political settlement amongst the power brokers of India, Pakistan and Kashmir will collapse if it is not accompanied by a movement of faith-based reconciliation among the people by :
(1) Restoring a condition in which numerous distinct ethnic, religious, or cultural groups are present and tolerated within a society :
(2) Furthering Individual and accumulated absolution;
(3) Promoting social justice- which affords individuals and groups fair treatment and an impartial share of the benefits of society;
(4) Re-establishing a sense of community across boundaries rather a social group sharing an environment, normally with shared interests;
(5) Addressing the historical wounds associated with anxiety of culture , physical and mental trauma ;
(6) Inculcating a new basis for political order and civil society;
(7) Seeks to provide an alternative identity for Kashmiris by means of a larger geo-political order;
(8) De-escalation followed by significant development which may technically called
management (withdrawal of troops) with the establishment of governments for a specific purpose and promoting free movement of people and goods.
After 9/11 world political priorities observed a paradigm shift the West and its policy makers developed bigoted approach towards all the conflict engagements across the globe including Kashmir and Palestine still seeking settlement. The pressure over India and Pakistan is mounting to settle Kashmir and other related issues. 9/11 proved to be vantage in global politics and rethought was given by the world community especially US over the supreme will of India and Pakistan for the resolution over Kashmir? The answer surely is confusing and difficult as Pakistan is a key partner in U.S war against anti-U.S. forces and the India is an emerging U.S. partner whom some U.S strategists prospect a counter to the emerging Chinese influence in the Asian Region . Indo-American nuclear deal is the brain child of this rising realm. Both India and Pakistan have maneuvered by their influence, created out of their individual significance to American; benefits to diffuse the pressure for settlement of Kashmir tangle. In spite of the growing American apprehensions that region may emerge as the anti-American strong hold , so Americas take measured steps vis-à-vis resolution of global conflicts like Kashmir , however the ground position remains unchanged: reason that can persuade the fate of this dispute is the polity of Kashmir itself. It is frequently said that Jammu Kashmir is an uncompleted schema` of division.
















Recap of answers for Kashmir Solution






















Scenario one: The status quo:

Kashmir has been a flashpoint between India and Pakistan for more than 62 years. Currently a boundary - the Line of Control - divides the region in two, with one part administered by India and one by Pakistan. India would like to formalise this status quo and make it the accepted international boundary. But Pakistan and Kashmiri activists reject this plan because they both want greater control over the region.
In 1947-8 India and Pakistan fought their first war over Jammu Kashmir. Under United Nations' supervision, they agreed to a ceasefire along a line which left one-third of the state - comprising what Pakistan calls Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the Northern Areas administered by Pakistan and two-thirds, Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley, administered by India.
In 1972, under the terms of the Simla agreement, the ceasefire line was renamed the Line of Control.
Although India claims that the entire state is part of India, it has been prepared to accept the Line of Control as the international border, with some possible modifications. Both the US and the UK have also favoured turning the Line of Control into an internationally-recognised frontier.
But Pakistan has consistently refused to accept the Line of Control as the border since the predominantly Muslim Kashmir Valley would remain as part of India. Formalising the status quo also does not take account of the aspirations of those Kashmiris who have been fighting since 1989 for independence for the whole or part of the state.(Source:BBC)










Scenario two: Kashmir joins Pakistan
Pakistan has consistently favoured this as the best solution to the dispute. In view of the state's majority Muslim population, it believes that it would vote to become part of Pakistan. However a single plebiscite held in a region which comprises peoples that are culturally, religiously and ethnically diverse, would create disaffected minorities. The Hindus of Jammu, and the Buddhists of Ladakh have never shown any desire to join Pakistan and would protest at the outcome.
In 1947 India and Pakistan agreed that the allegiance of the state of Jammu Kashmir would be decided by a plebiscite. Had the majority voted in favour of Pakistan, the whole state would have become part of Pakistan. This no longer seems to be an option.
A plebiscite offering the choice of union with Pakistan or India also does not take into account the movement for independence which has been supported by political and militant activists since 1989. India has long since rejected the idea of a plebiscite as a means of settling the Kashmir issue.
Instead the government argues that the people have exercised their right of self-determination by participating in elections within the state.
However the demand for a plebiscite to be held, as recommended by the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten in 1947, and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, is still considered by some as a way of letting Kashmiris exercise their right of self-determination. .(Source:BBC)












Scenario three: Kashmir joins India

Such a solution would be unlikely to bring stability to the region as the Muslim inhabitants of Pakistani-administered Jammu Kashmir, including the Northern Areas, have never shown any desire to become part of India.
In 1948 India and Pakistan then agreed to hold a plebiscite to confirm which country Kashmir's citizens wanted to join. The Indian Government believed that the majority population, under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, would vote to join India, with its secular constitution, rather than Muslim Pakistan.
If the plebiscite had been held and the majority had voted in favour of India, Pakistan would have had to relinquish control of the Northern Areas and the narrow strip of Jammu Kashmir which it occupied militarily in 1947-8[Indian Stand] and liberated [Pakistan Stand].
India has long since rejected the idea of holding a single plebiscite as a means of determining the fate of the state of Jammu Kashmir. It believes that the people made their choice by participating in elections within the state.
Without including a third option of independence from both India and Pakistan, the plebiscite also fails to satisfy the demands of those Kashmiris wanting full independence.














Scenario four: Independent Kashmir











The difficulty of adopting this as a potential solution is that it requires India and Pakistan to give up territory, which they are not willing to do. Any plebiscite or referendum likely to result in a majority vote for independence would therefore probably be opposed by both India and Pakistan
Both India and Pakistan fear that an independent Jammu Kashmir might also set in motion the demand for independence by other states in both India and Pakistan and lead to a "Balkanisation" of the region.
In the 1960s, following discussions between India and Pakistan over Jammu Kashmir, a group of Kashmiris demanded that the entire state should become independent as it was prior to the Maharajah's accession to India in 1947.
The movement for independence of the entire state is mainly supported by Kashmiris who inhabit the more populous Kashmir Valley and who would like both India and Pakistan to vacate the areas they are occupying. They base their claim on the fact that the state was formerly an independent princely state, is geographically larger than at least 68 countries of the United Nations, and more populous than 90 countries . (Source:BBC)












Scenario five: A smaller independent Kashmir

An independent Kashmir could be created from the Kashmir Valley - currently under Indian administration - and the narrow strip of land which Pakistan calls Azad Jammu Kashmir. This would leave the strategically important regions of the Northern Areas and Ladakh, bordering China, under the control of Pakistan and India respectively. However both India and Pakistan would be unlikely to enter into discussions which would have this scenario as a possible outcome.
If, as the result of a regional plebiscite, which offered the option of independence, the majority of the inhabitants of the Kashmir Valley chose independence and the majority of the inhabitants of Pakistani-administered Jammu Kashmir, (excluding the Northern Areas) also chose independence, a smaller, independent Kashmir could be created by administratively joining these two areas together.
This would leave the predominantly Muslim Northern Areas as part of Pakistan and Buddhist Ladakh and majority Hindu Jammu as part of India, with the possibility that some Muslim districts of Jammu might also opt to join the independent state.
Although Pakistan has demanded a change in the status of the Kashmir Valley, it depends on water from the Mangla Reservoir in Pakistani-administered Jammu Kashmir and would be unlikely to permit loss of control of the region.
India is still committed to retaining the Kashmir Valley as part of the Indian Union and has refused to consider holding a plebiscite in any part of the state.
Regardless of the aspirations of the inhabitants, to date neither country has contemplated a situation where the end result would adversely affect their own interests.( Source:BBC)








Scenario six: Independent Kashmir Valley

An independent Kashmir Valley has been considered by some as the best solution because it would address the grievances of those who have been fighting against the Indian Government since the armed resistance began in 1989. But critics say that, without external assistance, the region would not be economically viable.
The movement for independence in the Kashmir Valley gained momentum in the late 1980s when Kashmiris protested against their continuing allegiance to the Indian Union. In the present day, if a regional plebiscite offered independence as an option, it is possible that the majority of Kashmiris would vote in favour of independence.
With an approximate land mass of 1,800 square miles (80 miles long, 20 to 25 miles wide) it is much larger than Monaco and Liechtenstein – but only one-tenth of the size of Bhutan. Whether or not the rest of the state retained its current political affiliations, many Kashmiris therefore believe that the valley could be viable in its own right.
In terms of livelihood, the valley could sustain itself through tourism, handicrafts and agriculture and most importantly Hydroelectricity.
But an independent Kashmir Valley would also need to retain good relations with its neighbours in order to survive economically. Not only is the region landlocked, but it is snowbound during winter.
An independent Kashmir Valley would have the advantage of giving neither Pakistan nor India a victory out of their longstanding dispute. But although Pakistan might favour the creation of an independent Kashmir Valley, India would be unlikely to agree to the loss of territory involved.
Autonomy of the same region under the Indian Union is also an option; Pakistan is more likely to request a [joint protectorate] in order to share in safeguarding the Kashmir valley's political integrity and economic development.(Source:BBC)







Scenario seven: The Chenab formula

This plan, first suggested in the 1960s, would see Kashmir divided along the line of the River Chenab. This would give the vast majority of land to Pakistan and, as such, a clear victory in its longstanding dispute with India. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population would be brought within Pakistan's borders, as well as the majority Muslim areas of Jammu.
With the inclusion of Ladakh, which also lies north of the Chenab river, India would be left with approximately 3,000 square miles of territory out of 84,000 square miles. Musharraf regime had been keen on the Chenab Plan – a partition of Jammu Kashmir along its communal fault-lines . Islamabad is pushing for an arrangement where the ten Muslim-dominated districts of the Kashmir Valley – Srinagar, Budgam, Shopian, Baramulla, Bandipora, Ganderbal ,Kupwara, Anantnag , Kulgam and Pulwama[Present Status] – will be granted suzerainty, a near-sovereign status. This near-sovereign status would leave the new entity with power over all areas of governance other than foreign policy.
India, under the Chenab Plan, will then have to forgo all its claims to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. In turn, Pakistan would be called on to accept Indian sovereignty over the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the State. The Jammu region is made up of the ten districts of Jammu, Doda,Ramban Kathua,Samba, Udhampur,Reasi,Kishtiwar, Rajouri and Poonch[Present Status]. But the Chenab Plan calls for a further division of Poonch, Doda(including Ramban, Kishtiwar, Reasi districts) and Rajouri[present Status], all Muslim-majority areas. They will all go to Pakistan, if the LoC is extended eastward and then becomes the border between India and Pakistan. In return, Pakistan would also forgo any claim over Ladakh, leaving a decision on the future of the region to be made between India and China at their mutual convenience.

This solution would require the voluntary agreement of India to give up territory which it wants to retain. It is impossible to see what benefit India could derive from the transfer of so much land, and why the government - or the inhabitants of the region who are not contesting their status - would ever agree to such a solution.
It also does not take into account the movement for independence which has been extremely vocal ever since the armed resistance began in the 1989, and whose supporters have been demanding independence of all or part of the state.(Source:BBC)

At all levels demilitarization must be achieved in a much more holistic and integrated way. The approach involves several dimensions and obligations on the part of Pakistan and India.. It is not never-to -be-repeated affair and that is not how demilitarization works. The real space for civil society will emerge only after demilitarization. The police force in Kashmir has to be humanized, if the Kashmiris have to decide their own future.
Schemes for a partitioning of Jammu Kashmir have been in the air for some years now . During the Kargil War, back-channel negotiators Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani foreign secretary and RK Mishra, a leading Indian journalist, had been reported to have exchanged papers on the Chenab Plan, documented in a Pakistani proposal, an Indian counter-proposal, and a Pakistani response. Later, Pakistani negotiators demanded of their US interlocutors that a withdrawal from Kargil by Pakistan be premised on Indian reciprocity, in the form of the acceptance of the Chenab Plan- in February 2000, the then Kashmir Chief Minister, Abdullah and his key Cabinet Ministers held discussions with US-based businessman Farooq Kathwari, the author of detailed plans to divide Jammu Kashmir. Kathwari's Kashmir Studies Group (KSG) had, in a series of reports collectively called "Kashmir: A Way Forward", called for the creation of a new sovereign state but without an international personality.
Many observers find the Chenab Plan a variation of the "Dixon Plan.
As already mentioned that the "Dixon Plan" assigned Ladakh to India, the Northern Areas and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK) to Pakistan, split Jammu between the two, and envisaged a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan objected at first, but agreed later. It fell through because Pandit Nehru did not accept the conditions under which the plebiscite could be held. He wanted that the plebiscite to determine the future of the Kashmir Valley should be held under the then Prime Minister of the State, Sheikh Abdullah, something Dixon did not agree to. Otherwise, Nehru, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad and Abdul Kalam – had agreed with the Australian jurist that major portions of the pre-1948 J&K could be divided between India and Pakistan, with the Kashmir Valley given the option to decide for itself whether to join India or Pakistan through a plebiscite.
On the other hand, 2010 is not 1950, situation has changed considerably. Therefore, neither the Chenab Plan nor any other old thesis which are talking of the possibility of the solution. Instead, each of them would settle for a semi-independent status for the Valley. It is against this background that many think tanks and intellectuals of both India and Pakistan – the professional Track II personnel – have now floated in 2003-2004, what is called the Andorra model for Jammu Kashmir.
Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. Under a 1993 agreement, Andorra has near autonomy with its own constitution and currency. France and Spain both share responsibility for its defence. Applied to the Kashmir Valley, the Andorra model would suggest that its defence and foreign affairs would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan and its borders would be soft enough to allow the movements of both Indians and Pakistanis in and out of it.
General Musharraff propounded the matter by suggesting a four -point outline for resolving the Kashmir imbroglio permanently. At one time addressing Pakistani editors and columnists, he gave arguable “proposal, a food for thought”. He said that Pakistanis must discuss a “change of status” for Kashmir. “Change in status could be independent status- joint control (with India), it can be a UN mandate also,” he reportedly said, adding “We’ll have to sit down with legal experts who can give their opinion on what other status are possible”. And divided the pre-1948 Jammu Kashmir into seven regions. Two regions –“Azad Kashmir” and the Northern Areas – are under the control of Pakistan, whereas five regions are under Indian control. According to him, of these five, the first part comprises Jammu, Sambha and Kathua and in them Hindus are in majority. The second part also comprises Jammu but the areas include Doda, Kisthwar , Ramban , Poonch and Rajouri ;where the Muslim population is in a majority, which includes Gujjars, Sidhans and Rajas, “who are associated with Azad Kashmir”. The third part is the area of Kashmir Valley, which includes Srinagar and also has a Muslim majority. The fourth part is Indian administered area, which includes Kargil and has Shia and Balti population in a majority and the fifth area is Ladakh and adjoining areas where Buddhists live.
The second leg of Musharraf’s formula is that after their identification, these regions need to be demilitarized, following which, and this is the third leg, their status should be changed. According to him, the possibility of jointly controlling the area (by this he was referring to the Kashmir Valley) as an Indo-Pak condominium or giving it under the control of the United Nations could also be discussed. Musharraf said India, ”…because of its secular façade”, was opposed to a division of the territory on religious basis. But, he pointed out, “The beauty of this option for a Kashmir solution was that the same regions emerge even if you consider geography or ethnicity as the basis of division.”
From India’s point of view Musharraf’s Kashmir formula wants to take from India through peace offensive - the winning position. If his formula of regions is realized, then Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas will legally merge with Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan will also gain ceded areas from Jammu and Ladakh. And as for the Kashmir Valley, it would either go for independence or remain under joint India-Pakistan control. That means, India will either lose the Valley or retain partial control over it along with Pakistan. Pakistan gains here as well which Indians say.
Historically speaking, undivided Kashmir has consisted of five regions – Punjabi-speaking Azad Kashmir(PAK), Northern Areas, Ladakh, the Kashmir Valley and Jammu. Now the first two areas are under Pakistan’s control and the last three administered by India. Musharraf wanted to carve out two separate areas dominated by Muslims, one each from Hindu-majority Jammu and Buddhist dominated Ladakh. Instead, he uses the terms “geography” and “ethnicity”.
According to the Neelam Plan, the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) will become a free country and will have to obtain appropriate work visas to remain there.
Both India and Pakistan would need to officially obtain transit rights through this land. This would bring about a demilitarization of the Deosai Plain and thus effect a natural stabilization in places like Siachen, Kargil and Drass.
The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested region that makes up much of Azad Kashmir. The Neelam River enters from the Gurais sector of the Line of Control, and then runs west till it meets the Jehelum north of Muzzafarabad.
The specific Steps of Neelam Valley Plan are:
1. Move the LoC north of Gurais till it covers all the routes emerging from the
Burzil Pass.
2. Move the LoC in the Kupwara area to enclose the Neelam valley segment north of Muzaffarabad.
3. Move the Haji Pir Pass within India,
4. Move the LoC south of Poonch closer to New Mirpur, perhaps along the Poonch River.
5. Have UN troops to guard the rest of 'Azad Kashmir.'
6. The independence of Gilgit and Baltistan to the north will bring about a closure the entire scuffles (Indian point of View) .
However these points are unacceptable to Pakistan and Kashmiris in totality. Other than the decades-old unrealistic parliamentary resolution Taking back Azad Kashmir(PAK), New Delhi has never bothered to give any counterproposal to Pakistan , although it is said privately that Indira Gandhi had reached an understanding with ZA Bhutto in 1972 at Shimla that India would like the exiting LoC converted into an international border. On the other hand, Pakistan has consistently defined the Kashmir imbroglio. Pakistanis have defined the problem, they have defined the issues, they have taken a lead in actions and now they are defining the solution. Which is splendid in nature but the proposals should come from Kashmiri leadership which matters at present .


Conflict Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution
Reconciliation is about internalizing and integrating the changed relationships into one’s identity, which is distinct from conflict settlement or resolution and is the removal of the negation of “the other” in people’s identities . As such, reconciliation goes beyond conflict settlement, which concerns the interests at stake in a conflict. It may be possible to avoid conflict without actually resolving the dispute, by getting the parties to recognize that they disagree but that no further action needs to be taken at that time. In a few cases, such as in a democracy, it may even be desirable that they disagree, thus exposing the issues to others, who need to consider it for themselves, while in special case[ Kashmir], the parties might agree to disagree.
Conflict resolution or conflictology is the process of resolving a dispute or a conflict. Successful conflict resolution occurs by providing each side's needs, and adequately addressing their interests, so that they are satisfied with the outcome. Conflict resolution aims to end conflicts to avoid verbal, physical, or legal fighting. Conflict resolution concerns pragmatic changes in the relationship between rivals. More common but not popular with practitioners in conflict resolution is conflict management, where Conflict is a deliberate personal, social and organizational tool, especially used by politicians and other interest groups. Prolonged conflict resolution usually involves two or more groups with opposing views regarding specific issues, and another group or individual who is considered to be neutral in their opinion on the subject. This last bit though is quite often not entirely demanded if the "outside" group is well respected by all opposing parties. Resolution methods can include conciliation, mediation, arbitration or even litigation. These methods require third party intervention. A resolution method which is direct between the parties with opposing views is negotiation. Negotiation can be the 'traditional' model of hard bargaining where the interests of a group far outweigh the working relationships concerned. The 'principled' negotiation model is where both the interests and the working relationships concerned are viewed as important.

[i] ) Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1090th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1090, para. 99), 10 February 1964.
[ii] ) ( Nicholas Watt in Dhaka,Friday January 4, 2002,The Guardian)
[iii] ) 17 January 2009, The Dawn
[iv] ) ( Hindu, 22nd Jan, 2009)
[v] ) (Ronald Walker, Representative of Australia to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 765th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.765, para. 23), 24 January 1957.)
[vi] ) ( Fri, Jun 6, 2008, Indo-Pak Affairs ,SANA)
[vii] ) (Tingfu Tsiang, Representative of China to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 765th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.765, paras. 73-75), 24 January 1957.)
[viii] ) (Tingfu Tsiang, Representative of China to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 774th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.774, paras. 60-61), 21 February 1957.)
[ix] ) (Tingfu Tsiang, Representative of China to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 797th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.797, para. 51), 25 October 1957.)
[x] ) (Tingfu Tsiang, Representative of China to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 808th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.808, para. 30), 2 December 1957.)
[xi] ) (Y.C. Hsueh, Representative of China to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1012th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1012, paras. 23-24), 15 June 1962.)
[xii] ) (Y.C. Hsueh, Representative of China to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1115th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1115, para. 102), 12 May 1964.)
[xiii] ) (K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division,updated June 6,2007, prepared for members and committees of congress USA) .
[xiv] ) (See John Lancaster, “India, China Hoping to ‘Reshape the World Order’ Together,”
Washington Post, April 12, 2005, at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43053-2005Apr11.html].)
[xv] ) .(Source: Time magazine : By JYOTI THOTTAM / NEW DELHI Monday, Nov. 02, 2009)
[xvi])Ibid : Time magazine : By JYOTI THOTTAM / NEW DELHI Monday, Nov. 02, 2009)
[xvii] ) (Mohan Guruswamy, an Indian and a co-author of Chasing the Dragon, a new book about the two countries' economic rivalry).
[xviii] ) J.J Singh tells TIME the additional troops were planned well before any hint of tension — and they haven't arrived yet. "That's a future plan," Singh says.)
[xix] ) (The 62-year dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir is as sensitive for India as Tibet is for China.)
[xx] ) (Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) Oct 19, 2009)
[xxi] ) ( Speech in National Defense College in New Delhi. November 2009 )
[xxii] ) Yakov Malik, Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 570th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.570, para. 97), 17 January 1952.
[xxiii] ) (Edit; The Hindu 5 October 2000, Anand K Sahay; The Hindustan Times 1 October 2000)
[xxiv] ) Edit; The Asian Age 3 October 2000).
[xxv] ) (J.N. Dixit The Indian Express 5 October 2000.)
[xxvi] ) (Edit : The Hindu 6 October 2000).
[xxvii] ) (March 25th 2009)
[xxviii] ) Article by Turki al-Faisal International Herald Tribune, 3rd October,2009)
[xxix] ) (Toronto, November 13, 2009 Media reports )
[xxx] ) (September 24, 2009, Washington , Reuters)
[xxxi] ) Dakar, Senegal. 15 March:2009
[xxxii] ) José Arce, Representative of Argentina to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 240th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.240, p. 366), 4 February 1948.
[xxxiii] ) José Arce, Representative of Argentina to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 245th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.245, pp. 117-118), 11 February 1948.
[xxxiv] ) João Muniz, Representative of Brazil to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 538th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.538, para. 27), 29 March 1951.
[xxxv] ) João Muniz, Representative of Brazil to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 538th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.538, para. 33), 29 March 1951.
[xxxvi] ) Carlos Bernardes, Representative of Brazil to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1092nd Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1092, paras. 5-6), 15 February 1964.
[xxxvii] ) Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 765th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.765, para. 38), 24 January 1957.
[xxxviii] ) Ibid: Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 765th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.765, para. 41), 24 January 1957.
[xxxix] ) Ibid:Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 768th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.768, paras. 87-88), 15 February 1957.
[xl] ) Ibid;Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 768th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.768, para. 90), 15 February 1957.
[xli] ) Ibid;Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 768th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.768, para. 93), 15 February 1957.
[xlii] ) Ibid;Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 798th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.798, para. 19), 29 October 1957.
[xliii] ) Ibid;Emilio Portuondo, Representative of Cuba to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 798th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.798, para. 23), 29 October 1957.
[xliv] ) José Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (1996) and Prime Minister (2006-2007) and President (2008) of East Timor. “In Support of the Kashmiri People’s Right to True Self-Determination,” 14 July 1998.
[xlv] ) Mahmoud Bey, Representative of Egypt to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 399th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.399, p. 8), 13 January 1949.
[xlvi] ) Hashim Jawad, Representative of Iraq to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 769th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.769, para. 15), 15 February 1957.
[xlvii] ) Kadhim Khalaf, Representative of Iraq to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 797th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.797, para. 71), 25 October 1957.
[xlviii] ) Kadhim Khalaf, Representative of Iraq to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 797th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.797, para. 74), 25 October 1957.
[xlix] ) Kadhim Khalaf, Representative of Iraq to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 797th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.797, para. 80), 25 October 1957.
[l] ) Arsene Usher, Representative of the Ivory Coast to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1090th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1090, para. 74), 10 February 1964.
[li] ) Muhammed El-Farra, Representative of Jordan to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1248th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1248, paras. 21-22), 27 October 1965.
[lii] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 538th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.538, para. 54), 29 March 1951.
[liii] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 538th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.538, para. 58), 29 March 1951.
[liv] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 538th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.538, paras. 62-63), 29 March 1951.
[lv] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 543rd Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.543, paras. 27-28), 30 April 1951.
[lvi] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 566th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.566, para. 32), 10 November 1951.
[lvii] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 571st Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.571, para. 57), 30 January 1952.
[lviii] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 571st Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.571, para. 61), 30 January 1952.
[lix] ) D. J. von Balluseck, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 611th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.611, para. 1), 23 December 1952.
[lx] ) J.G. de Beus, Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1241st Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1241, para. 74), 18 September 1965.
[lxi] ) Carlos Romulo, Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 773rd Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.773, para. 46), 20 February 1957.
[lxii] ) Carlos Romulo, Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 804th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.804, para. 17), 20 November 1957.

[lxiii] ) Faris El-Khouri, Representative of Syria to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 286th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.286, p. 4), 21 April 1948.
[lxiv] ) Paysee Reyes, Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1251st Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1251, para. 18), 5 November 1965.