US foreign policy over Kashmir
“Regardless of whether execution of the instrument of accession should be considered inconsistent with any of Kashmir’s obligations toward Pakistan, the contested instrument of accession was not effective to settle definitively the rights of the parties, in view of the circumstances under which the instrument was executed.”[i] “The Security Council has from the beginning held that the issue of [Kashmir’s] accession is one which is to be settled by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and both parties, in the language of their own commitments, have accepted this view.”[ii] “Certainly there can be no misunderstanding of paragraph 1 of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 which reads as follows: ‘The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.’ Furthermore, this is in full conformity with the principle of the self-determination of peoples which is enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter as one of the very purposes for which the United Nations exists.”[iii]
The US policy-makers in the post-cold war era seems to be increasingly aggressive to implement the Dixon Plan in Kashmir for attaining ultimate target of having a foothold in the region and to use Kashmir as their main operations station say some strategic and political analysts with specialization in South Asian Affairs .
To understand the US intentions in Kashmir it would be advisable to observe the swift changes in Washington's foreign policy in the last ten years. The important developments in the Kashmir began with the eruption of the armed struggle (militancy) in 1989. The other major development followed with the breaking of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The end of the cold war was the turning point for the world history and the political scene at large. The policy makers in Washington put their heads together to set their priorities in the New World order.
Before going into studying the changes in the US Administration's priorities in the post cold war era, Washington was supportive of Pakistan on several international issues including Kashmir. India was considered a pro-Soviet nation. In the charged atmosphere of the cold war, Nehru's non-alignment policy was interpreted as pro-Soviet, mainly because of its popularity in the third world.
In September 1993, India was annoyed by the then President Bill Clinton who referred to Kashmir as a major trouble spot in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. He also said that his country shared Pakistan's concern about human rights abuses in Kashmir. In 1992, Clinton had referred to Kashmir in the same breath as Bosnia in his speech to the UN General Assembly. In March 1994 Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael issued a statement criticizing India for the excesses in Kashmir. She had created turmoil in the Indian political circle. She had been very vocal in her anti India tirade. In the meantime Indian government headed by P. V. Narasimha Rao began economic liberalization allowing the multi-national companies and entering India into the competitive world market. The Americans saw it as a positive sign advantageous to their business. The American Jewish lobby and the trading community exerted pressure on Washington Administration to change its policies towards India where one-billion population strong market was readily available. Washington, at this juncture decided to change its ally in the region, leaving behind Pakistan and taking India into its friends list for its ultimate game plan in the sub-continent in general and Kashmir in particular.
The beginning of winning India over was made with the appointment of Frank Wisner as new ambassador in New Delhi in July 1994. Before proceeding to New Delhi Wisner had reportedly said that he was absolutely confident that Indo-US relations were now back on a ‘serious track and we are going to move forward strongly’. He also added that ‘we also inherit the past and we have to cope with that as well’.
On this occasion Wisner was asked whether he was planning to play a facilitating role in solving the Kashmir issue. He said that it could only be solved through ‘negotiations between Pakistan and India taking into account the attitude and wishes of all the people of Jammu Kashmir.
After coming to New Delhi Frank Wisner, in Aug. 1994, during first interaction with the Indian press stated that Kashmir issue should be solved through direct bilateral negotiations ‘taking into account the will of the people of Kashmir.
Despite this major shift in the US policy towards Kashmir and India, the US Assistant Secretary of State Ms Robin Raphael continued her negative remarks for India . In early Oct. 1994, during her one-day visit to Mumbai, she stated that she was not convinced with the credibility of the elections, which were being proposed to be held in Jammu Kashmir. Washington changed its position on the polls in Jammu Kashmir in May 1995. The US Secretary of State Mr. Warren Christopher had stated that India's willingness to hold elections in Jammu Kashmir was an important step towards the resolution of the conflict. Christopher stated that certain steps taken by India in Kashmir encouraged US administration. At some time in 1994, Robin Raphael had also admitted publicly that Pakistan has aided the militants in Kashmir and that such aid was continuing. In November 1994 a US delegation headed by Mr. Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US Foreign Affairs sub-committee for Asia and Pacific visited Jammu Kashmir. Mr. Ackerman, while talking to the press persons said, ‘US would do everything possible’ to end violence in Kashmir. He also said, ‘all hands in Kashmir militancy are not local’.
In December 1994, a report quoting reliable sources said that US has launched a secret initiative to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table to ‘seriously discuss the future of Kashmir. This report further said that the Dixon Plan, proposed 44 years ago has been reviewed by the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphael. She spent more than a week in Pakistan discussing the possibilities of the implementation of Dixon Plan. During the same period India allowed Hurriyat leaders to attend OIC summit at Casablanca. In the past India had been consistently preventing Kashmiri leaders from attending OIC meetings. But due to Robin Raphael’s' efforts, India allowed these leaders to attend the OIC summit, it was learnt.
In January 1998 a senior US congressional delegation visited Kashmir to get themselves acquainted with the latest political, security and strategic situation in the valley. Mr. Mike Ennis headed the group. Later the high level delegation visited Islamabad.
In April 1998, US Army Chief General Dennis J. Romier had two day visit to the border areas of Kashmir. He visited the headquarters of the Northern Command in Udhampur town in Jammu and Leh town in the border areas of Ladakh. The chief of US army was accompanied by a high-level defence delegation.
At the same time some , US officials had admitted that time was not ripe to recognize Line of Control as International border. That indicated that US observers had been all-along observing developments at the ground level. In October 1998, US Ambassador to New Delhi Richard F. Celeste brushed aside the Indian stand on Kashmir, refusing to accept that the Kashmir issue was ‘internal’ to India. Only after a week he had to deny the statement and said that it was reported out of context.
Around the end of the year 1998 a report was published claiming that US citizens overwhelmingly wanted the UN to mediate between India and Pakistan. It said that an opinion poll was conducted in six American states of Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee and Utah where 79 to 86 percent responses favored the UN ‘route’ for mediating in the Indo-Pak dispute. Some 11 to 16 per cent Americans opposed such UN mediation. Like any other country, in the US also some NGOs serve the government objectives indirectly. The observers felt that this was an implanted survey result by the Washington establishment.
After using all kinds of tactics, the US decision-makers persuaded some people in Pakistan, including General Parvez Musharraf, to send ‘Mujahideen’ and little troops for assistance into Kargil. This was part of the ‘shock therapy’ to get India ready for the ‘outside mediation’. This therapy was successful when India virtually asked Washington to tell Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to get back his forces from Kargil. Bill Clinton made Pakistan ready for the same and India had to ‘indirectly’ accept US mediation, rather New Delhi invited US intervention into the matter. It was a major success for the US policy-makers in the Subcontinent. Officially both Washington and New Delhi refrained from using the word intervention or mediation. This was part of the understanding reached between the two. During these developments US used the term ‘infiltrators from Pakistan’. On this Pakistan complained to the US for its statements on Kargil ‘reflected a bias in favour of India.’ Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, Riaz Khokhar, a seasoned diplomat who also served in New Delhi, said that Washington was using the term ‘infiltrators from Pakistan’ instead of Kashmiri Mujahideen’. James Rubin, the spokesman of the State Department said, ‘We understand that there have been a number of conversations between Prime Minister Vajpayee and Sharif. We believe that India and Pakistan military and political leaders need to be in touch so that there are no misunderstandings and miscalculations.[iv]The motive behind this practice was to widen the area of influence and America has not been sincere towards Kashmir , seriousness would have been visible in the recent times , if US had asked for invoking Chapter VI under Article 33, Article 34 and Article 36 of , because US has a big say in UNO, as in September 1993 US President's passing reference to the Kashmir 'dispute' in UN General Assembly.
At the height of Kargil episode President Bill Clinton called on Pakistan to withdraw its ‘forces and its support to militants’ in Kargil. This was considered to be a [big blow] .The supporters of Kashmir cause in Europe and America were shocked by the President Clinton's statement. This had further ‘won’ the Indian hearts, feeling as if ,US is their true sympathizer.
The cluster of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 jumped Kashmir to the forefront of the United States and United Nations agendas, but the resulting steps towards Kashmiri self-determination as prescribed by the international law have been disappointing., this led to the U.S. Engagement on following grounds :
a). It is commonly acknowledged that, with India and Pakistan both being nuclear-weapon states directly confronting each other, this dispute is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It should, therefore, be a major interest of the U.S. to prevent this dispute from exploding into a conflict, which can be catastrophic for a large proportion of the human race. Yet, ever since the start in 1989-90 of the popular uprising in Kashmir is for resolution and fulfillment of commitments which India had made with Kashmiris in past and accentuated the character of the dispute, the U.S. has been content with playing often a passive, at times a tentatively advisory, marginal role. It has remained unmoved by the killings of anywhere between 50,000 (India's figure) and 100,000 (popular estimate) people in Kashmir. It has declared that it will not exercise mediation unless both parties ask for it. Since India is uncompromisingly opposed to U.S. mediation and since the United Nations also has been made inactive, the result is the total absence of a guiding hand towards a just, peaceful and lasting resolution of the conflict.
b). It is symptomatic of the U.S. approach that greater emphasis is placed on the "reduction of tensions" than on the settlement of the core issue, i.e. Kashmir. This encourages giving importance to superficial moves and temporary solutions even though it is known that such moves and solutions do not soften the animosities of the parties nor allay the life-and death concerns and anxieties of the people most directly affected.
c). An indication of this misplaced focus is the wrong-headed talk about the "sanctity" of the line of control in Kashmir. It is forgotten that this line continues to exist only because the international agreement which had been concluded between India and Pakistan, with the full support of the United States. This line was originally formalized by that agreement as a temporary cease-fire line pending the demilitarization of the State of Jammu Kashmir and the holding of a plebiscite to determine its future. As long as it will remain clamped down on the state, it will continue to impose a heavy toll of death on the people of the land. They have had no hand in creating a line which has cut through their homes, separated families and, what is worse, served as a protecting wall for massive violations of human rights. They are not resigned to its becoming some kind of a border. To treat this line overtly or otherwise as a basis for the partition of the State is to reward obduracy, countenance iniquity, encourage tyranny and oppression and destroy the hopes for peace in accordance with justice and rationality in Kashmir. Any kind of agreement procured to that end, will not only not endure; it will invite resentment and revolt against whichever leadership in Kashmir will sponsor or subscribe to it.
d). It must be pointed out in this context that some statements from the officials of the U.S. Administration have spoken of a settlement in accordance with the "interests" of the people of Kashmir. This seems to be an unnecessary departure from the traditional stand in favour of a settlement in accordance with the "wishes" of the people. Who is competent to determine their "interests" except they themselves? It is only their wishes that reflect their interests as perceived by them.
e). The mantra has been repeated too often that the U.S. has no alternative to relying on bilateral talks between India and Pakistan to achieve a settlement. The experience of past sixty two years is ignored. No bilateral talks between India and Pakistan have yielded agreements without the active role of an external element. If the U.S. does not deem it prudent to get directly involved, there is no reason why the Security Council of the United Nations or, with the Council's support, the Secretary General should not be urged to play a real facilitating role.
f). United States interests in the Kashmir conflict are manifold. Avoiding nuclear and missile proliferation is foremost. Secondary are a general predisposition favoring self-determination dating from President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, obedience to international law and human rights.
The policy of the Bush Administration had been that:
i. Kashmir is a disputed territory;
ii. It is neither the integral part of India nor Pakistan;
iii. Pakistan and India must seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict, after taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir;
iv. U.S. will mediate to help resolve the Kashmir issue, if both parties agree.
But United States especially Bush Administration has neglected to insist that the voice of Kashmiri sentiments, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC including pro-independents) - be included in all Kashmir negotiations, in the same manner as IRA involvement in the Northern Ireland negotiations and PLO involvement in the Palestinian negotiations with Israel.
The Kashmir issue for India has proven the most lethal and intractable. Gunbattles and bomb blasts have reportedly killed an average of between four and six people every day in Indian Administered Jammu Kashmir state. Conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty also has brought global attention to a potential “flashpoint” for interstate war between nuclear-armed powers. The problem is rooted in competing claims to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating Indian administered Muslim-majority Jammu Kashmir state and Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir. The dispute relates to the national identities of both countries: India has long sought to maintain its secular, multi-religious credentials, in part by successfully incorporating a Muslim-majority region, while Pakistan has since independence been conceived as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims. India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965. Majority Kashmiris seek independence from both countries. India blames Pakistan for supporting “cross-border terrorism” and for fueling a separatist [Freedom]rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with arms, training, and militants. Islamabad, for its part, claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls “freedom fighters” who resist Indian rule and suffer human rights abuses in the region. New Delhi insists that the dispute should not be “internationalized” through involvement by third-party mediators and India is widely believed to be satisfied with the territorial status quo. The longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir is that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
During the early years of the Kashmir armed resistance , hundreds of thousands of indigenous Hindu “Pandits” left the region up to half a million Kashmiri Pandits, Resolutions in the 110th Congress (H.Con.Res. 55 and S.Con.Res. 38) call for the safeguarding of the physical, political, and economic security of the Kashmiri Pandits.
In December 2006, Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf issued a newly-modified version of his “out-of-the-box” thinking on resolution to the Kashmir problem, saying Pakistan is “against independence” for Kashmir, and offering instead a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-governance,” defined as “falling between autonomy and independence.” Many analysts saw the proposal as being roughly in line with New Delhi’s Kashmir position. Some Kashmiri separatist[Freedom] groups rejected the proposal as an abandonment of Islamabad’s long-held policy, but Indian leaders welcomed Musharraf’s statements; in February 2007, Prime Minister Singh said the Pakistani government was “saying the right thing.”[v]
Regional Relations of US in South Asia
During an extremely tense 2002 another full-scale war seemed a real and even likely possibility ,and may have been averted only through international diplomatic efforts, including multiple visits to the region by top U.S. officials. An April 2003 peace initiative brought major improvement in the bilateral relationship, allowing for an October cease-fire agreement initiated by Pakistan. The process led to a January 2004 summit meeting in Islamabad and a joint agreement to re-engage a “Composite Dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”
During 2004, numerous mid-level meetings, normalized diplomatic relations, and increased people-to-people contacts brought modest, but still meaningful progress toward normalized relations. Regular dialogue continued in 2005 and a third round of Composite Dialogue talks was held in 2006. Numerous confidence-building measures have been put in place, most notably travel and commerce across the Kashmiri LOC for the first time in decades, and bilateral trade has increased. Yet militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express unhappiness that more substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not occurring.
Following July 2006 terror bombings in Bombay, India, New Delhi postponed planned foreign secretary-level talks, bringing into question the continued viability of the already slow-moving process. However, after meeting on the sidelines of a Nonaligned Movement summit in Cuba in September, President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations and also decided to implement a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. The Composite Dialogue resumed in November after a four-month hiatus when Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan paid a visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart. [vi] A notable step came in December 2006, when bilateral talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended with agreement to conduct a joint survey.
In January 2007, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri hosted his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, in Islamabad for the first such visit in more than a year. The two men reviewed past progress and planned for a fourth Composite Dialogue round in March. On February 18, two bombs exploded on an Indian segment of the Samjhauta [Friendship] Express train linking Delhi, India, with Lahore. Resulting fires killed 68 people, most of them Pakistanis. Days later, Kasuri traveled to New Delhi, where he and Mukherjee reaffirmed a bilateral commitment to the peace process despite the apparent effort to subvert it. While India refused a Pakistani request to undertake a joint investigation into that attack, the two countries did sign an agreement to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.
India and Pakistan agreed to use the mechanism for exchanging information about investigations ,and put efforts to prevent acts of terror on either side of the shared border, and to meet quarterly while immediately conveying urgent information. Hopes that the February 2007, train bombing would provide a fitting “test case” apparently were dashed, however, when India declined to share relevant investigative information with Pakistan. Moreover, Indian officials were unhappy with Islamabad’s insistence that the “freedom struggle” underway in Kashmir should not be treated as terrorism under this framework. A new rounds of dialogue was then launched in mid-March 2007, when the two foreign ministers met again in Islamabad. No new agreements were reached, but both officials lauded improved bilateral relations and held “the most sustained and intensive dialogue” ever on the Kashmir problem.
The “IPI” Pipeline Project
Islamabad insists it is going ahead with a proposed joint pipeline project to deliver Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and on to India. In January 2007, officials from the three countries resolved a long-running price-mechanism dispute, opening the way for further progress. In February, the fourth meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Working Group on the IPI [Iran-Pakistan- India] Pipeline was held in Islamabad, where the two countries agreed to split equally expected gas supplies. Prime Minister Showket Aziz has described the pipeline as being critical to Pakistan’s economic growth and political stability. Some independent analysts and Members of Congress assert that completion of an IPI pipeline would represent a major confidence-building measure in the region and could bolster regional energy security while facilitating friendlier Pakistan-India ties.[vii]As part of its efforts to isolate Iran economically, the Bush Administration actively seeks to dissuade the Islamabad government from participation in this project, and a State Department official has suggested that current U.S. law dictates American opposition: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24) required the President to impose sanctions on foreign companies that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The 109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). No firms have been sanctioned under this act to date.
Afghanistan
Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and “strategic depth” with regard to India though friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President General Zia ul-Haq’s support for Afghan Mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893 “Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.
Following Islamabad’s major September 2001 policy shift, President Musharraf consistently has vowed full Pakistani support for the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and he insists that Pakistan is playing a “totally neutral role” in
Islamabad has arrested more than 500 Taliban militants in 2006, remanding 400 of them to Afghan custody, and reportedly has provided $300 million in economic assistance to Kabul since 2001. Nevertheless, the two leaders continuously exchanged public accusations and recriminations about the ongoing movement of militants in the border region, and U.S. officials have issued increasingly strong claims about the problems posed by Taliban militants and other militants .Moreover, Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy of “strategic encirclement,” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001 opening of numerous Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat religious militancy. Continuing acrimony between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to U.S. interests.[viii]
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
A stable, democratic, economically thriving Pakistan is considered vital to U.S interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional terrorism; Afghan stability; weapons proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; human rights protection; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. In late 2003, Pakistan’s army began conducting unprecedented counterterrorism operations in the country’s western tribal areas. In 2006, Islamabad shifted to a strategy of negotiation with the region’s pro-Taliban militants (combined with longer-term economic and infrastructure development in the region). The United States strongly encourages maintenance of a bilateral cease-fire and continued, substantive dialogue between Islamabad and New Delhi over Kashmir . Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining about $3.4 billion in direct U. S. assistance for FY2002-FY2006, including nearly $1.5 billion in security-related aid. Pakistan also has received nearly $5 billion in reimbursements for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations since 2001.[ix]
See Pic 6
India-U.S. Relations
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation in present times is right on track . As of late June, 2007 following four rounds of formal negotiations, progress in negotiating a bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation (“123”) agreement has been much slower than hoped for by proponents: U.S. officials have expressed frustration with what they describe as India’s lack of seriousness and speed in engaging both the United States and the IAEA, and some Indian officials have suggested that New Delhi’s right to reprocess spent fuel is “non-negotiable.” Negotiators had resumed work in New Delhi in mid-March, with the U.S. delegation being led by the director of the State Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security, Richard Stratford. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, the overall lead U.S. negotiator in the process, subsequently expressed frustration, saying “The United States has done its part. We’ve met every commitment we said we would meet. ... Right now I would say the ball is in India’s court.”
On June 2,Under Secretary Burns end ed a two-day visit to New Delhi for the fourth round of negotiations. A U.S. Embassy statement said “some progress” had been made, but that “more work remains to be done.” Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon echoed the sentiment, saying the “intense, productive, and constructive” discussions succeeded in “removing some issues from the table,” but that more progress is needed. In late June, U.S. and Indian officials reportedly met in Washington for informal talks on the sidelines of a major nongovernmental nonproliferation conference .India-Pakistan Relations. The India-Pakistan peace initiative continues, with officials from both countries (and the United States) offering a generally positive assessment of the ongoing dialogue, even as substantive progress remains elusive. In early April, Indian and Pakistani officials reportedly agreed on a common map upon which to base their negotiations of the Sir Creek territorial dispute. Days later, the two governments completed two-day defence secretary-level talks on their militarized territorial dispute over the Siachen Glacier. No progress was made, but the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to a November 2003 cease-fire and agreed to continue seeking peaceful resolution. In May, further talks were held on the Sir Creek dispute. The two sides expressed approval of a joint survey, exchanged
maps, charts, and agreed to continue discussions toward amicable settlement.[x] See Pic 5
Most recently US said that;
1) India must be more sensitive to Pakistani concerns over New Delhi’s involvement in Afghanistan, a former senior US diplomat and expert on South Asia said . Nicholas Burns, former undersecretary of state for political affairs, wrote in the Boston Globe that the US should work more actively behind the scenes to urge India and Pakistan to restore their composite dialogue, reduce bilateral tensions, and commit to progress on outstanding Kashmir issue. “As the US is now the key power broker in the region, [US President Barack Obama] is uniquely positioned to help nuclear-armed India and Pakistan avoid the nightmare fear of war that has bedevilled their relations since partition in 1947,” he said.[xi]
2) Observing that the Obama administration is looking at Pakistan through a different lens than its predecessors, a former American diplomat said that the new US Govt. would quietly focus itself on Kashmir away from the public glaze. William Milam, the former US Ambassador to Pakistan, identified India and Kashmir as one of the issues, which the Obama administration would focus on while trying to find a solution to Pakistan. 'There is one more thing and it is a very delicate thing that I think this administration will focus on. But it will be hard to determine this focus because it will be quite closely held and under wraps. And that is the India-centricity of Pakistan,' said Milam, who was in Islamabad from 1998 to 2001.'Everything that Pakistan does, at least in foreign affairs and security issues, is viewed through the lens of India, which it views as its eternally hostile neighbour,' Milam said, adding that the US cannot do much at least on the issue of Kashmir due to India's position on it.' There is no good way we can do this. We certainly cannot be seen to meddle or to even mediate on the issues, particularly the Kashmir issue. But we really have to work on putting this back together,' Milam said testifying before the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.[xii]
[i] ) Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. “Accession of Kashmir to India” (p. 1), 30 January 1950.
[ii] ) Ernest Gross, Representative of the United States to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 537th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.537, para. 30), 21 March 1951.
[iii] ) Adlai Stevenson, Representative of the United States to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1012th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1012, para. 10), 15 June 1962.
[iv]) http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15032001/Art14.htm /U.S. Intentions in Kashmir/By M. Ahmad Kazmi)
[v] ) .( Author interviews, Srinagar, Kashmir, September 2006., Order Code RL33529,India-U.S. Relations,Updated June 26, 2007,K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs ,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)
[vi] ) [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].
[vii] ) See Pakistan Foreign Ministry Press Release No. 81/2007 at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/-Press_Releases/2007/March/PR_81_07.htm
[viii])(Order Code RL33498,Pakistan-U.S. Relations,Updated June 6, 2007,K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)
[ix] ) (Pakistan-U.S. Relations/Updated June 6, 2007/K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, prepared for members of committees of congress USA)
[x] ) (India -U.S. Relations/Updated June 6, 2007/K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, prepared for members of committees of congress USA)
[xi] ) ( App,25th November,2009)
[xii] ) 18 March 2009,The Nation)
“Regardless of whether execution of the instrument of accession should be considered inconsistent with any of Kashmir’s obligations toward Pakistan, the contested instrument of accession was not effective to settle definitively the rights of the parties, in view of the circumstances under which the instrument was executed.”[i] “The Security Council has from the beginning held that the issue of [Kashmir’s] accession is one which is to be settled by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and both parties, in the language of their own commitments, have accepted this view.”[ii] “Certainly there can be no misunderstanding of paragraph 1 of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 which reads as follows: ‘The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.’ Furthermore, this is in full conformity with the principle of the self-determination of peoples which is enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter as one of the very purposes for which the United Nations exists.”[iii]
The US policy-makers in the post-cold war era seems to be increasingly aggressive to implement the Dixon Plan in Kashmir for attaining ultimate target of having a foothold in the region and to use Kashmir as their main operations station say some strategic and political analysts with specialization in South Asian Affairs .
To understand the US intentions in Kashmir it would be advisable to observe the swift changes in Washington's foreign policy in the last ten years. The important developments in the Kashmir began with the eruption of the armed struggle (militancy) in 1989. The other major development followed with the breaking of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The end of the cold war was the turning point for the world history and the political scene at large. The policy makers in Washington put their heads together to set their priorities in the New World order.
Before going into studying the changes in the US Administration's priorities in the post cold war era, Washington was supportive of Pakistan on several international issues including Kashmir. India was considered a pro-Soviet nation. In the charged atmosphere of the cold war, Nehru's non-alignment policy was interpreted as pro-Soviet, mainly because of its popularity in the third world.
In September 1993, India was annoyed by the then President Bill Clinton who referred to Kashmir as a major trouble spot in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. He also said that his country shared Pakistan's concern about human rights abuses in Kashmir. In 1992, Clinton had referred to Kashmir in the same breath as Bosnia in his speech to the UN General Assembly. In March 1994 Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael issued a statement criticizing India for the excesses in Kashmir. She had created turmoil in the Indian political circle. She had been very vocal in her anti India tirade. In the meantime Indian government headed by P. V. Narasimha Rao began economic liberalization allowing the multi-national companies and entering India into the competitive world market. The Americans saw it as a positive sign advantageous to their business. The American Jewish lobby and the trading community exerted pressure on Washington Administration to change its policies towards India where one-billion population strong market was readily available. Washington, at this juncture decided to change its ally in the region, leaving behind Pakistan and taking India into its friends list for its ultimate game plan in the sub-continent in general and Kashmir in particular.
The beginning of winning India over was made with the appointment of Frank Wisner as new ambassador in New Delhi in July 1994. Before proceeding to New Delhi Wisner had reportedly said that he was absolutely confident that Indo-US relations were now back on a ‘serious track and we are going to move forward strongly’. He also added that ‘we also inherit the past and we have to cope with that as well’.
On this occasion Wisner was asked whether he was planning to play a facilitating role in solving the Kashmir issue. He said that it could only be solved through ‘negotiations between Pakistan and India taking into account the attitude and wishes of all the people of Jammu Kashmir.
After coming to New Delhi Frank Wisner, in Aug. 1994, during first interaction with the Indian press stated that Kashmir issue should be solved through direct bilateral negotiations ‘taking into account the will of the people of Kashmir.
Despite this major shift in the US policy towards Kashmir and India, the US Assistant Secretary of State Ms Robin Raphael continued her negative remarks for India . In early Oct. 1994, during her one-day visit to Mumbai, she stated that she was not convinced with the credibility of the elections, which were being proposed to be held in Jammu Kashmir. Washington changed its position on the polls in Jammu Kashmir in May 1995. The US Secretary of State Mr. Warren Christopher had stated that India's willingness to hold elections in Jammu Kashmir was an important step towards the resolution of the conflict. Christopher stated that certain steps taken by India in Kashmir encouraged US administration. At some time in 1994, Robin Raphael had also admitted publicly that Pakistan has aided the militants in Kashmir and that such aid was continuing. In November 1994 a US delegation headed by Mr. Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US Foreign Affairs sub-committee for Asia and Pacific visited Jammu Kashmir. Mr. Ackerman, while talking to the press persons said, ‘US would do everything possible’ to end violence in Kashmir. He also said, ‘all hands in Kashmir militancy are not local’.
In December 1994, a report quoting reliable sources said that US has launched a secret initiative to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table to ‘seriously discuss the future of Kashmir. This report further said that the Dixon Plan, proposed 44 years ago has been reviewed by the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphael. She spent more than a week in Pakistan discussing the possibilities of the implementation of Dixon Plan. During the same period India allowed Hurriyat leaders to attend OIC summit at Casablanca. In the past India had been consistently preventing Kashmiri leaders from attending OIC meetings. But due to Robin Raphael’s' efforts, India allowed these leaders to attend the OIC summit, it was learnt.
In January 1998 a senior US congressional delegation visited Kashmir to get themselves acquainted with the latest political, security and strategic situation in the valley. Mr. Mike Ennis headed the group. Later the high level delegation visited Islamabad.
In April 1998, US Army Chief General Dennis J. Romier had two day visit to the border areas of Kashmir. He visited the headquarters of the Northern Command in Udhampur town in Jammu and Leh town in the border areas of Ladakh. The chief of US army was accompanied by a high-level defence delegation.
At the same time some , US officials had admitted that time was not ripe to recognize Line of Control as International border. That indicated that US observers had been all-along observing developments at the ground level. In October 1998, US Ambassador to New Delhi Richard F. Celeste brushed aside the Indian stand on Kashmir, refusing to accept that the Kashmir issue was ‘internal’ to India. Only after a week he had to deny the statement and said that it was reported out of context.
Around the end of the year 1998 a report was published claiming that US citizens overwhelmingly wanted the UN to mediate between India and Pakistan. It said that an opinion poll was conducted in six American states of Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee and Utah where 79 to 86 percent responses favored the UN ‘route’ for mediating in the Indo-Pak dispute. Some 11 to 16 per cent Americans opposed such UN mediation. Like any other country, in the US also some NGOs serve the government objectives indirectly. The observers felt that this was an implanted survey result by the Washington establishment.
After using all kinds of tactics, the US decision-makers persuaded some people in Pakistan, including General Parvez Musharraf, to send ‘Mujahideen’ and little troops for assistance into Kargil. This was part of the ‘shock therapy’ to get India ready for the ‘outside mediation’. This therapy was successful when India virtually asked Washington to tell Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to get back his forces from Kargil. Bill Clinton made Pakistan ready for the same and India had to ‘indirectly’ accept US mediation, rather New Delhi invited US intervention into the matter. It was a major success for the US policy-makers in the Subcontinent. Officially both Washington and New Delhi refrained from using the word intervention or mediation. This was part of the understanding reached between the two. During these developments US used the term ‘infiltrators from Pakistan’. On this Pakistan complained to the US for its statements on Kargil ‘reflected a bias in favour of India.’ Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, Riaz Khokhar, a seasoned diplomat who also served in New Delhi, said that Washington was using the term ‘infiltrators from Pakistan’ instead of Kashmiri Mujahideen’. James Rubin, the spokesman of the State Department said, ‘We understand that there have been a number of conversations between Prime Minister Vajpayee and Sharif. We believe that India and Pakistan military and political leaders need to be in touch so that there are no misunderstandings and miscalculations.[iv]The motive behind this practice was to widen the area of influence and America has not been sincere towards Kashmir , seriousness would have been visible in the recent times , if US had asked for invoking Chapter VI under Article 33, Article 34 and Article 36 of , because US has a big say in UNO, as in September 1993 US President's passing reference to the Kashmir 'dispute' in UN General Assembly.
At the height of Kargil episode President Bill Clinton called on Pakistan to withdraw its ‘forces and its support to militants’ in Kargil. This was considered to be a [big blow] .The supporters of Kashmir cause in Europe and America were shocked by the President Clinton's statement. This had further ‘won’ the Indian hearts, feeling as if ,US is their true sympathizer.
The cluster of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 jumped Kashmir to the forefront of the United States and United Nations agendas, but the resulting steps towards Kashmiri self-determination as prescribed by the international law have been disappointing., this led to the U.S. Engagement on following grounds :
a). It is commonly acknowledged that, with India and Pakistan both being nuclear-weapon states directly confronting each other, this dispute is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It should, therefore, be a major interest of the U.S. to prevent this dispute from exploding into a conflict, which can be catastrophic for a large proportion of the human race. Yet, ever since the start in 1989-90 of the popular uprising in Kashmir is for resolution and fulfillment of commitments which India had made with Kashmiris in past and accentuated the character of the dispute, the U.S. has been content with playing often a passive, at times a tentatively advisory, marginal role. It has remained unmoved by the killings of anywhere between 50,000 (India's figure) and 100,000 (popular estimate) people in Kashmir. It has declared that it will not exercise mediation unless both parties ask for it. Since India is uncompromisingly opposed to U.S. mediation and since the United Nations also has been made inactive, the result is the total absence of a guiding hand towards a just, peaceful and lasting resolution of the conflict.
b). It is symptomatic of the U.S. approach that greater emphasis is placed on the "reduction of tensions" than on the settlement of the core issue, i.e. Kashmir. This encourages giving importance to superficial moves and temporary solutions even though it is known that such moves and solutions do not soften the animosities of the parties nor allay the life-and death concerns and anxieties of the people most directly affected.
c). An indication of this misplaced focus is the wrong-headed talk about the "sanctity" of the line of control in Kashmir. It is forgotten that this line continues to exist only because the international agreement which had been concluded between India and Pakistan, with the full support of the United States. This line was originally formalized by that agreement as a temporary cease-fire line pending the demilitarization of the State of Jammu Kashmir and the holding of a plebiscite to determine its future. As long as it will remain clamped down on the state, it will continue to impose a heavy toll of death on the people of the land. They have had no hand in creating a line which has cut through their homes, separated families and, what is worse, served as a protecting wall for massive violations of human rights. They are not resigned to its becoming some kind of a border. To treat this line overtly or otherwise as a basis for the partition of the State is to reward obduracy, countenance iniquity, encourage tyranny and oppression and destroy the hopes for peace in accordance with justice and rationality in Kashmir. Any kind of agreement procured to that end, will not only not endure; it will invite resentment and revolt against whichever leadership in Kashmir will sponsor or subscribe to it.
d). It must be pointed out in this context that some statements from the officials of the U.S. Administration have spoken of a settlement in accordance with the "interests" of the people of Kashmir. This seems to be an unnecessary departure from the traditional stand in favour of a settlement in accordance with the "wishes" of the people. Who is competent to determine their "interests" except they themselves? It is only their wishes that reflect their interests as perceived by them.
e). The mantra has been repeated too often that the U.S. has no alternative to relying on bilateral talks between India and Pakistan to achieve a settlement. The experience of past sixty two years is ignored. No bilateral talks between India and Pakistan have yielded agreements without the active role of an external element. If the U.S. does not deem it prudent to get directly involved, there is no reason why the Security Council of the United Nations or, with the Council's support, the Secretary General should not be urged to play a real facilitating role.
f). United States interests in the Kashmir conflict are manifold. Avoiding nuclear and missile proliferation is foremost. Secondary are a general predisposition favoring self-determination dating from President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, obedience to international law and human rights.
The policy of the Bush Administration had been that:
i. Kashmir is a disputed territory;
ii. It is neither the integral part of India nor Pakistan;
iii. Pakistan and India must seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict, after taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir;
iv. U.S. will mediate to help resolve the Kashmir issue, if both parties agree.
But United States especially Bush Administration has neglected to insist that the voice of Kashmiri sentiments, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC including pro-independents) - be included in all Kashmir negotiations, in the same manner as IRA involvement in the Northern Ireland negotiations and PLO involvement in the Palestinian negotiations with Israel.
The Kashmir issue for India has proven the most lethal and intractable. Gunbattles and bomb blasts have reportedly killed an average of between four and six people every day in Indian Administered Jammu Kashmir state. Conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty also has brought global attention to a potential “flashpoint” for interstate war between nuclear-armed powers. The problem is rooted in competing claims to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating Indian administered Muslim-majority Jammu Kashmir state and Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir. The dispute relates to the national identities of both countries: India has long sought to maintain its secular, multi-religious credentials, in part by successfully incorporating a Muslim-majority region, while Pakistan has since independence been conceived as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims. India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965. Majority Kashmiris seek independence from both countries. India blames Pakistan for supporting “cross-border terrorism” and for fueling a separatist [Freedom]rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with arms, training, and militants. Islamabad, for its part, claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls “freedom fighters” who resist Indian rule and suffer human rights abuses in the region. New Delhi insists that the dispute should not be “internationalized” through involvement by third-party mediators and India is widely believed to be satisfied with the territorial status quo. The longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir is that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
During the early years of the Kashmir armed resistance , hundreds of thousands of indigenous Hindu “Pandits” left the region up to half a million Kashmiri Pandits, Resolutions in the 110th Congress (H.Con.Res. 55 and S.Con.Res. 38) call for the safeguarding of the physical, political, and economic security of the Kashmiri Pandits.
In December 2006, Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf issued a newly-modified version of his “out-of-the-box” thinking on resolution to the Kashmir problem, saying Pakistan is “against independence” for Kashmir, and offering instead a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-governance,” defined as “falling between autonomy and independence.” Many analysts saw the proposal as being roughly in line with New Delhi’s Kashmir position. Some Kashmiri separatist[Freedom] groups rejected the proposal as an abandonment of Islamabad’s long-held policy, but Indian leaders welcomed Musharraf’s statements; in February 2007, Prime Minister Singh said the Pakistani government was “saying the right thing.”[v]
Regional Relations of US in South Asia
During an extremely tense 2002 another full-scale war seemed a real and even likely possibility ,and may have been averted only through international diplomatic efforts, including multiple visits to the region by top U.S. officials. An April 2003 peace initiative brought major improvement in the bilateral relationship, allowing for an October cease-fire agreement initiated by Pakistan. The process led to a January 2004 summit meeting in Islamabad and a joint agreement to re-engage a “Composite Dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”
During 2004, numerous mid-level meetings, normalized diplomatic relations, and increased people-to-people contacts brought modest, but still meaningful progress toward normalized relations. Regular dialogue continued in 2005 and a third round of Composite Dialogue talks was held in 2006. Numerous confidence-building measures have been put in place, most notably travel and commerce across the Kashmiri LOC for the first time in decades, and bilateral trade has increased. Yet militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express unhappiness that more substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not occurring.
Following July 2006 terror bombings in Bombay, India, New Delhi postponed planned foreign secretary-level talks, bringing into question the continued viability of the already slow-moving process. However, after meeting on the sidelines of a Nonaligned Movement summit in Cuba in September, President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations and also decided to implement a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. The Composite Dialogue resumed in November after a four-month hiatus when Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan paid a visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart. [vi] A notable step came in December 2006, when bilateral talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended with agreement to conduct a joint survey.
In January 2007, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri hosted his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, in Islamabad for the first such visit in more than a year. The two men reviewed past progress and planned for a fourth Composite Dialogue round in March. On February 18, two bombs exploded on an Indian segment of the Samjhauta [Friendship] Express train linking Delhi, India, with Lahore. Resulting fires killed 68 people, most of them Pakistanis. Days later, Kasuri traveled to New Delhi, where he and Mukherjee reaffirmed a bilateral commitment to the peace process despite the apparent effort to subvert it. While India refused a Pakistani request to undertake a joint investigation into that attack, the two countries did sign an agreement to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.
India and Pakistan agreed to use the mechanism for exchanging information about investigations ,and put efforts to prevent acts of terror on either side of the shared border, and to meet quarterly while immediately conveying urgent information. Hopes that the February 2007, train bombing would provide a fitting “test case” apparently were dashed, however, when India declined to share relevant investigative information with Pakistan. Moreover, Indian officials were unhappy with Islamabad’s insistence that the “freedom struggle” underway in Kashmir should not be treated as terrorism under this framework. A new rounds of dialogue was then launched in mid-March 2007, when the two foreign ministers met again in Islamabad. No new agreements were reached, but both officials lauded improved bilateral relations and held “the most sustained and intensive dialogue” ever on the Kashmir problem.
The “IPI” Pipeline Project
Islamabad insists it is going ahead with a proposed joint pipeline project to deliver Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and on to India. In January 2007, officials from the three countries resolved a long-running price-mechanism dispute, opening the way for further progress. In February, the fourth meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Working Group on the IPI [Iran-Pakistan- India] Pipeline was held in Islamabad, where the two countries agreed to split equally expected gas supplies. Prime Minister Showket Aziz has described the pipeline as being critical to Pakistan’s economic growth and political stability. Some independent analysts and Members of Congress assert that completion of an IPI pipeline would represent a major confidence-building measure in the region and could bolster regional energy security while facilitating friendlier Pakistan-India ties.[vii]As part of its efforts to isolate Iran economically, the Bush Administration actively seeks to dissuade the Islamabad government from participation in this project, and a State Department official has suggested that current U.S. law dictates American opposition: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24) required the President to impose sanctions on foreign companies that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The 109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). No firms have been sanctioned under this act to date.
Afghanistan
Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and “strategic depth” with regard to India though friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President General Zia ul-Haq’s support for Afghan Mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893 “Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.
Following Islamabad’s major September 2001 policy shift, President Musharraf consistently has vowed full Pakistani support for the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and he insists that Pakistan is playing a “totally neutral role” in
Islamabad has arrested more than 500 Taliban militants in 2006, remanding 400 of them to Afghan custody, and reportedly has provided $300 million in economic assistance to Kabul since 2001. Nevertheless, the two leaders continuously exchanged public accusations and recriminations about the ongoing movement of militants in the border region, and U.S. officials have issued increasingly strong claims about the problems posed by Taliban militants and other militants .Moreover, Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy of “strategic encirclement,” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001 opening of numerous Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat religious militancy. Continuing acrimony between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to U.S. interests.[viii]
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
A stable, democratic, economically thriving Pakistan is considered vital to U.S interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional terrorism; Afghan stability; weapons proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; human rights protection; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. In late 2003, Pakistan’s army began conducting unprecedented counterterrorism operations in the country’s western tribal areas. In 2006, Islamabad shifted to a strategy of negotiation with the region’s pro-Taliban militants (combined with longer-term economic and infrastructure development in the region). The United States strongly encourages maintenance of a bilateral cease-fire and continued, substantive dialogue between Islamabad and New Delhi over Kashmir . Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining about $3.4 billion in direct U. S. assistance for FY2002-FY2006, including nearly $1.5 billion in security-related aid. Pakistan also has received nearly $5 billion in reimbursements for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations since 2001.[ix]
See Pic 6
India-U.S. Relations
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation in present times is right on track . As of late June, 2007 following four rounds of formal negotiations, progress in negotiating a bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation (“123”) agreement has been much slower than hoped for by proponents: U.S. officials have expressed frustration with what they describe as India’s lack of seriousness and speed in engaging both the United States and the IAEA, and some Indian officials have suggested that New Delhi’s right to reprocess spent fuel is “non-negotiable.” Negotiators had resumed work in New Delhi in mid-March, with the U.S. delegation being led by the director of the State Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security, Richard Stratford. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, the overall lead U.S. negotiator in the process, subsequently expressed frustration, saying “The United States has done its part. We’ve met every commitment we said we would meet. ... Right now I would say the ball is in India’s court.”
On June 2,Under Secretary Burns end ed a two-day visit to New Delhi for the fourth round of negotiations. A U.S. Embassy statement said “some progress” had been made, but that “more work remains to be done.” Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon echoed the sentiment, saying the “intense, productive, and constructive” discussions succeeded in “removing some issues from the table,” but that more progress is needed. In late June, U.S. and Indian officials reportedly met in Washington for informal talks on the sidelines of a major nongovernmental nonproliferation conference .India-Pakistan Relations. The India-Pakistan peace initiative continues, with officials from both countries (and the United States) offering a generally positive assessment of the ongoing dialogue, even as substantive progress remains elusive. In early April, Indian and Pakistani officials reportedly agreed on a common map upon which to base their negotiations of the Sir Creek territorial dispute. Days later, the two governments completed two-day defence secretary-level talks on their militarized territorial dispute over the Siachen Glacier. No progress was made, but the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to a November 2003 cease-fire and agreed to continue seeking peaceful resolution. In May, further talks were held on the Sir Creek dispute. The two sides expressed approval of a joint survey, exchanged
maps, charts, and agreed to continue discussions toward amicable settlement.[x] See Pic 5
Most recently US said that;
1) India must be more sensitive to Pakistani concerns over New Delhi’s involvement in Afghanistan, a former senior US diplomat and expert on South Asia said . Nicholas Burns, former undersecretary of state for political affairs, wrote in the Boston Globe that the US should work more actively behind the scenes to urge India and Pakistan to restore their composite dialogue, reduce bilateral tensions, and commit to progress on outstanding Kashmir issue. “As the US is now the key power broker in the region, [US President Barack Obama] is uniquely positioned to help nuclear-armed India and Pakistan avoid the nightmare fear of war that has bedevilled their relations since partition in 1947,” he said.[xi]
2) Observing that the Obama administration is looking at Pakistan through a different lens than its predecessors, a former American diplomat said that the new US Govt. would quietly focus itself on Kashmir away from the public glaze. William Milam, the former US Ambassador to Pakistan, identified India and Kashmir as one of the issues, which the Obama administration would focus on while trying to find a solution to Pakistan. 'There is one more thing and it is a very delicate thing that I think this administration will focus on. But it will be hard to determine this focus because it will be quite closely held and under wraps. And that is the India-centricity of Pakistan,' said Milam, who was in Islamabad from 1998 to 2001.'Everything that Pakistan does, at least in foreign affairs and security issues, is viewed through the lens of India, which it views as its eternally hostile neighbour,' Milam said, adding that the US cannot do much at least on the issue of Kashmir due to India's position on it.' There is no good way we can do this. We certainly cannot be seen to meddle or to even mediate on the issues, particularly the Kashmir issue. But we really have to work on putting this back together,' Milam said testifying before the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.[xii]
[i] ) Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. “Accession of Kashmir to India” (p. 1), 30 January 1950.
[ii] ) Ernest Gross, Representative of the United States to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 537th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.537, para. 30), 21 March 1951.
[iii] ) Adlai Stevenson, Representative of the United States to the United Nations. Verbatim Record of the 1012th Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.1012, para. 10), 15 June 1962.
[iv]) http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15032001/Art14.htm /U.S. Intentions in Kashmir/By M. Ahmad Kazmi)
[v] ) .( Author interviews, Srinagar, Kashmir, September 2006., Order Code RL33529,India-U.S. Relations,Updated June 26, 2007,K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs ,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)
[vi] ) [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].
[vii] ) See Pakistan Foreign Ministry Press Release No. 81/2007 at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/-Press_Releases/2007/March/PR_81_07.htm
[viii])(Order Code RL33498,Pakistan-U.S. Relations,Updated June 6, 2007,K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)
[ix] ) (Pakistan-U.S. Relations/Updated June 6, 2007/K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, prepared for members of committees of congress USA)
[x] ) (India -U.S. Relations/Updated June 6, 2007/K. Alan Kronstadt,Specialist in Asian Affairs,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, prepared for members of committees of congress USA)
[xi] ) ( App,25th November,2009)
[xii] ) 18 March 2009,The Nation)
No comments:
Post a Comment